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Abstract 
The aim of the dissertation is to propose a new theory of collective responsibility 
that will be able to determine individual responsibility for collective harms from small 
collectives to large, unstructured collectives Theories of collective responsibility seek to 
address the harms that are caused when agents work collectively, and then to determine 
where responsibility will he in such cases In the dissertation I show that these theories 
cannot address large, unstructured harms while being reducible to the individual The key 
case for this dissertation is climate change, and I propose a theory of collective 
responsibility that will both identify this as a collective harm and determine individual 
moral responsibility 
Many scholars have written on collective responsibility I begin the dissertation 
with the question is climate change a collective harm? And if it is, what are the members 
of that collective responsible for? Examining key theories of collective responsibility 
including Margaret Gilbert's "plural subject" and Christopher Kutz's "participatory 
intentions" I argue that to defend an individualist account that can address collective 
harms a shift in procedure is required I propose a theory that first determines 
membership in a collective, then assesses the moral responsibility of those members, and 
finally distributes responsibility in a just manner By applying my theory to the case of 
climate change I am able to identify the collective that is causing the harm, identify who 
are the responsible members, and distribute moral responsibility 
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Introduction 
I. The Problem 
In 1984 there was a gas leak of methyl isocyanate from the Union Carbide India 
Limited pesticide plant in Bhopal which exposed approximately half a million people to 
deadly gas and resulted in the world's largest industrial catastrophe In 1994 there was 
genocide in Rwanda that included the mass murder of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 
people These are harms that were not the result of one person acting harmfully, and they 
were not a mere collection of different individuals acting harmfully These were 
collective actions By working together agents were able to create a harm far greater than 
any could have alone While collective harms may be easy to identify, the question we are 
left with is when we act together to cause a harm what am I responsible for9 
This dissertation is an investigation of the responsibility of individuals who are 
part of harm-causing collectives ' The relationship between the individual and the 
collective is complex and needs further exploration With the conclusion of World War II 
began a discussion both within academia and without as to whether the Holocaust was the 
responsibility of a few, or of a collective of either Nazis or Germans as a whole The 
Holocaust is a candidate for collective action because it possesses the following 
characteristics it was perpetrated by a group and the harm was more than the sum of the 
individual actions of its members The Holocaust was initiated by the commands of Hitler 
and was perpetrated by the members of the Nazi party - both those who directly harmed 
others, and those who facilitated such actions Although the Holocaust may have been 
perpetrated by a group, one might argue that as the leader Hitler bears full responsibility 
1 1 will be defining the "collective" later in my dissertation Some examples would be 
couples, teams, companies, nations, or car drivers 
1 
However, if that were the case then the claim that a person was only following orders 
would have excused them from prosecution at the Nuremberg trials The failure of this 
excuse points to the agency of all those in the harm causing collective, and characterizes 
this as a group act, if perhaps one where different members bear different degrees of 
moral responsibility 
Although discussion of the Holocaust may have begun the recent debates 
regarding the possibility of collective responsibility, it is not the only candidate for such 
analysis In our globalised world there have been, and are occurring, many genocides that 
have staking similarities to the Holocaust and raise similar questions of responsibility 
But it is not just deliberate violent action which may be collective, but also less directed 
harms Larry May makes the argument that social systemic harms such as racism are the 
responsibility of a collective In our world where climate change is part of nearly every 
international or political discussion, this also appears to be a candidate for collective 
responsibility Climate change is not caused by the actions of one agent, but rather is 
caused by the actions of millions or even billions of people And climate change has its 
victims, climate refugees, who must flee their homes or nations because of rising sea 
levels, desertification or other effects of climate change 
Some writers argue against the concept of collective responsibility H D Lewis 
claims that collective responsibility makes agents responsible for the acts of each other 
He argues, " it would be very strange to ascribe it [moral value] to features of our 
conduct that we do not fully understand and bring within our control "2 D E Cooper 
claims that collective responsibility can provide a descnption of certain harms, however, 
he argues that a collective may hold responsibility for a harm without it being the case 
2
 Lewis (1948) 21 
2 
that any of its members have fallen below what is expected of them 3 Jan Narveson 
complains that collective responsibility is a dangerous device that mistreats the 
individual4 
Despite these arguments against collective responsibility, and the concern that it 
will blame agents for what they cannot control, there is something compelling about 
accounts of collective responsibility A collective is able to produce a harm that is more 
than the sum of the individual actions of its members, and can thus affect more victims 
than individual actions can or do An account of collective responsibility provides an 
explanation that an individual account of responsibility cannot It could be argued that 
for the purpose of understanding harm that is perpetrated by many individuals we could 
use collective responsibility as a type of short form which would indicate the number of 
people involved, but not suggest the existence of a different kind of action This approach 
would acknowledge the unusual circumstances that the actions of many individuals cause, 
without further naming these individuals a "collective" or determining responsibility We 
could argue that systemic social harms, such as racism, can only occur if they are 
performed by the collective, through repetition of certain acts and embedding certain 
values This account may be merely descnptive, and does not seek to hold agents 
responsible for the problems illuminated However, if we are to admit to the plausibility 
of collective responsibility even as a descnptive device, this leads to the question of what 
we mean by responsibility To hold a collective responsible, yet no agents individually 
responsible, it appears that these harms belong to no perpetrators Only a conceptual 
construct is held responsible If no people can be held accountable, then these collective 
3
 Cooper (1968) 44 
4
 Narveson (2002) 179 
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harms appear to be no different than it raining when we want to have a picnic, or a 
tornado touching down on my land rather than yours, mere blameless acts of nature 
Thus, coming up with an account of individual responsibility for collective harms is an 
important part of understanding what it means for a harmful action to be collective, for 
such an account must acknowledge that a collective harm is more than the sum of the 
actions of its members but remains the responsibility of those members 
A successful account of collective responsibility will need to assess the full cost of 
the harm and identify the responsible members of the collective It will then have to 
determine responsibility without simply dividing the harm among those m the harm-
causing collective, because in large groups where the harms are often over-determined 
(the harm is caused by the actions of many, yet the actions of any one individual make no 
difference to the harm), the piece allotted to each member would be negligible, and the 
result would be the same It will have to apply to groups both big and small, structured 
and unstructured while sustaining similarities to accounts of individual responsibility It 
will be the analysis of what a collective harm is that will allow an understanding of 
individual responsibility to emerge that will satisfy these criteria 
II. Methodology 
In this dissertation I will defend an account of individual responsibility for 
collective harms that will cover all types and sizes of collectives Due to the scope of this 
project, I will be focussing on the theory of collective responsibility, and not on analysmg 
many specific instances of collective harm A theory that can address the case of climate 
change is currently absent from the literature, and so I will focus on this one case to test 
out the efficacy of my theory The theory that I will defend will include a definition of 
membership m collectives, causal and epistemological conditions for responsibility, and a 
theory of reducibihty in order to determine individual responsibility for collective harms 
A successful account of collective responsibility must find a way to answer these 
concerns, including those of Lewis, Cooper and Narveson mentioned above The account 
must determine individual responsibility for a collective harm without making individuals 
responsible for the actions of another, or for that which is completely beyond their 
control The latter is particularly difficult since collective acts, by their very nature, are 
not achievable by individuals on their own Further, the account must not hold agents 
responsible for what they could not know An account that claims that Jane is responsible 
for the collateral deaths that occurred during an American military black-ops mission 
because she is an American (part of that collective) is not plausible Although it may be 
possible to link all people, however tenuously, to all harms that occur through strings of 
association, to do so will not provide an adequate account of responsibility 
Other waters including Margaret Gilbert, Christopher Kutz and Michael 
McKenna link members to the collective by starting from small structured groups and 
then expanding the theory to cover much larger and less structured groups Gilbert and 
Kutz both claim that their theories capture the nature of these larger groups, whereas 
McKenna claims that his theory only works m highly organised collectives both large and 
small When these accounts move from the small to the large, from the highly organised 
to the less structured, the link to the collective becomes much less plausible, and there 
seems little reason to distinguish between a collective such as a nation, and a collective 
such as Westerners (or Easterners) I argue that this move fails to capture the nature of 
responsibility in large groups 
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I argue that a successful account of collective responsibility needs to be able both 
to determine the individual responsibility of its members, and to cover all collectives, 
from two members, to corporations, to nations and groups of all sizes 
IV. Structure of Dissertation 
Here is a roadmap for this dissertation In general I begin with an examination of 
accounts of collective responsibility from the literature, and then move on to discuss each 
of the important elements of collective responsibility, from individual conditions for 
responsibility, to arguments for and against a reducible account I present a case study in 
the second chapter, on climate change, which provides a problem for most theories of 
collective responsibility, and I solve these problems by applying my theory of collective 
responsibility in the conclusion 
In Chapter 1 Collective Responsibility I examine two theories of collective 
responsibility, one from Margaret Gilbert and one from Christopher Kutz Both of these 
theorists offer compelling accounts of collective responsibility that have played an 
important role in the larger debate Gilbert argues that collectives are a kind of "plural 
subject" which describes how multiple agents perform a joint action Kutz argues that 
agents can be connected to collective actions through their "participatory intentions" or 
their intention to do their part of a collective act In both these cases the theorists are 
moving to collectivize the conditions for individual moral responsibility in order to 
account for collective responsibility I argue that this move is problematic, and it leaves 
one kind of collective, a large, unstructured collective, as outside the purview of 
collective responsibility I examine the problem of large unstructured collectives in 
Chapter 2 Unstructured Collective Harms where I examine the case of climate change In 
6 
this chapter I look at climate change as a harm that is being caused by a collective which 
includes all the members of the global population who may be said to be either supporting 
a culture of excessive carbon emissions or causally contributing to this harm I examine a 
number of alternatives to collective responsibility to determine responsibility for 
environmental harms, but do not find a successful alternative theory Climate change is a 
very complex harm, the causes are not completely understood, and it is over-determined 
However, it is not a mere "act of nature" and so I conclude that we need to be able to 
understand responsibility in this case 
In Chapter 3 Individual Moral Responsibility and the Control Condition, and 
Chapter 4 The Problem of Knowledge I examine traditional theories of individual moral 
responsibility, focusing on the conditions often required for agents to be responsible - the 
causal condition and the epistemic condition In these chapters I examine the accounts for 
individual moral responsibility and argue for what they can, and cannot, account for in 
cases of collective harms I argue that the conditions for individual moral responsibility 
are compelling, and if an account of collective responsibility can apply the same 
conditions this would be beneficial However, as I argued in Chapter 1, it cannot be the 
case that we simply collectivise the conditions in the case of collective harms When I 
examine the control condition I include a critique from H D Lewis that requires that an 
account of collective responsibility be reducible to different degrees for different 
members of the collective, and that agents are not held responsible for the actions of 
others 
In Chapter 5 Reductive Collective Responsibility I turn to a central question in 
the discussion of collective responsibility - if collectives can be responsible, does this 
mean that individual agents who are members are responsible? Non-reductive theories 
7 
posit that this cannot be the case, and I examine this side of the debate looking at Gilbert, 
D E Cooper and Virginia Held Reductionist theories claim that collective responsibility 
can be reduced to the individual in a way that the individual will be responsible for 
something I look at defenders of this view including Kutz, R S Downie and Jan 
Narveson To further examine the case of reductive collective responsibility I look at how 
a few theorists have proposed we reduce to the individual, examining the methods of 
Howard McGary, Robin Gildert, and Tracy Isaacs At the end of the chapter I argue that 
reductive accounts are more plausible, and leave outlining my own theory of reduction for 
the next chapter 
In Chapter 6 A New Theory of Collective Responsibility I propose my definition 
of membership in a collective, and then connect this condition to two conditions for 
responsibility, a causal and epistemic condition I argue that first agents must meet the 
condition of membership, and then if they meet this condition, they are eligible for 
responsibility if they also meet the causal and epistemic conditions If they meet the first 
condition, for membership, but fail to meet the two conditions for responsibility then they 
will be members, but not responsible After determining who the responsible agents in a 
collective are, I turn to my theory of reduction Here I am not proposing a straight 
reduction from collective to individual When determining individual attributions of 
responsibility we look at all the responsible members, but no longer take into 
consideration the actions/attitudes that landed them in the position as responsible 
members Now the focus is on the role the agents have in the collective Agents with a 
more powerful role (to affect change), and who had the greatest perspective (to see the 
entirety of the collective action) will bear the most responsibility These members are 
called the "Order Givers" Under the Order Givers will be a class of agents who work for 
8 
the Order Givers and have somewhat less power and perspective, and these will be called 
the "Order Followers " Lastly, there will be members of the collective with very little 
power, and almost no perspective, and these will be called the "Supporters" This account 
can apply to all collectives, and so the distinction between collectives is no longer 
important 
In the Conclusion Climate Change and Collective Responsibility I return to the 
problem case of climate change from Chapter 2, and I apply my theory of collective 
responsibility from Chapter 6 Under my account we can identify the collective that lS 
responsible for the harm, which agents are responsible for the harm, and to what degree 
they are responsible 
9 
Chapter 1: Collective Responsibility 
1.1 Introduction 
We painted the house together The hockey team lost the match The US waged an 
undeclared war in Vietnam In each of these cases if we look at individuals in isolation 
then the act as a whole is not explained satisfactorily We may say that Sue painted the 
north facing wall or that she missed an easy goal The painted house or losing the hockey 
game may occur because of these individual acts, yet causally, each member is only 
connected and responsible for actions that cannot alone achieve these ends One painted 
wall is not the same as a painted house In these cases where a collective performs an 
action, the individual members may each perform a different act or have a different 
intention Sue's action is that she painted the north facing wall, while Bob's was to brace 
the ladder for Sue Together these two actions are integral components of "painting the 
house" In traditional accounts of individual moral responsibility agents need to cause the 
act in question and either intend the outcome or be able to reasonably foresee it Bob 
causes the ladder to be secure, he intends to keep Sue safe Bob's connection to the larger 
collective act of "painting the house" is that he performs one of the many needed acts, 
and does so with the intention of assisting the overall goal Under traditional accounts 
Bob would only be responsible for holding the ladder for Sue This leaves the "collective 
of house painters", but no individual agents, responsible for painting the house 
In the philosophical literature on responsibility many have written on collective 
responsibility, some providing theoretical backing for the concept while others aim to 
disprove its possibility In this dissertation I will be assuming that collective 
responsibility is possible, and therefore not arguing for collective responsibility, but 
10 
rather exploring what happens when we apply the concept5 Those who have written m 
favour of the theory have proposed a number of different methods to understand 
responsibility m this new and challenging context This chapter examines the theories 
proposed by Margaret Gilbert and Christopher Kutz 6 Each of these theories grapples with 
the problem of moving from a traditional account of individual responsibility (which I 
will discuss in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4) to the complicated case of many 
individuals in a collective Often these theories begin with responsibility in a two person 
group, and then expand the theory to cover much larger groups These theories achieve 
collective responsibility by collectivising the conditions for individual moral 
responsibility - instead of responsibility being attributed to the one person who acts, we 
now have a group that acts, instead of the knowledge and intention of a single agent, we 
have collective agency and intention Although there are many benefits to this move, I 
argue that by collectivising these conditions these accounts limit which collectives they 
can apply to, and, more importantly, cannot apply to large, unstructured collective harms 
As I will examine in Chapter 2 this will leave harms such as climate change outside of the 
realm of collective responsibility and thus, potentially, in a place where no one bears any 
responsibility 
5
 There is disagreement m the literature on whether collective responsibility as a notion is 
plausible Jan Narveson, for example, argues against collective responsibility 
I am focusing on Margaret Gilbert and Christopher Kutz's accounts of collective 
responsibility because they are the most thorough and most frequently referenced in the 
literature Their accounts are also relevantly similar to most other accounts that support 
collective responsibility 
11 
1.2 Collectives 
I will first define "collective" In the literature on collective responsibility one of 
the only agreed upon definitions for a "collective" is that it must contain more than one 
individual However, this term is quite complex, and the answer to, "what is a 
collective?" can determine much of what happens in any account of collective 
responsibility In the literature there are three basic kinds of collectives, which I will 
describe below 
The first definition is fairly structured, and is the most common in the literature 
Used by philosophers such as Margaret Gilbert and Christopher Kutz, this model is 
intuitively appealing as it focuses on those groups which are most like individual agents 
Gilbert claims that collectives and aggregates are the two species of population She 
offers a list, instead of a definition, which includes, " couples, families, workgroups, 
platoons, sports teams, street gangs, terrorist cells " etc 7 A collective appears to 
encompass a group of two going for a walk together as well as a nation What 
differentiates these groups from mere aggregates is that they constitute a "plural subject", 
a concept I will discuss m detail below In a similar vein, Kutz claims that a collective 
action is the product of individuals who, " orient themselves around a joint project " 8 
The more structured a group, the more it will follow the same rules that apply when 
determining individual moral responsibility 
Michael McKenna (2006) introduces useful categories of collectives He 
distinguishes between collectives that are randomly organised, arising out of the 
particulars of the situation, and randomly disorganised such as being born into a certain 
7
 Gilbert (2006) 95 
8
 Kutz (2000) 67 
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ethnicity The simple collectives are organised around a particular goal or goals, such as 
going for a walk together, and complex collectives (e g Corporations) are organised 
around particular institutionally codified procedures and have a hierarchy 9 McKenna 
goes on to restrict his own discussion to simple collectives and corporations Looking at 
these groups in light of Gilbert and Kutz it is quite plausible to suppose that they would 
endorse this distinction 
A second kind of collective is one that lacks this degree of organization and 
hierarchy Virginia Held, Stanley Bates and David Copp10 write about possible 
responsibility to be attributed to random collections of individuals This includes 
situations of "mob behaviour" as well as the often discussed case of the murder of Kitty 
Genovese On March 27, 1964 Martin Gansberg wrote an article about the murder in the 
New York Times He described the event in this way 
For more than half an hour 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens 
watched a killer stalk and stab a woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens 
Twice their chatter and the sudden glow of their bedroom lights interrupted 
him and frightened him off Each time he returned, sought her out, and stabbed her 
again Not one person telephoned the police during the assault, one witness called 
after the woman was dead ' l 
While stopping the murder of Kitty Genovese would not necessarily require a collective 
effort, the 38 people who knew what was happening, and did nothing, could be said to be 
collectively at fault for failing to act Copp is concerned with groups, like these 38 
bystanders, that lack a formal decision making apparatus, but are sometimes capable of 
acting together While only one person needed to call the police, by acting together the 38 
people, or some subset thereof, could likely have saved Kitty Genovese by challenging 
9
 McKenna (2006) 17-18 
10
 Copp (1998), Held (1970), Bates (1971) 
11
 Gansberg (1964) "Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder Didn't Call Police " 
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the murderer, without risking harm to themselves Copp claims that the many problems 
afflicting the world today, world hunger and homelessness for example, require collective 
solutions Individuals cannot solve these problems With this in mind, Copp claims a 
person can be blamed for failing to do what would be necessary to bring about a 
cooperative or collective solution 12 Along a similar vein, Held argues that we cannot 
blame individuals for not forming into collectives to solve these problems, but we can 
hold the collective responsible Held argues that if a reasonable person would see the 
action as called for, and a positive outcome is expected, then failure to act is 
blameworthy However, the individuals are only blameworthy for failing to form into a 
group that could have acted, and none of the individuals are responsible for not taking the 
action that the collective should have taken 13 In both these cases the individuals in 
question are not a collective, but rather in order to avoid blame they will have to form into 
an organized collective and then perform the action needed Returning to McKenna's 
analysis, while these groups may begin as randomly organised, they very well may turn 
into a simple collective once action begins or is required 
The third type of collective appears in the accounts of Tracy Isaacs and Trudy 
Govier Isaacs and Govier do not begin with considerations of organization or hierarchy, 
but rather write about collective responsibility for atrocities such as genocide Isaacs 
argues that by rethinking the description of individual acts in the context of genocide, by 
renaming them as "contributions to genocide" this captures those involved in the act14 
Under certain interpretations of this theory, acts such as a single murder could be 
classified as a "contribution to genocide" but also less obvious actions such as inciting 
12
 Copp (1998) 233 
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 Held (1970) 94 
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 Isaacs (2005) 172 
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violence, or failing to take appropriate and reasonable precautions Govier distinguishes 
between different levels of perpetrators and victims, and connects those on the outskirts 
of an actual harm to the harm under the idea that they, " share the intention of the group 
engaged in violence and make causal contributions to its efforts "15 Govier would 
therefore argue that withm a society that perpetrated genocide, all agents, even if not 
directly involved, are complicit Under this framework it is not necessary to see oneself as 
part of a group, for the nature of the act itself creates the group In the case of the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda it has been argued that the international community not only created 
the conditions for the genocide (specifically Belgian colonists) but also are responsible 
because of a failure to act when genocide was imminent and occurring Under these 
accounts one could claim widespread global culpability for a failure to stop atrocities The 
endorsement of inaction and the failure to act would be the connection to the harm which 
creates the group Although there may be some reasons to proceed in such a direction, 
such global responsibility threatens to dilute the impact of being responsible, and to 
decrease the responsibility of those who actually intentionally participated Responsibility 
that falls on all may be too mild when it comes to atrocities such as genocide Isaacs' and 
Govier's accounts may fall under McKenna's randomly disorganised or randomly 
organised collectives 
It is important to acknowledge the different kinds of collectives that are at issue in 
any account of collective responsibility, and to identify which collectives are most often 
and most easily included in accounts of collective responsibility Most theories, as 
15Govier (2005) 5 
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 In the documentary on the Rwandan genocide, Shake Hands with the Devil (2007) the 
film ends with a list of those who should be (according to the documentary) be held 
responsible The list includes the international community, and does not include 
Rwandans 
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discussed above, do not seek to include large unstructured collectives In order to exclude 
such groups there needs to be an argument that shows the difference between large, 
unstructured groups and the other types of collectives For now I am simply pointing to 
the unexplained exclusion, and will return to this topic in Chapter 2 
For the purposes of clarification I will analyse collectives along the following 
lines There are two important characteristics of a collective, its size and structure A 
small structured group would consist of only a few people, and have a clear mandate, 
such as two people painting a house together, or a ten person committee proposing a new 
city project In these collectives the members each know of each other's existence, they 
know what they are involved in, and they know of their responsibility for collective acts 
A large, structured group can consist of many individuals, but they are organised under a 
specific set of tasks or objectives An example would be a corporation A multinational 
corporation might employ millions, yet there is a company code, a hierarchy, and shared 
aims and goals of the employees In this situation they might not know the identity of all 
the members of the group, but they know how to identify who is a member Most 
importantly, there is clear decision making procedure The description of small or large 
when applied to collectives cannot be exact There is no magic number of participants 
that pushes a small collective to become a large one Rather, in a small collective the 
members know of one another, and in a large collective they do not Further, the fact that 
members do not know each other m a large collective is due not to mysterious 
membership conditions, but simply to the size The department of philosophy at Wilfrid 
Launer University is a small collective where the members all know one another, the 
university is a large collective where membership qualifications (employment) is clear, 
but no member of the collective knows all other members The terms small and large are 
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conceptual and not exact calculations of membership numbers Both of the structured 
groups are those most often and most easily dealt with in the literature on collective 
responsibility because it is easy to understand how the collective acts as one 
The case becomes more complex when discussing unstructured collectives In this 
case there may be no decision-making procedure, no obvious method for the collective to 
act, and members may not know who else is in the collective, and may not even know 
that they are in it However, if we view the collective from the outside, especially in light 
of any actions of the collective, the collective nature of the group may be easier to see A 
small unstructured collective may consist of a few strangers who stop to help someone 
who has fallen on the winter ice They have no formal decision making structure, yet they 
act in concert to aid someone These types of collectives may not be that difficult to deal 
with In these situations, as the collective acts the members become apparent, and it is 
easy for a leader and/or a decision making structure to emerge 
A large, unstructured collective will cover all the cases not touched on thus far 
Throughout this dissertation I will be returning to the issue of providing a definition for 
large unstructured collectives To fully understand the role of such collectives a definition 
is needed However, at this point it could include cases such as those responsible for 
genocide, the creation and support of systemic social inequalities such as racism or 
sexism, or some environmental harms as will be discussed m Chapter 2 Each of these 
acts is only possible because of the actions of many individual agents Genocide is the 
concerted actions of many, otherwise we label it "mass murder" Larry May makes a 
similar claim when he argues that the involvement or approval of the state in harmful acts 
means such acts are systemic rather than random May is arguing for the elevation of such 
harms to an international level, but his analysis is of use here He argues 
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If rapes are part of a State-sponsored plan to eliminate an ethnic group within that 
State's borders, or as a State-accepted way for some individuals to intimidate a sub-
group of women in a given community, then that individual crime rises to the level 
of an international crime because of its systematic and invidious nature 1? 
May goes on to characterise such harms as identifiable because they are systemic, and 
because they, " assault people for reasons not based on their individual 
1 R 
characteristics " May has distinguished genocide from being merely a collection of 
individual harms, be it killing or rape While genocide is typically considered a state 
action (and therefore the action of a semi-structured collective - see below) this analysis 
is useful when looking at large, unstructured collectives In the same way that genocide 
cannot be perpetrated by a single agent, a harm such as climate change cannot either It 
would be highly difficult, if not impossible, for one person to cause climate change Often 
in cases of large unstructured collective acts individuals will not see themselves as 
members, and will not understand how they are contributing to a larger act Here the 
distinction between acts which are random and those that are systematic will be 
important Large, unstructured collectives will be the most difficult group to identify, yet, 
as I will explore m Chapter 2, they can also cause the greatest harm 
There is one additional type of collective that bears mentioning The semi-
structured collective would include groups such as nations These are semi-structured 
because nations do have decision making procedures in place, there is a hierarchy, and 
citizens do, in a sense, create the actions of the collective 19 However, there are many 
ways in which the citizens in most countries, because of the nature and the size of the 
collective, have very little say in the actions of its leaders, and yet do, m a sense, retain 
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power to collectively stop or alter that behaviour There are similarities in this group with 
both structured and unstructured groups, and it may depend on the action in question as to 
which classification it more closely resembles 
The descriptions of collectives that I have provided illustrate the variety of 
situations theories of collective responsibility seek to address Many theories, as I will 
explore, cannot account for all types of collectives The most common move in the 
literature is to address the most structured collectives, and either propose a different 
theory for unstructured collectives, or exclude them altogether I will argue that while not 
all situations are appropriate for collective responsibility, accounts of collective 
responsibility can, and should, address all the collectives descnbed here Next I will move 
on to discuss the details of two accounts of collective responsibility, that from Margaret 
Gilbert and Christopher Kutz Gilbert and Kutz's theories both address collective 
responsibility, but they do so by making different claims about the nature of 
responsibility, and the role of the individual in the collective 
1.3 Margaret Gilbert 
1.3.1 The Plural Subject 
In 1989 Margaret Gilbert introduced her theory of the "plural subject", a concept 
that describes collective intention and action, and would go on to play a large role in her 
published work for the next two decades Gilbert examines the nature of social groups by 
looking at the pivotal case of two people doing an action together - her most famous 
example being two people going for a walk together Gilbert does not intend to use this 
theory for the purposes of collective responsibility for many years (until 2006) However 
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other wnters, including Chnstopher Kutz (2000), have included consideration of Gilbert's 
plural subject in their own accounts of collective responsibility 
Gilbert examines the case of two individuals and what would need to be the case 
if we were to say that they were going for a walk together Gilbert claims that to be going 
for a walk together it must be "common knowledge" between both parties that each has 
this goal Otherwise, it is possible that one of the two in fact wishes the other would go 
away, or perhaps, one is stalking the other In order for it to be a joint action, they must 
have common knowledge that they share this goal Although this qualification initially 
appears quite ngorous, Gilbert softens the requirement by allowing that in some cases this 
common knowledge can occur quite easily, perhaps in this case by merely continuing to 
walk alongside each other for a certain length of time 20 Thus, for Gilbert the act of 
walking together (which is necessanly collective) occurs when both parties are acting 
(walking) and have the same relevant set of intentions, including an intention to 
participate in the collective act Once this is a joint action Gilbert claims they constitute 
the plural subject of the goal It is an instance of the parties willingly pooling their wills 
together to achieve something collective 
Gilbert's plural subject easily descnbes small and structured collectives In a 
structured collective the members of the collective each know of the common goal of the 
collective In the case of painting the house, both Sue and Bob know of the goal of 
painting the house (in fact, you could argue, without this common knowledge, their 
actions make little sense ) This will also hold, similarly, for large structured collectives 
The employees of Company X each know of the goal of the company, whether it is 
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maximizing profits, meeting a deadline, or some other goal The success of the company 
will depend, in part, on the employees working together on a project The only issue may 
be that in these collectives the identity conditions, but not the identity, of the members is 
known For example, members of Company X know that membership is defined as 
employment, however no one employee knows the identity of all other employees 
However, since the goal and intention to participate in the collective endeavour is known 
by all, this is not a concern In the case of the small unstructured collective of the 
pedestrians who stop to help someone who has fallen, again the goal of their activities -
helping the fallen person - is clear to all, and organizes their activity accordingly The 
question arises, what happens in the case of semi-structured and large, unstructured 
collectives'? 
1.3.2 Obligations in Semi-Structured Collectives 
In 2006 Gilbert developed an account of political obligation that was based upon 
her theory of the plural subject As mentioned earlier, states are an example of a semi-
structured collective States are their own unique collective because they have a hierarchy 
and decision making procedure, one that is intended to reflect the wishes and needs of all 
However, the size of states often excludes participation of all in decisions about the 
actions of the state Further, unlike the case of Company X, membership in a country is 
often static, as citizens are often born members, and such identification is not easily 
changed Gilbert's discussion of political obligation is of interest because it aims to 
determine obligations that arise for members of states via their membership, and 
considers these in a collective context If Gilbert's theory adequately describes the semi-
structured collective and resulting obligations for members, this theory may shine light on 
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the possibility for a similar approach to large, unstructured collectives Before 
proceeding, it must be noted that in this argument Gilbert is concerned with showing that 
citizens have obligations to their states, not that states, as a kind of collective, have 
obligations regarding other states Gilbert is looking to prove there are political 
obligations for all citizens in relation to their country and political institutions This 
relates to my discussion of collective harms in two ways first, Gilbert is using a theory of 
collective action and obligation to tie together all the members of a state, and the method 
she uses to do so is worth discussing when speaking of collective actions Second, 
Gilbert's theory could determine responsibility for members of a state who have 
supported problematic or harmful national practices, for example sexism or racism 
Gilbert argues that political societies are a kind of social group She provides the 
following definition 
A and B (and ) (or those with feature F) constitute a. plural subject (by 
definition) if and only if they are jointly committed to doing something as a body— 
in a broad sense of 'do' 22 
Joint commitments are central in this case, and indicate that the parties involved in the 
group have jointly committed to X as a body 23 Forming a joint commitment requires that 
the parties' expressive behaviour is an expression of readiness for joint commitment, and 
that this relevant expressive behaviour is common knowledge among the parties 24 While 
this is described as the members of the group accepting, intending, or believing such-and-
such once again Gilbert softens the conditions that at first appear nearly impossible for 
citizens of a nation to collectively meet What it means for something to be common 
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knowledge for Gilbert is not clear, and the definition of this term will greatly affect the 
ability of agents to be responsible Gilbert provides the example of a joint commitment to 
believe that democracy is the best form of government 
The constitution of a single body with the belief in question will be achieved by a 
suitable concordance of the several actions and expressions of the individual 
parties Suppose there is a community in which the members are jointly committed 
in this way When they encounter one another, they will conform to their 
commitment by saying things that imply that democracy is the best form of 
government and avoiding saying things that imply the opposite To all intents and 
purposes, they will function as would the several 'mouths' of a single body with the 
belief in question 
In the above example the joint commitment is easy, and is one that occurs in most, if not 
all, democracies Further, Gilbert claims that a joint commitment can be developed 
through simple repeated practice Thus, returning to the example of two people going for 
a walk together, the fact that they go for that walk every night at 5pm can create a joint 
commitment to do so, without any actual discussion on the topic 27 Under this descnption 
common knowledge is easily accessible 
This joint commitment allows the citizens of a nation to be viewed as a plural 
subject, which means that citizens have the same relationship to one another as do Sue 
and Bob when they go for a walk together Gilbert argues that members of a political 
98 
society are obligated to uphold its political institutions This, in turn, leads to owing 
your conformity to the other parties, and the result that the other parties may feel betrayed 
if you fail to conform 29 This obligation is restricted to actions that were part of the 
agreement between those m the collective, most importantly, the obligation to uphold 
political institutions 
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As Gilbert moves her account of the plural subject from small and often highly 
structured groups to the semi-structured nation, there are a few questions that must be 
answered One big challenge in such a large group (one that will be more difficult in the 
case of large, unstructured collectives) is that of the impersonality and anonymity of the 
members When Sue and Bob paint a house together, they each know each other, and 
during the process, they interact Here I do not intend to imply that Sue and Bob are 
personally close, but rather by working in a team of two they have learnt things about the 
other person, and come to know a lot about them as a team member If we argue that large 
groups act together and form plural subjects, it is going to be the case that most of the 
members do not know each other When the group is large enough, such as in the case of 
most nations, it will not be possible to know each other While repeated practice of 
defending democracy, for example, can be seen as the relevant behaviour, can agreement 
be common knowledge9 Can such a group constitute a plural subject? 
Gilbert answers yes, if certain conditions are met She says such a group can 
constitute a plural subject if one can describe, 
at least one process by means of which there can be common knowledge in the 
population that the members of the population have expressed their readiness to be 
jointly committed in some way30 
The common knowledge condition changes for Gilbert when the collective grows from 
two people going for a walk together to a nation "Common knowledge" becomes, 
"Population Common Knowledge" "Common knowledge" is common knowledge 
between particular people, for example between Sue and Bob, or between you and me 
"Population common knowledge", on the other hand, is, " common knowledge between 
people considered by those involved as members of a population individuated by means 
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of a certain general description " For example, those who live east of the mountain know 
that those who live east of the mountain speak Spanish Population common knowledge is 
completely out in the open among that specified population 31 
It is difficult to analyse "population common knowledge" What does it mean for 
it to be open among a specified population9 While the language of a particular locale 
would be known by those who live there (it would have to be m order for there to be any 
interaction at all), what about information that is not necessary to live9 While the fact that 
Canada is a democracy is population common knowledge among Canadians, are the facts 
of Canadian history9 What about systemic social harms9 Further, the method of 
disseminating such knowledge is unclear Should the media be involved9 What about 
formal education9 In what way are we to measure knowledge being available and 
"completely out in the open" when it comes to millions of people9 I will return to the 
issue of knowledge in Chapters 4 and 6, and leave these as open questions for now I find 
population common knowledge an interesting concept, but it requires further clarification 
When Gilbert moves from "common knowledge" between you and I, to 
"population common knowledge" as knowledge completely out in the open to those in a 
specified population, she appears to be changing her theory as the collective grows in 
size If there is such an ad hoc change in theory then it will require defence Otherwise, it 
appears as if Gilbert assumes collective responsibility for certain collectives, and creates a 
theory to address these cases, instead of being driven by the rationality of the argument 
itself Despite appearances, although Gilbert's terms change, the theory does not 
Depending on the answers to the questions in the above paragraph, it could be argued that 
common knowledge and population common knowledge are simply a weak and strong 
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version of the knowledge component of collective responsibility Population common 
knowledge is the same as common knowledge between you and me, because the relevant 
population is you and I Since Gilbert has already weakened the common knowledge 
condition between two people to the extent where merely repeating an action is sufficient, 
the only difference between common knowledge and population common knowledge is 
connected directly to the numbers involved If this is true, then it may have implications 
for collective responsibility If the stronger version which can be used on smaller and 
more structured groups is preferable, this raises questions as to the plausibility for 
responsibility at all for larger, less structured collectives 
What happens when citizens, through repeated actions, cause a foreseen, 
collective harmful result? This question moves away from Gilbert's concern regarding 
political obligations of citizens to looking at citizens as a collective that can potentially 
bear responsibility Consider racism Most Western democracies identify racism as an 
unwanted occurrence within society Systemic, nationwide racism is caused by many 
unconnected and repeated racist acts by individuals If we were to examine this situation 
under Gilbert's theory of the plural subject as first developed for two people, the 
collective of citizens may not pass as a collective that can bear responsibility Systemic 
racism can exist without many or even most citizens of a nation intending to create such a 
situation Once a racist environment has persisted for a few generations, race-based 
inequalities can become ingrained, and even those with the best intentions may be 
performing actions that further entrench unequal treatment If we are to examine this 
situation under Gilbert's weaker, or softened, version of the plural subject the repeated 
actions that promote racism, connected to the fact that the causes and harmfulness of 
racism are population common knowledge, make this look like the blameworthy action of 
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a plural subject If this account does not seem plausible, what may be lacking is the 
connection between the repeated behaviour and the acceptance that it is indeed the 
repeated actions of all that are causing the problem However, not seeing oneself as 
comphcit may be a personal moral failure, and not a failure of the theory itself 
Before considering this matter closed and claiming that Gilbert can account for 
collective responsibility in large semi-structured collectives, we must return to her 
stronger claims about plural subjects Recall, Gilbert said that when two or more parties 
constitute a plural subject it is an instance of the parties pooling their wills together 
While it is true that under the weaker interpretation of Gilbert's plural subject we can 
attnbute responsibility to semi-structured collectives, it is not true that we can do so when 
adhering to the stronger version of her theory While Gilbert does weaken her claims 
about the plural subject for small groups, such as Sue and Bob going for a walk together, 
she would not have to do so in order to claim that they constitute a plural subject 
However, in order to claim that the citizens of a country constitute a plural subject, 
Gilbert would have to appeal to the weaker version of her theory Again, this raises 
questions about the applicability of Gilbert's theory in the case of larger collectives 
1.3.3 Plural Subjects and Different Collectives 
The stronger version of Gilbert's plural subject theory requires that the members 
of the collective know of each other's intentions, and that they all intend the collective 
goal in question If we look at the stronger version of Gilbert's theory then is seems that 
Sue and Bob walking together constitute a plural subject (small, structured collective), the 
employees at Company X working to meet a deadline constitute a plural subject (large, 
structured collective), as do the strangers who stop to help someone who has fallen on the 
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ice (small, unstructured collective) As discussed above it will be hard to make the case 
that members of a semi-structured collective can constitute a plural subject in the stronger 
sense 
The weaker version of Gilbert's plural subject requires the same conditions as the 
stronger version, except that the method to determine common knowledge has changed 
Members do not need to perceive themselves as promoting the particular goal, and they 
do not need to discuss in any way their collective identity Instead repetitive action or 
knowledge that is open to all is considered sufficient when creating a plural subject 
Under the weaker version semi-structured collectives such as nations can be plural 
subjects, as well as large, unstructured collectives such as those who perform genocide, or 
potentially those who contribute to climate change (although this case is far from clear 
and will be examined in the next chapter) In the latter case the members of these 
collectives perform repeated actions that are harmful collectively and the harmful nature 
of their actions are known, in most cases, by all members However, what is clear in the 
case for large unstructured collectives is that the collectives may be enormous Consider 
the example of genocide Under the weak interpretation of the plural subject, the 
collective will consist of not only those committing the murders and those organizing 
them, but also members of the commumty-at-large who could be said to be supportive of 
the genocide, even if this support is nothing more than refusing to sacrifice one's own life 
to fight it (which is often the cost of any action perceived as contrary during genocide) 32 
If genocide occurs in a particular country, it is possible that the collective could include 
other nations as well, if we claim that by failing to stop the genocide they are in fact 
32
 For example, in Germany during WWII members of the White Rose (a secret resistance 
group) composed mainly of students were executed for speaking against the government 
28 
comphcit As I argued above when everyone is responsible for a harm, the responsibility 
becomes diluted Whether this is an avoidable problem when it comes to large, 
unstructured collectives or not is something I will address throughout this dissertation 
It bears repeating that Gilbert is not arguing for the collective responsibility of 
citizens in her account of political obligations, she argues elsewhere33 regarding 
responsibility that results from the actions of plural subjects (or rather, collective actions) 
By being plural subjects collectives can intend and act as one, and thus can bear 
responsibility in much the same way as an individual can Gilbert does not argue that this 
automatically transfers to responsibility of the individual members in these collectives, 
but I will put this issue aside for a moment, and return to it in Chapter 5 For now I will 
consider that a political society is a kind of social group, and as such, according to 
Gilbert, is a plural subject 
When viewing Gilbert's theory in this way, the move to stretch it to include large, 
unstructured collectives may appear uncontroversial If the harm is population common 
knowledge, then it seems the contnbutions of individual behaviour will also be (action or 
inaction) And if this is the case, then the collective, in this loose sense, seems to have 
both an identity, and potentially something to answer for It is unclear if Gilbert would 
want to stretch her theory to cover large, unstructured collectives because she clearly 
distinguishes between populations that are collectives, and those that are aggregates 
When considering global populations, for example "rich people" or, as I will discuss in 
the next chapter, "polluter's" Gilbert calls these aggregates Although she does not 
exclude the possibility for responsibility, she does not discuss them when looking at 
collective responsibility Gilbert wants to restrict joint commitments to collectives, and 
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not aggregates Joint commitments link people together in such a way that makes them 
more than a mere aggregate of individuals 34 
There are a number of areas of concern m Gilbert's account Does she intend to 
cover large, unstructured collectives9 What constitutes population common knowledge*? 
More importantly, when considering the strong and weak versions of the plural subject, 
which do we choose7 Is it important that the stronger version fails when considering 
semi-structured and large, unstructured collectives9 And can a change in theory be 
adequately defended9 Each of these questions impacts any analysis of collective 
responsibility I will explore the question of knowledge in Chapter 4 The other questions 
above will be touched on throughout this chapter and this dissertation However, when it 
comes to changing the theory as the collective grows, I do not have an adequate defence 
Kutz makes a similar move in his theory, which I discuss below Ideally, a theory of 
collective responsibility will apply in the same way to all collectives, or, alternatively, 
provide an argument to defend a difference in theory for different collectives Such a 
theory would ease concerns that collective responsibility is following where we wish to 
hold agents responsible, as opposed to being theoretically strong In Chapter 6 I will 
propose a theory of collective responsibility which will include all collectives 
Another area of concern in Gilbert's account is her view on individual moral 
responsibility Individual moral responsibility typically requires two conditions the agent 
must be acting freely in violation of a moral requirement, and the agent must know the 
action is wrong 35 Gilbert concludes, in light of the nature of both these conditions that in 
the collective context agents may not be blameworthy for joining or continuing as a 
34
 Ibid 102 
35
 Ibid 98 
30 
member of a collective Members may not be blameworthy for any action that contnbuted 
to the collective act The participation of an agent in the joint commitment, " put her in a 
position to say 'We are to blame' - a way of speaking that automatically includes her as 
'it: 
one of the 'we', without implying her personal blameworthiness " Thus, Gilbert's 
theory of collective responsibility is just a theory of collective responsibility, not 
individual responsibility Her theory cannot reduce to the individual To hold a collective 
responsible, when a collective can be considered a concept, instead of any particular 
people, is counterintuitive to many This opens the possibility that the concept of 
responsibility that Gilbert is using may not be the same as the one used in accounts of 
individual moral responsibility where we determine whether agents are blameworthy or 
praiseworthy This argument for collective responsibility without members incurring 
personal responsibility is an issue that Christopher Kutz takes up in his account of 
collective responsibility Kutz's critique of theories like Gilbert's is that they lack the 
ability to connect individuals to the harm, and thus to motivate them I sympathise with 
Kutz's critique, and turn to his theory next 
1.4 Christopher Kutz 
1.4.1 Participatory Intentions 
Christopher Kutz (2000) proposes a theory of collective responsibility that 
expands the scope of individual accountability to include what one does with others, 
without creating collectives that bear no relation to the individuals 37 Kutz is concerned 
with keeping the theory on an individualistic foundation Although Gilbert can describe 
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various groups as social groups, and thus as plural subjects, this does not immediately 
translate into individual responsibility Gilbert argues that individuals can be members of 
blameworthy collectives without themselves being responsible Agents may say, " we 
are to blame" without implying personal blameworthiness 38 Gilbert separates the actions 
of collectives from the actions of individuals when it comes to blameworthiness in part 
because it is difficult for agents to meet the conditions for responsibility when in a 
collective In particular, it will be difficult for an agent to control the actions of the 
collective, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3 This leads Gilbert to propose a non-
reductive theory of collective responsibility I will return to this distinction between a 
non-reductive theory (responsibility of the group but not the members) verses a reductive 
account (responsibility of the group means responsibility of the members) in Chapter 5 
Kutz characterizes his project in this way 
Because individuals are the ultimate loci of normative motivation and deliberation, 
only forms of accountability aimed at and sensitive to what individuals do can 
succeed in controlling the emergence of collective harms The oughts of morality 
and politics must apply to me The trick lies, then, not m modifying the fundamental 
bearer of accountability, but in expanding the scope of individual accountability by 
i n 
including an assessment of what an individual does with others 
Kutz is writing in response to non-reductive collective responsibility theories (such as 
Gilbert's) where collectives can bear responsibility in a way that is potentially 
unconnected to the responsibility of the individual members Kutz sees Gilbert's claim 
that an agent can say, " we are to blame," and yet bear no personal responsibility as an 
empty claim Instead, Kutz seeks to create a theory of collective responsibility that will 
capture responsibility from a more individualistic standpoint 
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To accomplish this, Kutz uses, "participatory intentions" to hold the individuals in 
groups responsible Kutz says, 
I will argue that intentional participation in a group's activities is the primary basis 
for normative evaluation, both when agents contribute to collective harms and when 
they fail to contribute to collective goods Intentional participation establishes a 
special evaluative position, transforming prior social and ethical relations 40 
The individual has the intention of contnbuting to the collective outcome, and further, the 
agent's intentions are strategically responsive to their beliefs and predictions about what 
others will do 41 This is similar to Gilbert's theory where the joint activity must be 
common knowledge between those in the group While at first this seems only to apply to 
structured collectives, Kutz poses a minimalist conception of joint action where there 
only needs to be "sufficient" overlap among members' participatory intentions 42 Further, 
Kutz argues that members of the collective only need to intend to participate, and do not 
need to intend the goal of the collective act as a whole 43 To clarify, it is not intention 
alone that makes agents responsible, but rather intention to participate coupled with agent 
participation This eliminates problem situations where members of a collective may not 
know of the overall consequence of the collective act, but do, in fact, know of the 
consequence of their individual contribution It is unclear what level of knowledge they 
do need to possess, and I will return to this concern later 
By focusing on intentional participation Kutz is already bringing the individual 
into consideration in a much bigger way than Gilbert For Gilbert, the key was to 
determine how agents could form together into collectives capable of action and thus 
responsibility Kutz, on the other hand, wants to see the actions of agents in the context of 
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the actions of collectives Gilbert immediately moves away from the individual, whereas 
Kutz is attempting to keep the individual front and centre as he discusses collective 
responsibility 
1.4.2 Over-Determined Harms 
Kutz wants ultimately to hold individuals responsible for the actions of 
collectives, and thus he needs to have a way to understand individual contributions to 
collective acts In traditional accounts of responsibility the agent must have caused or 
knowingly contnbuted to the action in question in order to bear any responsibility This is 
difficult when it comes to collective acts because of their size, and the fact that often they 
are over-determined When we speak of Sue and Bob painting the house their respective 
contributions - Sue painting the wall and Bob holding the ladder- are clear They each 
contribute an integral part of the desired goal - painting the house Their contributions tie 
them to the final product Many harms caused by large collectives will not follow this 
simple description What happens when the contributions of each member are small9 
What if they are so small that no one contribution to the act made any difference to the act 
itself 
Kutz addresses this When it comes to the actions of collectives there will be times 
when the harm itself is over-determined Kutz uses the example of the Allied strategic 
bombing of Dresden in 1945 In this case the attack on Dresden included a series of 
incendiary bombing raids which combined with meteorological conditions to create a 
firestorm which destroyed Dresden's residential sectors Dunng the three raids there were 
at least 1000 planes and 8000 crewmen involved Kutz argues that each person's 
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contnbution was so small as to be insignificant, and further, the addition or elimination of 
any one crewman or plane would have made no difference to the overall result44 
Traditional accounts of individual moral responsibility include the condition that 
the agent must have caused the harm in question However, in cases like the Dresden 
bombing this causal condition could link those involved to insignificant harms, if any 
harm at all To avoid this problem Kutz instead focuses on the intentions of those 
involved, and introduces his "Complicity Principle", which states, "I am accountable for 
what others do when I intentionally participate in the wrong they do or the harm they 
cause "45 Kutz means that when an agent explicitly intends to act in a way that contnbutes 
to a collective act, then the agent will be, to some degree, responsible for that act This 
replaces the need to have the agent cause the harm directly, or be only responsible for 
their action (the difference they make) Like the example of the house painters, Bob's 
intention to participate in the painting of the house means he is also, in part, responsible 
for the painting of the house, and not just for holding the ladder Kutz is not concerned 
with determining the causal contnbution of agents, but rather focuses on their intention to 
be participants in the collective that is at fault 
Although focusing on intentional participation by members eliminates the 
problem of over-determmed harms, a situation that will exist in many collective acts from 
genocide to the environmental harms that I will discuss in Chapter 2, it exposes new 
problems What is really required to have intentional participation'? Take the following 
two cases Jayna immediately throws out resumes from applicants who are over 55 
because she believes they have few years left they will work, and are not worth the 
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investment Ellen prays for the political protesters in Iran Jayna's actions could be 
considered a contribution to ageist hiring practices, which may victimize older workers 
However, Jayna is not intentionally participating in creating a culture that does this, in 
fact she would normally be sympathetic to older workers entering the workplace She 
does not have any beliefs about the larger harm when she acts Jayna sees her own action 
as being one that is m the best interest of her company and as an isolated occurrence 
Ellen is intentionally supporting the protestors in Iran She prays for their success every 
day But the protestors in Iran do not know of Ellen's support, nor does anyone else 
Returning to Kutz's minimalist claims that there simply needs to be sufficiently 
overlapping participatory intentions, can either Jayna or Ellen be considered members of 
the collective9 If we are to answer yes in the case of Jayna, it appears that there is little 
difference between Kutz and Gilbert's accounts, and that, in fact, Kutz is lessening his 
focus on the individual When Kutz is looking for a theory of collective responsibility that 
will reduce to the individual members, and motivate them to alter their behaviour, can 
"sufficient overlap" of intentions really include the cases above9 Does Jayna have these 
overlapping intentions9 And does Ellen's intending to help, although not making a causal 
difference to the outcome, count her as part of the collective act9 
It seems to be the case that Jayna is contributing to a collective act, even if she 
does not view herself as a member of the collective, or does not intend to participate as 
part of the group While Jayna could be convinced to see her action in a collective way, to 
say she must so view her action will take more work Ellen, on the other hand, believes 
she is participating in the collective action of the political protests in Iran But her actions 
have no causal impact on what is occurring and the other members are unaware of her 
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participation Kutz's participatory intention initially has Ellen as part of the responsible 
collective, and Jayna as not This is directly contrary to our intuitions in cases like this 
Can Jayna's denial of the collective context of her action keep her from having the 
required participatory intention'? Kutz explains that often our knowledge of our part m a 
collective act will be hazy or distorted, and we will not know the character of what we 
intentionally promote together Kutz claims this leads agents to sustain a 
compartmentalized attitude about their own participation, a "just doing my job" 
explanation of participation m a harmful act46 Kutz's answer to this problem is that there 
are costs to cooperating and acting collectively, the possibility of expanding our powers 
through collective action entails the risk that the result may not be to our moral liking 47 
Kutz provides the example of a mid-level engineer who designs control modules that are 
used by the company to manufacture consumer products However, they are also used to 
manufacture land mines that are sold in the Third World Kutz claims that while the 
engineer may not identify with participating in the production of land mines, she can be 
regarded as a collective actor so long as she conceives her actions as a means, and thus is 
accountable for the consequences to which she contributes Kutz says, "Indeed, so long as 
the decision to work with the company is voluntary, and information about the company's 
activities is available, every employee bears an accountable relation to the victims of land 
mines "48 In Chapter 4 I will return to the issue of knowledge in such contexts This claim 
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Ibid 157 What is going to count as "voluntary" is important in this case, but what I 
want to focus on here is that the employees will be accountable for the collective act to 
some degree Kutz clarifies that the engineer is not accountable in the same manner as the 
vice president of the company 
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is very important as it clearly links a member of the collective (and not the leader of the 
collective) to responsibility for the harms of that collective 
Kutz here is arguing against agents compartmentalising their activities when they 
are, in fact, members of a collective It cannot be the case that an agent can merely decide 
they do not support the collective action or end, while making no change in their 
behaviour Kutz does soften this claim later, claiming that it might be the case that the 
responsibility of the engineer is different than that of the CEO of the company, as 
complicity will vary according to the scope of the agent's contribution 49 However, Kutz 
does not provide a clear method to make such a distinction 
It is unclear whether Kutz's explanation of compartmentahzation changes Jayna's 
complicity While the engineer sees herself as a member of the company, and a collective 
actor, Jayna likely does not see herself as a member of the wider society of those who are 
hiring This difference is characteristic when comparing large structured collectives to 
large unstructured collectives If information were made available about the problems of 
ageist hiring practices, Jayna may view her complicity differently However, she may 
continue to see herself as isolated from others who are hiring Only the collective of all 
who are hiring can cause the harm in question If Jayna does not see herself as a member, 
then regardless of what information is available she may not see herself as participating I 
will explore this issue in more depth m Chapter 4 At this point this appears to be another 
instance where Kutz's theory fails at the level of unstructured collectives However, his 
analysis is still interesting, and emphasizes that while there is some sympathy felt for 
agents who do not intend a harmful collective act, this alone will not excuse them 
Further, Kutz says, "Knowledge can implicate a participant, but ignorance can never fully 
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exculpate " So, while we are left thinking that Jayna may bear some culpability for the 
actions of the collective, the exact nature of her complicity is still unclear, and under 
Kutz's account, may not exist 
While Kutz's participatory intention focuses on the individual, a move with which 
I am very sympathetic, there are further problems that must be resolved In particular, 
collective responsibility at the level of large unstructured collectives needs further 
analysis While Kutz's theory can account for over-determined harms, which will be 
necessary in a successful account of collective responsibility, there is more work to be 
done 
1.4.3 Participatory Intentions and Collectives 
Kutz's theory can address small and large structured collectives, as well as small 
unstructured collectives In structured collectives the goal of the collective is clear - such 
as those painting the house, or a corporation's goal to maximize profits Since the goals 
are clear, then intentionally participating in the collectives is a clear link between 
individual and collective responsibility In the case of small unstructured groups, like that 
of the strangers who stop to help someone who has fallen on winter ice, this is the same 
The goal - to help the person who has fallen - is clear All members intend to participate 
in aiding this person All of these cases are unproblematic 
I would argue that in the case of the semi-structured collective this will be the 
same Nations have agendas, goals, intentions, and these are available (if not known) to 
the citizens In so far as this is true, it seems plausible to suggest that intentional 
participation in the nation (1 e being a citizen) can link you to the collective and confer 
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responsibility Since leaving this collective is very difficult, some may argue that it 
should not be a collective that can be responsible However, certain choices do exist for 
the agent, such as who to vote for, and what structures of the government to support If 
this answer is not satisfying, then perhaps what it missing from the account is some 
individual determination of responsibility This is a topic I will return to m Chapters 3 and 
4 When it comes to national actions it will often be the case that the actions of each 
member are too small to alone make a difference For example, perhaps responsibility is 
determined because each person has the ability to vote and thus affect leadership One 
vote does not make a difference, but together the votes cause the outcome Much like the 
case of the Dresden bombing, the action may be over-determined, but participation is 
clear as are the goals, so Kutz's theory may well work in this case 
What happens when we move to discuss large, unstructured collectives7 Agents 
may lack a clear causal connection (over-determined harms), and the members may not 
see themselves as participants in a collective action, or intending their part of a collective 
goal Simply denying complicity is not sufficient to keep agents from being responsible, 
and wilful ignorance is not an excuse However, while you are complicit for the actions of 
the company you work for, it may not be reasonable to require agents to view themselves 
as members of large, unstructured collectives The problem cases of systemic social 
harms, genocide, and environmental harms remain unaccounted for 
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1.4.4 Quasi-Participatory Intentions and Character 
Kutz wants to hold individuals responsible for the harms we do together 51 
Kutz relies on his participatory intentions in order to avoid the problem of the causal 
connection in collective actions By relying on intentions it no longer matters whether 
each individual m the collective contributed to the harm in a causal sense, or if the 
harm was over-determined However, by relying heavily on the intentional 
participation of members, Kutz acknowledges he has created a situation where harms 
such as environmental damages, which are caused without this intention, cannot fit 
into his account 
In order to deal with large, unstructured collectives Kutz introduces two 
connected qualifications for accountability quasi- participatory intentions and 
symbolic or character based accountability Quasi-participatory intentions occur when 
individuals are participants in a shared venture that does harm, but that there is no 
specific project to which the individuals are contributing Kutz says, 
Individual agents are, broadly speaking, participants m a shared venture that does 
harm, and so are inclusively accountable for the unintended consequences of what 
they do together Call this a quasi-participatory basis of accountability, "quasi" 
because there is no specific project to which individuals contribute 52 
Under this system individuals are accountable for the unintended consequences of 
what they do together While on first glance this is a controversial claim, the 
consequences are unintended, but not unforeseen Perhaps Kutz's theory needs to be 
clearer on this point, and it is a problem I return to in Chapter 4 Symbolic or character 
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based accountability is based on the idea that through accepting a benefit, an agent 
condones the actions that produced the benefit53 
These new kinds of accountability raise a number of questions First, why 
would it be the case that when we move to examining unstructured collective harms, 
the account we use to determine responsibility changes9 There needs to be an adequate 
explanation beyond that we feel, intuitively, that these groups are still responsible, yet 
they do not fit the earlier model If the combination of quasi-participatory intentions 
and symbolic accountability is enough to hold these large and diverse groups 
accountable, it should also be enough to hold the smaller and/or highly structured 
groups accountable Kutz does not provide an adequate reason for this change in 
theory 
To expand, compare Kutz's participatory intention to the new conditions of 
quasi-participatory and character based accountability While it is clear that 
participatory intention will not suffice in cases of large, unstructured collectives, the 
question is, could we use the quasi-participatory intentions for the smaller and more 
structured groups'? Remember, for members of a group to have a participatory 
intention they must intend to contribute to the collective outcome, and their intentions 
must be strategically responsive to their beliefs about what others will do In the case 
of Sue and Bob painting the house, Bob intends to paint the house, and he is holding 
the ladder for Sue under the belief that she too intends to paint the house He is acting 
on his belief that if he holds the ladder, Sue will use the ladder to paint the second 
story wall of the house A similar story about Sue, that she wants to paint the house 
and is climbing the ladder because she believes that Bob has the same goal, and further 
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that he will thus brace the ladder for her, holds true In this case it is true that both Sue 
and Bob have a participatory intention to paint the house 
Do Sue and Bob have a quasi-participatory intention to paint the housed Here 
the focus is on participating in a collective action Do Sue and Bob have an intention to 
participate in the collective of house painters9 Yes, it seems that this must be true Sue 
and Bob have decided to work together painting houses, and therefore would see 
themselves as a kind of collective (a team or company) Do they bear responsibility for 
what this collective does together9 Yes, they bear responsibility for what their team, of 
Sue and Bob, do together I will leave aside character based accountability, although 
you could argue that Sue and Bob, by participating in the joint venture of painting the 
house, show that they approve of working as a collective to pamt houses, and thus bear 
responsibility Character based accountability is far more awkward here, and it seems 
that although it works in theory, quasi-participatory intentions are a better fit to hold 
agents responsible Since character based accountability is often characterised as 
accepting the benefit from the action in question (in this case accepting pay for the 
painting job) Sue and Bob will meet this condition However, I am unsure of the 
usefulness of this condition when joined with quasi-participatory intentions since such 
intentions include the intentional participation of the agent, which seems to suggest the 
same kind of agent characteristic must be involved as would be m accepting the pay 
Under Kutz's account I am unconvinced that character based accountability adds a 
missing condition to quasi-participatory intentions 
If quasi-participatory intentions can hold agents responsible in all the different 
types of collectives, why designate one kind of responsibility to small and/or 
structured collectives, and another to large unstructured collectives9 This becomes 
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clear when we examine the nature of the action itself While it is true that quasi-
participatory intentions will work in the case of Sue and Bob who are painting the 
house together, there are others who will be pulled into a collective that is defined 
thus When removing the need for the agents to knowingly participate in a collective 
with a known goal and have intentions that are strategically responsive to beliefs about 
what others will do, we open up the definition for the group in general Who may be 
included in the group now? 
At first this may seem like a strange question Consider the simple case of the 
housepainters Under participatory intentions we can define the group of house 
painters as the group of individuals who were hired, for example, to paint the house 
This group was looking for a job and then this house came along What connects this 
group is that the action - painting the house - was their purpose If we change to 
quasi-participatory intentions then instead the group is defined as those who contnbute 
to a shared venture, even when there is no specific project to which the agents are 
contributing Barney and Johnny set up a lemonade stand down the street from the 
house that Sue and Bob are working on It is a hot day, so the lemonade stand attracts 
good business all day long Some of the people at the lemonade stand drink their 
lemonade while admiring the painting job of Sue and Bob In the following weeks Sue 
and Bob are contacted for jobs from a number of these people, which results m a boost 
in their profits and helps them move their business to the next step (hire a third 
painter) Barney and Johnny's lemonade stand contributed to the success of Sue and 
Bob's painting business, but they had no connection to that goal In fact, most of us 
would find it strange for Barney and Johnny to say, "We helped grow Sue and Bob's 
business " 
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If Barney and Johnny are included in our group of house painters now, then 
who all would be members9 How are we to define contributing to this collective act9 
Such an account can snowball quickly and what had seemed like the collective action 
of a few becomes the action of a mass of people, most unaware of the goal of painting 
the house or growing a painting business Too many people must now be included in 
the collective in question 
Kutz links quasi-participatory intentions to a second qualification symbolic or 
character based accountability He says, 
By their acceptance of the benefit, they can be thought to indicate their tolerance for 
the conduct that produced it Agents are accountable not only by virtue of what they 
have done or caused, but for what they might have done or caused They are 
accountable in virtue of who they are 54 
This second kind of accountability is important, because it may be the filter that will 
keep those we deem outside of the collective, in fact, outside of the collective 
Although I dismissed this condition as unhelpful, I will examine it briefly here 
Symbolic or character based accountability may explain why it is the case that Barney 
and Johnny are not in the collective with Bob and Sue that is growing their painting 
business However, this condition seems to lack the teeth to actually do so What part 
of Barney and Johnny's characters are we assessing9 Whether they are the type of 
people who would want to grow someone else's' painting business9 If they are, 
perhaps we are comfortable including them in the collective, although likely we will 
want their responsibility to be to a significantly lesser degree What if they want the 
painting business to fail9 Or what if, as will be the case for most children, they have no 
intentions regarding the painting business one way or the other9 Without actions to 
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support the internal characters of the two boys, we would be reluctant to include them 
in the responsible collective While I do not want to say that character is unimportant 
in these cases (and I will return to this topic in Chapters 3 and 5), it fails to support 
quasi-participatory intentions and therefore fails when applied to small collectives 
Quasi-participatory intentions and symbolic or character based accountability 
fail at the level of small and/or structured collectives They include agents in the 
collectives that we do not want to include, that we do not consider members of the 
collective If this is the case in these collectives, it is possible that the same mistake is 
happening in the case of large, unstructured collectives This being true, it seems that 
not only is there no reason to change the theory when an unstructured collective grows 
in size, but that the theory itself is problematic 
Quasi-participatory intentions link individuals to unintended consequences 
Symbolic or character based accountability hold people responsible for receiving 
benefit, which Kutz claims indicates the wrong kind of character To receive benefit is 
to indicate your approval of the act However, since we have moved away from using a 
causal connection to harm to hold these people accountable, it is problematic to now 
move away from knowing your contribution to the act Kutz focuses on the idea that to 
the victim, the identity of the perpetrator, even collective perpetrators, is clear For 
example, although a car-owning North American may not know they are a member of 
a collective, those suffering ill health due to the increased number of smog days 
believe that car drivers all are the members of the offending collective This move to 
access the victim's perspective in order to identify the members of the collective is 
effective, and yet, importantly, it still runs against the traditional account of individual 
moral responsibility which is only concerned with the knowledge the perpetrators 
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possess Typically such ignorance on the part of the offender would mitigate 
responsibility 
If we rely on the traditional account of individual moral responsibility then these 
overlapping intentions provide a great explanation both for how a collective can act, and 
what it means that the collective acted, including the attribution of responsibility 
However, this common tendency in the literature to simplify the process of collective 
responsibility threatens to exclude unstructured collective harms Unstructured 
collectives consist of members who may not know there is a collective action, or even 
when they do know might not understand their contribution to it As mentioned above, to 
permanently exclude unstructured collectives from the discussion must be justified 
Gilbert and Kutz both propose theones that share many elements, and yet overall 
the theories separate Gilbert and Kutz at a fundamental level, placing them on opposite 
sides of the reductive/non-reductive debate The most striking similarity is the way they 
both alter their theones in order to cover larger collectives Gilbert introduces population 
common knowledge, which although the same as common knowledge, indicates a 
conceptual shift in the theory Additionally, in order to cover large, unstructured 
collectives (or semi-structured collectives) Gilbert's plural subject must be applied with 
the weaker or softer conditions Kutz changes his conditions for collective responsibility, 
moving from participatory intentions to quasi-participatory intentions and symbolic or 
character based accountability Much like Gilbert, these changes represent a decrease in 
the strength of the conditions Kutz was applying to smaller and more structured 
collectives And while in both cases the change in theory can allow us to hold members in 
large, unstructured collectives responsible, if we take the same theory and apply it to 
smaller groups, it fails The group of housepainters becomes much larger than we first 
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expected, including Barney and Johnny and their successful lemonade stand A change in 
theory, one that cannot be applied backward, requires further analysis and defence Once 
again it appears almost as if we have already decided that members in certain collectives 
must be responsible, and thus we are altering the theory to include them 
There is one additional point of similarity between Gilbert and Kutz that pertains 
to the discussion on collective responsibility Both Gilbert and Kutz have an interesting 
condition that applies in cases of collective responsibility when speaking of small and/or 
highly structured collectives They both underline the importance of working as a group 
Gilbert argues that forming a joint commitment requires that the parties' expressive 
behaviour is an expression of readiness for joint commitment This is part of the common 
knowledge that must exist between the members of the collective Kutz argues that the 
agent's intentions must be strategically responsive to their beliefs and predictions about 
what others will do Both of these conditions require that the agent be acting as if a 
member of a collective These conditions easily exclude not only Barney, but also Ellen 
who was participating in a collective act without being aware of the other members in the 
collective, and without them being aware of her The reason that this condition fails m 
these cases is because the collective has changed, become larger and less structured 
While it is unclear whether such a condition can remain in any account that covers large, 
unstructured collectives, it underlines an important point We want to focus on those who 
are in collectives that are performing harms and are in some way aware of the collective 
nature of their actions Those who independently assign themselves to collectives, but are 
not acting in concert with the other members of the collective, appear unlikely members 
of responsible collectives Even if we are to assign them some responsibility, this 
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responsibility is likely different than we would assign other members A successful theory 
will have to account for this 
1.5 Collectivising the Conditions for Responsibility 
In Chapter 3 I will examine theories of individual moral responsibility including 
that of Aristotle as well as more recent accounts Individual moral responsibility is of 
integral importance to accounts of collective responsibility because it is in understanding 
how such an account could work in a collective context that we end up with accounts that 
best cover highly structured groups with transparent motives and membership 
The basic conditions for individual moral responsibility are that the agent caused 
the action in question and that they intended it (or could foresee it) Typically collective 
responsibility accounts coUectivise these conditions for individual moral responsibility If 
we look at the first condition, the causal condition, the first question we have to answer is 
who caused the act9 It is not the individuals, because the collective act is not simply the 
sum of many individual acts The collective act is viewed like a play We are not 
concerned with the actor who played Viola, or the person who made Viola's costume, but 
the production that performed Twelfth Night The action in question includes the 
individual contributions to it, from actors, to stage managers, to the ushers, and yet the 
result is more than the sum of these actions Although we may not, when pressed, 
congratulate each of these group members equally upon a successful showing of Twelfth 
Night, we do understand that they each contributed By collectivismg the causal condition 
we can discuss the play that particular production performed 
This move to collectivize the causal condition also legitimizes the claim that 
collective actions are more than the sum of the individual actions which comprise them 
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This can be seen clearly in the case of murder Many unconnected murders are tragedies, 
but many connected murders, even when performed by different individuals, can be 
genocide Genocide is more harmful than a collection of murders, as it often victimizes a 
larger group In the case of genocide the concerted actions of the perpetrators to eliminate 
a group can victimise not only those killed and their loved ones, but also those who 
associate with the target group Genocide targets the destruction of entire families, 
villages, or ethnicities This method destroys groups of individuals, which results in the 
loss of culture, ethnic diversity, and bloodlines The harm caused by genocide often 
reverberates through generations as we continue to reflect on what was lost 
The second condition, that the individual intended, or could reasonably foresee the 
consequences of the action, is far more complex Gilbert requires that members of the 
collective intended to pool their wills into the plural subject Kutz requires that they have 
a participatory intention - intend to do their part The collectivizing of the intentions of 
the individual members seems to require that the members each intended to be in the 
group Perhaps we would claim they had to be aware of the intention of the act itself (m 
the above case to perform Twelfth Night), or that such knowledge was available Unlike 
the case of collectivizing the actions of many into a collective act, making the same move 
with intentions is more problematic And in such a case, it appears that there needs to be 
someone who has the intention of the group as well, that someone intends to perform the 
best production of Twelfth Night But this imposes the necessity for some kind of 
hierarchy and structure upon a group that in some cases, such as environmental harms, 
will have very disparate intentions 
This act of collectivismg individual conditions for moral responsibility lends itself 
more successfully to cases of structured groups The more structured, the easier it is to 
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conceive of a group acting as a single agent, a new collective agent And the more a 
collective resembles a single agent, the more comfortable we are attnbuting responsibility 
to it (either to the collective or to the individual members through a reductive account) 
However, this popular technique to justify and legitimize claims of collective 
responsibility neglects the more difficult cases What about where there is no structure? In 
a nation the collective intention may be set by the government, supposedly in response to 
the intentions and desires of the citizens However, in a large unstructured group the 
intentions of the members will be to perform an action that, to them, may appear isolated 
Perhaps a male manager chooses to hire only men because of his own sexist beliefs, and 
his intention is to have the best employees He does not intend to create a culture of 
sexism and barriers in the workplace for women However, his action does contribute to 
that end 
Collectivising the conditions for individual moral responsibility may be intuitive, 
and yet at the same time problematic because it cannot account for cases of large 
unstructured groups As discussed above, both Gilbert and Kutz's accounts falter when it 
comes to large unstructured groups Many of the other writers who defend collective 
responsibility have accounts similar to Gilbert and Kutz, and thus are vulnerable to the 
same problems Michael E Bratman defines "shared cooperative activity" as a case where 
there is mutual responsiveness, commitment to the joint activity, and commitment to 
mutual support55 Bratman goes on to argue for more qualifications for collective action, 
including appropriate attitudes and meshing subplans between those in the collective 
John Searle writes about collective intentions, which he characterizes as the intention a 
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football team has to execute a pass play, or the playing of an orchestra Searle argues 
that this collective intentional action is not reducible to individual intentional action 
Searle constrains collective intentionality by claiming first that there are only individual 
minds (no group mind), and second that all intentionality is independent of whether the 
particular mind has it "right" 57 
The failings of both Gilbert and Kutz to adequately address large, unstructured 
collectives will be similar to the other theories that are based around much the same 
premise What is interesting to identify is this tendency to begin with a small highly 
structured collective and then stretch the theory to cover all collectives, including large 
unstructured collectives Gilbert defends this practice, saying, 
For present purposes, would it not be both possible and preferable to look directly at 
cases in which blame is attributed to a collective, and consider what conditions for 
blameworthiness seem to be at issue there? It would indeed be possible to do this, 
and it may in some contexts be preferable One reason for proceeding with an 
account of blameworthiness drawn from the individual human case, however, is that 
for many that case is the least problematic In a discussion of collective 
blameworthiness that hopes to engage someone who feels this, it seems best to 
derive a general working account of blameworthiness from the individual case, and 
then to present a model of collective blameworthiness that fits it58 
While I am sympathetic to Gilbert's sentiment - that the smaller and more structured a 
group the less problematic the theory of responsibility, this alone is not a sufficient 
reason to proceed in this way If we begin with a person, or two people, and use that 
theory to cover other groups we end up unable to account for large unstructured harms 
without either sacrificing reducibihty or arbitrarily altering the components of the 
theory If our reason for collectivising the individual or small group conditions for 
responsibility is ease and theoretical elegance, then while these qualities are preferred, 
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it opens the door to finding a more substantial method that will account for large, 
unstructured collectives 
1.7 Conclusion 
The situation for unstructured collectives is complicated By collectivismg the 
conditions for individual moral responsibility, the theories of collective responsibility 
examined fail to include large unstructured groups It may follow from this analysis that 
attnbuting responsibility to such groups is not possible In the next chapter I will present 
the phenomenon of climate change and its negative consequences, whose existence 
suggests that we do require a theory of responsibility for large, unstructured collectives 
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Chapter 2: Unstructured Collective Harms 
2.1 Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to examine collective responsibility for large 
unstructured groups As explored in the previous chapter a common method to determine 
collective responsibility is to collectivize the conditions of individual moral responsibility 
- instead of the agent acting, the group acts, instead of the agent intending, the group 
intends However, this method is most successful in small highly structured groups that 
most closely resemble an individual agent The result is that many theories exclude large 
unstructured collectives from their accounts of collective responsibility I argue that these 
are collectives, and that the theory of collective responsibility must therefore be able to 
account for them The inability to do so indicates, not that the groups are not collectives 
in the proper sense, but that the theory is not successful in that it excludes them 
In this chapter I will explore the case of climate change ' The driving force behind 
climate change, as noted in a report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(2007) are greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide By 2005 the atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide was far higher than the natural range over the last 
650,000 years Further, the primary source of the increased concentration of carbon 
dioxide since the pre-industnal period is mostly from the use of fossil fuels 2 Although 
the complex nature of climate change restricts our ability to identify with complete 
certainty its effects, at present the following events have been linked to the high levels of 
11 will primarily be using "climate change" to describe the global changes m the 
environment In the literature global warming and climate change are often used 
interchangeably 
2
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carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases in the global average air and ocean 
temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea levels 3 
These changes in the global environment, changes caused largely by the use of 
fossil fuels, have victimized people around the globe The question that this chapter 
poses is, is climate change caused by a collective9 And can this collective be held 
responsible*7 Or is climate change the result of the actions of a "mere aggregate", to use 
Margaret Gilbert's term, and thus the responsibility of no one9 
2.2 The Victims of Climate Change 
To examine the responsibility of a large unstructured collective, it can be helpful 
to first focus on who is being affected by the actions of this collective, or in the case of 
climate change, victimized For the purposes of this dissertation I will be looking at 
climate change as a harm only insofar as it harms individuals, and not as intrinsically 
bad 4 Some arguments against harming the environment rely on attributing rights to 
animals, the Earth, or rocks and soil I will restnct my discussion to harm done to agents 
both direct harm and harm to what they value So who are the victims of climate change9 
The following three cases illustrate the harm caused by climate change 
The first is the case of Jalaluddin Saha In April 2009 Joydeep Gupta wrote an article 
about the plight of climate refugees in India 5 
3
 Ibid 3 
4
 I am not arguing here that harming nature or native species of flora or fauna is a 
problem But rather, focussing on the case of the actions of some people harming other 
people This is the clearest case, and the one I will be focussing on 
5
 "Climate Refugees" or "Environmental Refugees" are not official terms, and are not 
recognised by the UN Typically they refer to people who have been affected by climate 
change, but do not, necessarily, refer to those who have had to leave their home country 
as a result (as would be the case for a political refugee) In this dissertation I will avoid 
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The rising sea has drowned two of Jalaluddin Saha's small homes and threatens a 
third Last monsoon surging water ruined his crops and he and his family ran for 
their lives His livestock drank the brine and died 
In eastern India, this 62-year-old retired schoolteacher is experiencing climate 
change first hand So are the other 8,000-odd residents of Bahwara and other 
villages in the little island called Mousuni, facing the Bay of Bengal at one of the 
numerous mouths of the Ganga river that Indians consider sacred 
With their backs to the Sundarbans - the world's largest mangrove forest - and one-
third of their 10-km by two-km island engulfed by the rising sea in the last 10 years, 
climate change is no theoretical threat to the thousands who live in the 12 sea-
facing islands of South 24 Parganas district 
The next island, Gorumara, has already been abandoned to the waves The residents 
have scattered 
"You see these fertile nee fields, these coconut groves, these ponds we have dug 
with our own hands and which are teeming with fish We don't know if they'll last 
beyond the month of Bhadra (August-September)," Saha told a visiting IANS 
correspondent 
"We're not imagining a disaster It has happened to us, again and again, especially 
in the last few years We can see how the sea is rising Do you see the waves 
playing with the stump of that dead coconut tree9 My second house was beyond 
that, just eight years ago Today you can't see a single sign of i t " 
"I'll fight as long as I can But I know my children cannot As the world gets 
hotter, the sea is rising all the time "6 
Saha's story is typical of those living in the coastal regions, especially in less wealthy 
areas, many of which do not have the reserve capital or ability to easily relocate In 
2001 Bangladesh's environment minister said that if official predictions about sea-
level rise occur, one fifth of her nation would vanish underwater which would create 
20 million ecological refugees 7 The 2001 World Disasters Report claims that those 
people living in the world's poorest regions are most at risk, and that by 2080 over 
using the term 'refugee' because it automatically has its own set of moral connotations 
that are not necessary or useful in a discussion of collective responsibility, however I will 
leave the term in direct quotes or references from sources 
6
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three billion people across Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent will 
suffer from an increase in "water stress" This includes an increase in both droughts 
and floods, and that the most dangerous strains of malaria will pose a risk to an 
additional 290 million people as warmer and wetter climates encourage mosquitoes to 
breed8 
While India will lose one fifth of its nation, the Republic of Maldives, an island 
country located south-west of India, faces complete destruction Eighty percent of the 
islands in this small nation are less than one meter above sea level, and if global sea 
level continues to nse, this nation will disappear in the next 100 years Nick Bryant, a 
BBC correspondent writes, "The Maldives' survival as a sovereign nation is truly at 
stake "9 Over one third of the population of the Maldives were affected by the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami, and the government was forced to relocate many Maldivians 
due to massive damage Years later some of these Maldivians are still living m camps 
in other countries 
Climate change is not restricted to changes m sea level, but also desertification, 
droughts, famines, disease, and weather events such as cyclones, and the 2004 
Tsunami According to the reinsurance company Munich Re, since the 1950s costs 
associated with "natural" disasters have increased fourteen times At the end of the 
1990s there were twenty-five million people who were forced to move due to natural 
disasters For the first time more people were fleeing natural hazards than conflict10 
The third example illustrates a different kind of problem, the connection between 
climate change and increased political conflict Quoted in an article for The Independent 
8
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in 2007, Achim Sterner the executive director of the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP) claims that changes in terrain and climate are leading to conflict and that 
societies are unprepared for the speed with which they will have to decide what to do with 
large groups of people Sterner argues that dramatic changes to the environment in the 
Darfur region of Sudan contnbuted to the conflict which has now displaced more than 2 5 
million people and killed at least 200 000 ' ' Climate change had the following impact 
The roots of the four-year conflict can be found in the devastating drought that 
swept Sudan and the Horn of Africa in the 1980s Since then, rainfall in the Sudan 
has fallen by 40 per cent, a result, claim scientists, of global warming Farmers 
began to fence off land to which nomads once had access Clashes over shrinking 
resources between nomads, who tend to be Arab, and the mainly African farmers, 
became widespread 
In the Darfur region, the inhabitants are victimized both by the change in climate and 
impact on resources, as well as by conflict that is caused by these changes 
The three cases described above each illustrate how events linked to climate 
change have victimized individuals around the globe Climate change is causing an 
increase in natural disasters, which is both killing people and forcing them to relocate 
Although you could argue that everyone is being affected by climate change, these are the 
people who are being victimized by it The question is, is climate change being caused by 
a group, or a mere aggregate9 
2.3 Causes of Climate change 
In order to determine if there is a collective that is responsible for climate change, 
the cause of climate change must be identified This paper is not meant to be conclusive 
11
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proof for the causes and nature of climate change However, by examining what 
climatologists have identified as the causes of climate change, we may be able to answer 
the question as to whether this is being caused by a collective, and who might be 
members of such a collective 
It is important to note that there are many unsustainable local practices, whether 
industry or agnculture, that are causing localized problems from deforestation to pollution 
of the water supply Some of these practices are the result of the local population, and 
some of them are due to global demands for certain products While there may be an 
argument that some poorer nations are taking on such unsustainable practices in order to 
provide goods for the industrialised world, at the moment I will put these considerations 
aside I am focusing on those actions that are causing climate change, specifically 
greenhouse gas emissions and the increased global temperature The IPCC report states 
that, "Most of the observed increase in global average temperature since the mid-20th 
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations " Although this restricts the example, the restriction is reasonable 
because greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide and methane, are the primary 
causes of climate change 
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, (EPA) the 
largest source of carbon dioxide emissions globally is the combustion of fossil fuels, 
particularly coal, oil and gas in power plants, cars, industry and other sources 
Deforestation also presents a problem, as trees naturally remove carbon dioxide from the 
13
 International Panel on Climate Change (2007) 10 "Very likely" means 90% The 
report notes that the remaining uncertainty is mostly based on current methodologies 
59 
atmosphere and in many places are not being replaced at the same rate they are being 
destroyed 14 
In the US methane emissions come from decomposition m landfills, ruminant 
digestion and manure from domesticated livestock, natural gas and oil systems, and coal 
mining Landfills alone account for 34% of all methane emissions in the US 15 In 2006 
senior UN Food and Agriculture official Hennmg Steinfeld said, "Livestock are one of 
the most significant contnbutors to today's most senous environmental problems " A UN 
report warns, 
When emissions from land use and land use change are included, the livestock 
sector accounts for 9 per cent of C02 denving from human-related activities, but 
produces a much larger share of even more harmful greenhouse gases It generates 
65 per cent of human-related nitrous oxide, which has 296 times the Global 
Warming Potential (GWP) of C02 Most of this comes from manure 16 
The pnmary cause of climate change is the emission of greenhouse gases, and these 
emissions come pnmanly from industry, transportation, landfills, and certain kinds of 
food production When these sources of greenhouse gases are examined a picture of those 
responsible begins to emerge However, before delving into who is causing this, I will 
first turn to one more issue that needs to be addressed when examining the harm itself 
The effect of climate change is hard to define because of the large and complex 
nature of the problem While it may be easy to say that the Maldivians may lose their 
country over the next century, or even that Saha lost two of his homes to nsmg sea levels 
which were the result of climate change, these are merely small examples in a much 
14United States Environmental Protection Agency (2009) "Human related sinks and 
sources of carbon dioxide" 
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larger story Before making any attempt to simplify the problem, there is one additional 
complication that must be considered When looking at the global climate system, climate 
scientists warn that we will not see the results of current greenhouse gases immediately, 
and further, that there is the possibility of "feedback" loops which will greatly increase 
the harm done 
In the IPCC report, it warns that climate change will continue for centuries due to 
the length of time associated with climate processes and the feedbacks they create 
Further, this will be the case even if greenhouse gas concentrations are to be stabilised 17 
This is due, in part, to the time required for removal of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere Further, chmatologists have described "temperature thresholds," claiming 
that once global temperatures reach certain levels it will set off rapid changes in the 
global environment For example, as ice melts in the Arctic, more sunlight will hit the 
dark waters of the ocean, as opposed to the white of the snow The dark sea water absorbs 
more heat, and thus this will increase both the melting of the ice, and the warming of the 
oceans 18 This is an example of positive feedback 
Delayed warming, the slow removal of carbon from the atmosphere, and the 
possibility of such feedback loops complicate any calculations that seek to identify the 
harm that has or will occur They also magnify the harm caused by climate change This 
harm, as I will continue to discuss, is unlike the case of the hockey team winning the 
game The hockey team acts as the result of deliberate coordination of individuals in line 
with the training they have received The team engages other teams knowingly, and there 
is no possibility that by winning one match they have passed a threshold which 
17
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guarantees they will win all While we know that some climate change (perhaps most) is 
caused by human action, mostly through the creation of greenhouse gases, the specifics of 
the harm are not known in the way that they are in the collectives discussed in Chapter 1 
The nature of climate change will have a great impact on any knowledge conditions for 
responsibility, a topic I will return to in Chapter 4 
Margaret Gilbert distinguishes between forward and backward looking 
responsibility She claims that forward looking responsibility deals with what action we 
are required to take, or refrain from in the future For example, "We are morally 
responsible for cleaning this place up " Backward looking responsibility refers to having 
caused something in the past or present, and having obligations in response, for example, 
"We are morally responsible for the war "19 Gilbert's distinction is far less clear in the 
case of environmental harms An argument can be made that "we" are responsible for 
causing climate change, and also, that we are responsible for taking the necessary actions 
to combat its effects in the future Climate change is an ongoing occurrence, and we do 
not know when it will end Without knowing this, we cannot know the entirety of the 
harm And in a sense, "we" have caused the problem, but cannot determine exact 
obligations because the harm is unfinished This aspect of climate change must be 
addressed in any successful account of this harm 
2.4 Perpetrators of Climate change 
The next task of this chapter is to discuss, as far as possible, who we can identify 
as causing the problems noted above Here I am relying on a causal account to indicate 
who we are to focus on In traditional accounts of individual moral responsibility, as will 
19
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be explored in Chapters 3 and 4, causal connection alone is not sufficient to determine 
responsibility for an action, however it is necessary For now I will put such concerns to 
the side, and see who, if anyone, can be causally connected to the harms in question 
Further, if perpetrators can be identified, by what means and using what cntena are such 
identities determined 
According to a 2002 report by GRID-Arendal (a collaborating centre of UNEP) 
the ten countnes with the highest carbon dioxide emissions per capita are (in order of 
highest to lowest) United States, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan The ten lowest 
contnbutors per capita all fall at or below the low income average, and include (from 
highest to lowest) Guatemala, Pakistan, Yemen, Togo, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Uganda, and Mali20 Additionally, a 2007 report shows that after ten years, 
the Western economies that signed the Kyoto Protocol instead of cutting emissions by 
5%, have actually increased them by 11% Together, countries have increased their 
emissions of greenhouse gasses by 22 7% since 1990 21 
Few countnes are without some complicity for greenhouse gases, as carbon 
dioxide is being emitted beyond the global carbon budget This means that only 54% of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is being removed by natural land and ocean C02 
99 
sinks At this point, all emissions are causing damage However, while all countnes 
may be comphcit, developed countnes bear the brunt of the causal responsibility for the 
harm Further, because the nchest countnes are also the biggest contributors to 
20
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greenhouse gas emissions, these countries have both the technology and capital to make 
the necessary changes to drastically reduce emissions, an ability developing nations may 
lack 
While it may be possible to identify, for the most part, what and who is causing 
climate change, these groups are far from the defined and interactive groups described by 
Margaret Gilbert, Christopher Kutz, and many who write on collective responsibility I 
cannot and have not been able to say that climate change is caused by something specific, 
and I cannot hold the United States responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, but decide 
that Japan, who contributes far less per capita, is not I could, for the sake of the argument 
of this dissertation artificially, and perhaps arbitrarily, restrict both the harm and the 
groups in question However, the indefinable nature of the harm and the groups is why 
this harm is complex, and is why theories struggle to address this circumstance I have 
simplified for the sake of brevity some of the issues surrounding climate change and 
emissions, but only to move on to discuss the implications for responsibility As I proceed 
I aim to preserve the complexity of these groups in order to reflect the reality of an 
intrinsically complex situation 
Before continuing my analysis of climate change as a collective act, I will turn 
briefly to the literature in environmental philosophy that seeks to determine whether such 
harms can be included in discussions of the moral standing of agents These accounts are 
not making collective responsibility arguments, per se, but rather provide interesting 
insights into possible solutions Further, it is important to note the success or lack of 
success such arguments have had accounting for climate change to determine if viewing it 
under the classification of collective responsibility is relevant 
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2.5 Game Theory and Climate change 
James Garvey (2008) identifies three reasons why it is difficult to think about 
climate change The first reason is the global features of the problem of climate change 
itself The relevant causes and effects of climate change are spread across the globe The 
second is the intergenerational aspect of climate change, as it involves agents who are 
temporally dispersed And the last is, as Garvey calls it, " our theoretical ineptitude "23 
The first problem I discussed through examination of the science behind climate change 
The problem of temporal dispersion I will return to below I agree with Garvey's claim 
about our "theoretical ineptitude" This ineptitude creates space to examine this problem 
in greater detail, and to develop new solutions 
In the philosophical literature on the environment, and particularly harm to the 
environment, writers often invoke game theory to examine and predict the actions of 
agents Lwill briefly outline and examine the two most used examples, the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, and the Tragedy of the Commons in relation to the discussion on philosophy of 
the environment Both these theories will be familiar, as they are used to describe all 
manner of situations both inside and outside of philosophy 
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a puzzle that was devised initially in the 1950s by 
Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher as part of the Rand Corporation's investigation into 
game theory Intended to test possible applications of global nuclear strategy, the 
Prisoner's Dilemma has been widely cited since first publication, and has become a core 
part of the philosophical tradition Here is one version of the Prisoner's Dilemma as 
written by Steven Kuhn, 
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Tanya and Cinque have been arrested for robbing the Hiberma Savings Bank and 
placed in separate isolation cells Both care much more about their personal 
freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice A clever prosecutor makes the 
following offer to each "You may choose to confess or remain silent If you 
confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and 
use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time Likewise, if 
your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do 
the time If you both confess I get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get 
early parole If you both remain silent, I'll have to settle for token sentences on 
firearms possession charges If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the 
jailer before my return tomorrow morning "24 
The dilemma that the prisoners face is that whatever the other does, each is better off 
confessing than remaining silent Yet the best outcome is if both remain silent It is 
argued, then, that what is rational for each agent to choose is, in fact, the sub-optimal 
result, confession instead of staying silent, because the cost of staying silent while the 
other confesses is too high 
The Prisoner's Dilemma can illuminate the problems of climate change if we 
replace the example of two agents who want to avoid impnsonment, with, as Kutz calls it, 
collective action problems Kutz claims that these problems are one reason the world is 
nfe with collective harms 25 Consider the following example Waterloo city council puts a 
restnction on residents prohibiting the use of chemical pesticides on residential lawns 
Jim faces a few choices, he can secretly use the pesticides, hoping to avoid the fine He 
can use the more expensive, and less effective "natural" pesticide Or Jim can do nothing, 
and let his lawn do what it may Jim approves of the ban for the region, and enjoys the 
benefits When we consider Jim's actions, it is not between Jim and his neighbour, but 
Jim's actions as part of the larger social group of Waterloo In this case, like that of Tanya 
and Cinque, Jim must decide what choice will provide him with the best result If Jim 
Kuhn "Pnsoner's Dilemma" 
Kutz, (2000) 173 
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does not use the prohibited pesticide, he takes on the additional cost of the natural 
pesticide, and loses some enjoyment he normally receives from his pristine lawn If all 
other residents uphold the ban, then Jim may feel good about this choice The burdens are 
being distributed evenly If, on the other hand, most residents defect Jim will be a 
"sucker", taking on the additional cost, and not receiving the benefit of the improved 
environment If Jim expects others to defect, much like in the case of Tanya and Cinque, 
the rational response is to defect as well On the other hand, if Jim secretly uses the 
pesticide and gets away with it, he is essentially free-ndmg on the rest of society, gaming 
the benefit of the cleaner environment without the cost When weighing the costs, the 
Pnsoner's Dilemma results in Jim having very good reason to defect if he expects others 
will, and a fairly good reason to defect if he believes it can be kept secret Overall Jim 
prefers a society in which everyone complies with the prohibition, but does not want to 
comply if enough others do not comply 
Kutz claims the example is further complicated when looking at collective harms 
where the actions of one make no perceptible difference to the outcome, yet the "nght" 
action is costly to the agent In these cases, universal defection is the equilibrium in the 
game, and no one who is facing the prospect of universal defection has any reason to 
comply 26 Kutz suggests that because it will be rational for individuals to defect, many 
collective action problems call for political solutions 
If we view climate change as a type of Prisoner's Dilemma, it will be true that not 
only do individual contnbutions make no perceptible difference, but the emissions of 
Ibid 175 
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entire countnes may not matter Garvey raises the objection that unless everyone cuts 
emissions, climate change cannot be stopped Even if a country like Britain were to cut all 
emissions, in a few years this decrease would disappear because of the increased 
emissions from China C02 will continue to increase in the atmosphere, and the global 
temperature will continue to rise Considering the costs associated with decreasing 
emissions, it appears this will provide countries with more reasons to defect than comply 
with agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol or the 1992 Rio Declaration In the case of a 
global phenomenon, political solutions of the type Kutz suggests will not be enough to 
significantly decrease emissions unless all countries work together 
Such collective action problems can be seen in the current discussions about 
climate change at the G8 meeting in Italy last year (2009) Previously, under President 
Bush, the US balked at language in the Kyoto Protocol which required nothing binding 
from developing nations This reaction was viewed as hypocrisy considering the high 
emissions of the US Now, with President Obama's apparently green-minded 
administration, the attention is focussed on developing nations Shyam Saran, who heads 
India's international negotiating team on climate change, says the only limit India will 
accept on greenhouse gas emissions is the same per capita as is enjoyed by citizens in 
developed countnes Of course, if this were to occur in India, the results would be 
catastrophic At the G8 meeting in L'Aquila the industrialised countries proposed a plan 
where by mid-century they would cut their emissions by 80% However, the developed 
countnes argue that if the developing countries do nothing, these expensive efforts will be 
in vain With these international agreements, each country is closely watching the 
28
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others, which decreases the ability to be a free-rider on the system However, most 
nations are unwilling to take the necessary steps to decrease emissions if they bear the 
burden alone (or are not assured of global compliance ) 
The tragedy of the commons is a multiplayer version of the Pnsoner's dilemma, 
and can provide additional insight when examining the case of climate change The 
concept of the tragedy of the commons comes from Garret Hardin (1968) He described 
the situation thus 
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way Picture a pasture open to all It is 
to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the 
commons Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries 
because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast 
well below the carrying capacity of the land Finally, however, comes the day of 
reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a 
reality At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates 
tragedy 30 
In this case the rational choice for each herdsman is to make full use of the common 
resource, and yet if all use it, a threshold will be passed, and the resource depleted or 
destroyed While the Pnsoner's dilemma includes only two parties, the many involved m 
the tragedy of the commons changes the equation If in the Pnsoner's Dilemma Cinque 
and Tanya return to the same situation a second time, the choices they made the first time 
impact what choices they will make the second time For example, if Cinque tnes to 
frame Tanya, the second time Tanya will not trust Cinque, and take this into account 
when deciding upon what action to take In the tragedy of the commons the problem is 
different If an individual herdsman decides to refrain from using or overusing the 
commons, this will not stop the commons from being destroyed The only effect this will 
Hardin (1968) 1243 - 1248 
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have will be added costs for the herdsman, and a competitive disadvantage in relation to 
the other farmers 
The tragedy of the commons is discussed in the literature on environmental harms 
because the damage that is occurring is to a "commons" in much the same way One 
commons could be carbon sinks in the environment Each country, industry, and person 
can choose to make use of the carbon sinks or refrain However, avoiding C02 emissions 
is costly to those who refrain, and if no others follow suit, will not affect the damage to 
the environment Peter Singer argues that the "carbon sinks" that exist belong to all 
humans in common, and that we have to be wary because by using it now we are 
depriving others of the ability to use the sink without bringing about results that are 
harmful to us all Singer uses this to argue for an equal distribution of the use of carbon 
sinks, theorizing a fair and just way to distribute the resource 31 
Both the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons seek to illustrate 
how agents do act when they face the harms we are collectively doing to the environment 
They point out that there are problems when it comes to convincing agents, who will 
normally act m their own rational self-interest, to take the steps necessary to halt this 
destruction Although both these theories are important, I want to quickly move them to 
the side now As Garvey says, whether or not you can convince people that their actions 
are wrong, does not affect whether or not they are wrong Morally demanded actions are 
not contingent on the actions of others, and if it is the nght thing to do, it will still be the 
nght thing to do regardless if others are domg it too 32 Collective action problems, as 
Kutz discusses, are really problems for policymakers after being convinced of the 
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rationality of the argument that collectives bear responsibility for these harms One thing I 
will note is that properly identifying large unstructured acts requires a reconceptuahsing 
of our actions when we act collectively Such re-conceptualisation may help in the case of 
collective action problems All of these problems stem from the image of the agent as 
isolated and individual However, when we act collectively, such an image is misleading 
and likely false 
2.6 Theories of responsibility for Climate change 
In the literature on environmental ethics there are a number of theories that are 
used to argue that there is responsibility when it comes to the environment I am going to 
look at three of these proposals I am looking at these proposals in order to analyse how 
responsibility has been attributed in the literature, and to see any common themes, or 
problems in their approaches In this dissertation I am not directly concerned with our 
responsibilities to the environment By arguing for a new approach to collective 
responsibility that will cover the case of climate change, I am aiming to develop a theory, 
and then follow that theory to its rational and natural conclusion The theories that I am 
examining below start from the assumption that we must bear responsibility for 
environmental damages, and the trick is to figure out how such responsibility will be 
determined This list is not exhaustive 
2.6.2 The Polluter Pays Principle 
The Polluter Pays Principle became popular during the 1970s Basically, it claims 
that "if you break it, you pay for it," or in the case of pollution, industries who are 
polluting should bear the costs of cleanup This principle is embedded in the laws of 
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many countnes, and is in the background of some international agreements For example, 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 states that "National 
Authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and 
the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in pnnciple, bear the cost of pollution "33 From this you can make the further 
argument that it is not just industry that bears responsibility, but nations as well Peter 
Singer identifies this argument in his book One World He wntes 
To put it in terms a child could understand, as far as the atmosphere is concerned, 
the developed nations broke it If we believe that people should contribute to fixing 
something in proportion to their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed 
nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix the problem with the atmosphere 34 
These arguments from Garvey and Singer are attributing responsibility via a causal 
connection 
Although at first glance this proposal has an intuitive appeal, its simplicity may, in 
fact, be its undoing The "you broke it, you bought it" pnnciple is very much in line with 
traditional individual moral responsibility We can assume that not only is the causal 
connection important, but that there will be some kind of epistemological component as 
well, 1 e the consequences need to be reasonably foreseeable For example, you enter a 
china shop and begin running around and roughhousmg among the vases If a vase were 
to break, then you would be responsible for this Further, typically you would be required 
to pay for the broken vase or in some other way provide the vender with something of 
equal value Similarly, it is argued that industrial countnes "broke" the environment and 
therefore are responsible for this loss of value 
Quoted in Garvey (2008) 75 
Singer (2002) 33-34 
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This theory has the same problem introduced in Chapter 1 It treats the collective 
as a single agent, or, in other words, it collectivises the conditions of individual moral 
responsibility In the case of climate change we do not know the causes and effects with 
certainty While we can draw some conclusions regarding cause and effect, it is dissimilar 
to the certainty we have with the broken vase Once again, we cannot simply blame those 
who are the highest emitters of greenhouse gases, because like the vase store, the US is 
not the only one swinging its arms in disregard to the fragile china Every country is m 
the small store The US and other top emitters are simply swinging their arms the most 
wildly This may affect degree of responsibility, but it does not excuse the other 
countries 
Beyond issues of the causes of climate change, and global culpability (if we do 
not restrict it to the worst offenders) there is another pressing issue What about people7 If 
we are going to have an account of responsibility for climate change that is reducible to 
individuals, then more factors need to be taken into account A single person cannot 
"break" the environment, only a collective can However, there must be a way to 
understand individuals withm these collective contexts I will return to this problem in 
Chapter 5 
Although this argument is appealing, it is essentially a causal responsibility 
argument As discussed in Chapter 1 there are problems with these types of arguments 
when it comes to collective responsibility In particular, they are effective in the case of 
attributing responsibility to the collective, but they run into problems when determining 
what that might mean for the individuals m the collectives Do all Americans equally 
share the blame for the carbon emissions of their country, regardless of their own 
contribution? Or are they connected to the harm by their own contribution9 In the latter 
73 
case this will bring m concerns about over-determined harms Additionally, your causal 
contribution to a harm is rarely sufficient in terms of moral responsibility While causal 
contnbutions must play a part in this discussion, more needs to be said about 
responsibility in a collective context 
If we do not adopt the polluter pays principle then we need another principle to 
use if there is going to be responsibility for causing climate change The next argument 
poses a psychological challenge to agents, claiming that if we believe pollution is wrong, 
then we must judge our own action in the same way 
2.6.3 Argument from Consistency 
The argument from consistency identifies the tendency in common parlance to 
blame those developed countries who are the biggest producers of emissions, often for 
luxury items (as opposed to subsistence) Garvey make the following argument, " if you 
find America's or some other country's behaviour morally outrageous, and the principles 
operative in your thinking this apply to you too, then you should find your own behaviour 
morally outrageous too " Garvey here is relying on an argument of consistency, 
claiming that if you believe it is wrong for some to pollute, then if you are yourself 
contributing, you must also be at fault 
This is a powerful argument that has the potential to persuade people to change 
their behaviour However, philosophically, the argument is missing some key ingredients 
While it is true that consistency is important, and it is true that if being a major polluter, 
like Amenca, is morally blameworthy, then the ways in which you act similarly make you 
morally blameworthy as well, we must remember that we do not yet have the theory that 
35
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explains America's blameworthiness satisfactorily The US does have the highest carbon 
emissions per capita, so if we can attribute responsibility for this act to a collective, the 
US will be responsible However, we still need a theory to do so As discussed in Chapter 
1 theones of collective responsibility typically do not cover collectives such as nations, or 
if they do, the theones need more work At best the consistency argument is the second 
part of a bigger argument, one that must first show that Amenca is a collective in the 
sense that it can bear responsibility, and that America fell below or deliberately violated a 
moral rule 
What we need is a theory that can explain the responsibility that someone has to 
stop climate change, or stop actions that are causing climate change The next theory is 
proposed by both Ernest Partridge and Martino Traxler, and seeks to ground a theory of 
responsibility regarding climate change in the nghts of future people 
2.6.4 Rights of Future Generations 
Ernest Partridge (1990) argues that members of future generations have nghts 
claims on present people Partridge's mam contention rests on the fact that the actions of 
present people can affect the lives of future generations, and it is from this ability that 
future generations gam a nghts claim against present people Martino Traxler (2002) 
makes a similar argument, claiming that not only through our ability to harm future 
generations through emissions do current agents become responsible for such harm, but 
that secondly we have duties to avoid harm, " duties to not let harm happen to others, 
particularly when we can do something about it and they cannot and will not be able to do 
so " Traxler considers this our duty of non-maleficence, and the violation of this duty he 
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considers one of the worst things we can do to future generations Traxler claims that 
many of the emissions in developed countries are for luxury items, which he says is 
maleficent For Traxler the production of harmful emissions for non-necessary reasons is 
a morally evil act This means that we are responsible for the damage done to future 
generations 37 
The claim that future generations have rights against present people is common in 
the media We are told that we are the stewards of our children's futures There is a 
powerful PowerWise commercial where David Suzuki is sitting in a tree house with 
young children One child whispers to Suzuki "David I have a friend and his parents 
don't believe in conserving " Before Suzuki can answer, another child says seriously, 
T O 
"But it is our future " And then all the children nod sagely This appeal to our emotions 
rests on the idea that future generations can make rights claims against present people 
The argument claims we all have a right to a life free from problems caused by the 
malicious neglect of the environment by our parents And as such future generations (not 
just our children, but generations into the future, people we will never meet) have these 
rights against us 
Often this argument is backed by John Locke's theory of private property Locke 
argued that you can only hold property justly if you meet the following proviso if you 
leave enough and as good in common for others It is in this way that private property is 
justified Those who seek to use Locke to defend the rights of future generations argue 
that the present use of natural resources, and the Earth in general, can only be justified if 
Traxler (2002) 102-103 
Ibid 109 
Powerwise Commercial (2009) 
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enough and as good is left for future generations This creates a rights claim against 
present people to ensure that future generations will have adequate resources 
What kind of rights can future generations possess*? Do future generations have a 
right to a particular world9 Do they have a right to a world with the Great Barrier Reef 
in it9 Do we have a right to a world with the Dodo in it, a right that is left unfulfilled9 
Such specific rights make little sense Consider a more general right the right to a 
liveable, breathable environment This right may hold more weight However, future 
generations are still imaginary Can they have rights9 And are these rights strong enough 
to force drastic actions on those now living9 
Consider the following example For people living in India, the best situation for 
the future generation of Indians will be for India to continue its technological and 
industrial development, and have the other nations in the world cut back their emissions 
so that climate change will be halted For India to reduce its own emissions will impede 
its development while, if enough it not done globally, it still suffers from climate change 
This will be disastrous for future generations in India who will not only suffer from rising 
sea levels and unpredictable and drastic weather, but also low GDP and little economic 
growth, which will negatively impact their ability to deal with the effects of climate 
change In this case the only way that cutting emissions would be in India's best interests, 
is if developed nations made it a condition upon cutting their own emissions Thus, there 
are different arguments for action that can be made using the justification that it is about 
The idea of obligations to nonexistent persons is problematic, and some have argued 
that is cannot be philosophically sound The existence of these future peoples depends, 
often, on the actions of present people For example see Derek Parfit (1984) Reasons and 
Persons, Oxford Clarendon Press 
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the nghts of future generations What is unclear is exactly which rights, and of what kind, 
future generations can possess 
Each argument for responsibility for climate change, the Polluter Pays Principle, 
Argument from Consistency, and the Rights of Future Generations, provide insights into 
the problem of climate change, but none of them are without their own problems These 
are only three examples of arguments that seek to prove that there is responsibility for 
environmental harms Beyond the insights that such theories provide, they also 
demonstrate a desire to account for environmental harms While alone such a desire is not 
a foundation for a theory, it does indicate that a theory that can do so, and that I will 
propose in Chapter 6, will be welcomed 
2.7 Garvey's four requirements 
Returning to my more general discussion of climate change, I want to examine 
what a successful theory will have to include James Garvey argues that a successful 
account of responsibility for climate change must address four topics historical 
responsibilities, present capacities, sustamability and procedural fairness He argues that a 
successful theory must either address each of these issues, or make a strong argument for 
failing to do so 
Historical responsibilities refer to the fact that some countries have emitted more 
greenhouse gases than others Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere after emission 
Therefore, some of the current problems and climate change can be attributed to 
greenhouse gases that were emitted years ago 40 This is important, because the developed 
countries have been emitting greenhouse gases for decades, while some developing 
40
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countries, like China and India, may become big emitters, but this is a fairly recent 
occurrence What is important to note about emissions occurring presently is that there is 
a global awareness now of what the emissions are doing, an awareness that is fairly 
recent While some countries have been emitting greenhouse gases for much longer, 
under most accounts of responsibility these countries will not meet the epistemic 
condition 
The argument about present capacities focuses on who is able to take action 
Much of the technology and action required to decrease greenhouse gas emissions is 
expensive, both monetarily and time wise When it comes to devoting a large amount of 
resources to research and development of these technologies the developed countries are 
in a better position to do so Garvey argues that the developed world can much more 
easily take on the burdens of adaptation and mitigation He argues that this ability leads to 
a greater responsibility to do so 41 This is an interesting argument, but will require more 
defence before it becomes compelling Measuring which country has the greatest ability 
to make a difference is inexact It could be the case that solutions to climate change will 
come from the least developed countries, in which case it would be strange for 
responsibility to lie mostly, or solely, with developed countries who, despite resources, 
were not able to enact a solution 
The third issue that Garvey brings up is sustainabihty This connects to the issue 
of future people, and that the lives of future people ought to matter to us 42 This argument 
will depend on a further examination of the argument for the nghts of future generations, 
41
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and will likely depend on the costs of action and inaction Problems with this type of 
approach were outlined in the previous section 
The fourth issue is procedural fairness Garvey says that each party to the 
agreement should have equal share in the information relevant to a decision, and an 
adequate understanding of the facts 4 31 will keep all these issues in mind when working 
through this dissertation Any solution presented in this dissertation will have to go 
beyond these issues which are only considering climate change as that which people can 
be responsible for, and is not considering it as a case of collective responsibility 
2.8 Suggested Solutions 
In the literature there are two proposed solutions that I will discuss briefly They 
capture some of the same ideas as the theories above The first is that the solution must 
include an equitable use of C02 sinks The idea is that there is, at any given time, a finite 
amount global C02 sinks can absorb without there being a build-up of C02 with the 
result of climate change If there is an amount of C02 that can be safely emitted, it is 
argued, we must determine what would be an equitable allocation of this resource Some 
argue on simply dividing the C02 among the global population and allotting emissions 
individually While this is the most just distribution there are enormous practical 
problems, the least of which is that global population is not constant Further, there are 
convincing arguments that subsistence emissions should be allowed first, and such 
emissions will depend on geographic location (heating in cold climates) as well as 
technological ability Adding in these considerations only adds to the procedural 
Ibid 118 
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complexity So, as a philosophical solution to how we contnbute (and who is responsible) 
this may be satisfactory, but impractical 
The second is a solution outlined by Bart Gruzalski (1990) Gruzalski is struggling 
with the idea that in the case of pollution individual acts are not harmful, and that the 
harm often happens when many individual actions pass a threshold Gruzalski looks at it 
from the perspective of act utilitarianism, but adds the idea of what is a foreseeable 
consequence Without this addition, it will be unclear m the case of any individual act 
whether it will be necessary or sufficient to cross the threshold and move from harmless 
to damaging Gruzalski suggests we move away from measuring actual consequences, 
and instead focus on foreseeable consequences 44 
Gruzalski argues that an act is right if and only if the expected desirability of the 
act is no less than the expected desirability of any available alternative 45 While it might 
not be clear which individual act of pollution will cross the threshold and cause damage, 
each action has, as its foreseeable consequence, the harm Further, Gruzalski argues that 
the greater the degree of pollution, the greater the harm caused So, for example, throwing 
garbage into the ocean increases the likelihood of individual sea animals being harmed, 
and increases the possibility of thresholds being crossed that would produce much greater 
harms 46 
Gruzalski's solution may require that we re-conceptualize our actions in a way 
that, although not collective, see our actions as part of a mosaic of like actions Our 
individual action may not cross any pollution threshold, but if we know that others are 
acting in a similar manner, then our one action could be substantially more damaging 
44
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Gruzalski claims that this nature of certain actions is foreseeable, and thus even on a 
consequence heavy theory like act utilitarianism individual acts of pollution can be 
blameworthy 
I sympathize with Gruzalski's solution, and throughout this dissertation I argue 
that a re-conceptualization of our individual acts is essential to understanding our role in 
collectives Gruzalski's theory will restrict some harms because of the requirement of 
foreseeability While now the global population may see emissions in such a light (I will 
return to this in Chapter 4) this is fairly recent There is a question that lingers - what 
does reasonable foreseeabilty mean? And while I may foresee that throwing garbage into 
the ocean has the potential to harm sea creatures, do I see my dnvmg to the university as 
truly contributing to a cyclone in Asia9 And can I? 
Having explored some issues in the literature of environmental philosophy, I will 
return to analysing climate change in terms of collective responsibility 
2.9 Problems with climate change as a collective act 
Before examining climate change from the perspective of specific theories of 
collective responsibility, I will lay out two problems any theory of collective 
responsibility will have to address or explain if such large unstructured groups are to be 
considered These two issues are the problem of over-determined harms and what 
constitutes group membership 
When looking at the case of two people painting a house together, we could easily 
look at the painted house (completed project) and see that Sue painted the south facing 
wall, and Lou painted the east facing wall Each painter contributed in a noticeable way 
While the "painted house" is, in a sense, an indivisible accomplishment, we can easily 
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identify the actions of each member to the house m question This allows us, if necessary, 
to claim that Lou's actions contributed to the painted house, that the house would not 
have been painted in the same way (or perhaps in the same time) had Lou not done her 
part of the collective act 
While the example of painting the house is simplistic, a similar argument can be 
made for the actions of teams, corporations, and any collective with a structure Each 
member contributes, and the final act is the result of these combined efforts There are 
two ways of understanding this type of responsibility - collective responsibility can be 
considered reductive or non-reductive In Chapter 5 I will be examining this difference in 
greater detail, but it does pertain to the discussion of over-determined harms If, as some 
writers claim, collective responsibility is not reducible to the members of the collective, 
so that the collective can be responsible while the members themselves are not culpable, 
then we do not need to understand the impact of the actions of each member on the 
determination of collective responsibility However, if, as other writers argue, collective 
responsibility is reducible in some way to the members, in that the members are culpable, 
then we may need to understand what the contributions of the members are m order to 
determine the weight of the responsibility they may bear 
In the case of Sue and Lou, the contributions of each are clear In the case of some 
teams, corporations, etc, we can come up with complex, but clear guideline as to the 
contributions of each The collective act is the sum of the individual actions of the 
members, and thus contributions are easy to determine Many actions of large 
unstructured collectives will be over-determined After a certain number of members have 
contributed to the collective act, each additional member's actions will not alter the 
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outcome In other words, the removal or addition of one member will have no effect on 
the collective act 
In Chapter 1 I introduced Christopher Kutz's example of the firebombing of 
Dresden In this case the additional contribution or elimination of a single bomber would 
have made no difference to the harm done (the firestorm) In much the same way, when 
looking at the case of climate change if I were to live "off the grid", not using any 
resources from society and living a completely pollution free and sustainable life, this 
would not decrease greenhouse gas emissions in any measurable way If I were to buy a 
SUV and drive five hundred kilometres every day, this also would not change emissions 
in any relevant sense And in particular, when speaking of the existing greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere these actions would make no difference 
Kutz addresses the firebombing example by moving to a theory of collective 
responsibility that relies on participatory intentions, as opposed to causal contributions 
Group membership and thus responsibility is determined by intention to participate, 
intention regarding the end goal of the collective In the case of the allied bombing this is 
easier to see than in the case of climate change The pilots, the bombers, all those 
involved were ordered to do so as part of their job And while we may argue over whether 
that makes the individuals responsible, or in the case of strict military hierarchy, the 
person in charge responsible, we do agree that the goal was clear as was the result of 
participation The firestorm itself was not predicted, but the result of destroying that 
particular target was Climate change is similar to the Dresden case because much like the 
addition or elimination of any one bomber would have made no difference to the 
outcome, the addition or elimination of any one polluter will make no difference to 
climate change However, Kutz attributes collective responsibility in the Dresden case 
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based on the intention to participate by the members Climate change is not the intention 
of the polluters In some cases you can even argue it is not foreseen by polluters, as they 
did not believe their action made any difference to the outcome Thus, while in the 
Dresden case the over-determined nature of the harm does not affect responsibility, if we 
use Kutz's participatory intentions, this same approach fails in the case of climate change 
Climate change is over-determmed, but appealing to participatory intentions will not help 
connect agents to the harm Kutz's participatory intentions will not be enough in the case 
of climate change, and any theory that seeks to account for such large, unstructured 
collectives will have to address the problem of over-determination 
The second problem is that of membership in these collectives We can say that, in 
broad terms, industrialised countries are causing climate change And in this case the 
membership of that collective may appear clear As long as we are not aiming to actually 
hold either the group or the individuals responsible, this description will suffice 
However, if responsibility is to be attributed, I may want to know if I am in the collective 
causing climate change Does membership pertain to all countries, or only those who are 
the top half of contributors to greenhouse gas emissions? Does it matter if the country is 
industrialised or not9 What if it has the ability, technology and capital to significantly 
decrease emissions? Should we look at the emissions of countries as a whole, or per 
capita, or look only at individual contributions above a certain level? In the case of the 
Dresden bombing the members of the collective were clear In the case of Sue and Lou 
painting the house, membership in the collective is clear But when examining the case of 
large unstructured collectives membership is more complex, and may never lead to the 
same clarity that can exist in other types of collectives Any theory that seeks to account 
for responsibility of such large unstructured collectives will also have to address this 
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membership problem, either accounting for its dissimilarities with other kinds of 
collectives, or finding some common ground 
Having identified two issues that occur in collective responsibility, over-
determined harms and mysterious membership conditions, I will return to Kutz to 
examine his treatment of environmental harms as cases of collective responsibility 
2.10 Kutz on the environment. 
Christopher Kutz (2000) characterizes environmental damage as being the result 
of, " knowing but uncoordinated activity of disparate individuals, each of whose actions 
contnbutes only imperceptibly to the resulting harm "47 Kutz focuses on the case of 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used in car air conditioners, the use of which contnbutes to 
the destruction of the ozone layer Residence under "holes" in the ozone layer has been 
linked to increased skin cancer rates 48 
Kutz asks us to suppose that Amencan dnvers of CFC-cooled cars contnbute one 
quarter of the CFCs released into the atmosphere, and further that the increased CFC 
emissions globally have been linked to 4000 additional skin cancer cases in Northern 
Australia because of a hole in the ozone layer According to Kutz, we can thus attnbute 
1000 skin cancer cases to Amencan dnvers In Kutz's example Amencan dnvers do 
make a difference, and could do better if more expensive, non-CFC-based refrigerants 
were widely used 49 For Kutz what makes this case difficult is that each individual dnver 
has a negligible impact on the outcome (one more or less driver wouldn't change the 
number of those harmed), and further, reducing or eliminating the harm requires that all 
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or most of the drivers change their actions This leads to problems for Kutz's theory, 
and he claims that in the end it means that although American drivers as a group may be 
responsible for 1000 skin cancer cases, no individual driver can be 
Kutz then examines a few different possibilities to determine responsibility in 
these cases, suggesting an expansion of his complicity principle (I am accountable for 
what others do when I intentionally participate in the wrong they do or the harm they 
cause51) to cases of unstructured collectives He claims, "If agents are individually 
morally accountable for the harms that result when no one cooperates, then each has 
C O 
reason to ensure that the harms are mitigated or prevented " However, Kutz discards 
this possibility because each agent, if they believe others will alter behaviour, will have 
reason to continue In the CFC example, if Jack knows that everyone else is changing 
their air conditioners to the non-CFC kind, then he no longer has any need to Jack, as the 
lone user of the CFC-based coolant is no longer causing harm This is a collective action 
problem, or the Prisoner's Dilemma as discussed in section 2 5 Jack ultimately wants to 
free-ride on the system, as that would be the best outcome for him 
Kutz argues instead that individuals need to see themselves as part of the group, 
and to accomplish this he proposes two conditions that are jointly required to ground 
individual accountability in cases of unstructured group responsibility quasi-participatory 
accountability, and character or symbolic based accountability As discussed m Chapter 1, 
the first refers to collective responsibility even when the individual members of the 
collective do not have a specific project to which they contribute 53 Kutz adds that when 
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we emphasize the moral importance of pre-existing networks of collaboration it will bnng 
individuals to awareness regarding how they participate in the actions of the collective 54 
American society can be argued to support the use (or overuse) of cars which are 
affordable to all (or most) which leads Americans to see driving their car as necessary, or 
as a right, and does not connect them to the need to pay for an expensive upgrade in order 
to decrease the harm done to others 
Symbolic, or character based responsibility is connected to the idea that by even 
benefiting from a wrong, it can be argued that an agent indicates his or her tolerance for 
the conduct that produced it55 Kutz says, "Agents are accountable not only by virtue of 
what they have done or caused, but for what they might have done or caused They are 
accountable in virtue of who they are " Kutz says further that, in these cases the motive 
might not be causal, and the agent need not believe that they will even cause others to 
behave similarly Rather, the agent chooses this action as a way of "expressing 
meaning "56 
In the case of symbolic or character based accountability, Kutz is eliminating the 
distinction between the person who intended to act and did not, and the person who 
intended to act, and did For example, if you support the bombing of Dresden such that, in 
different circumstances, you would have participated, then under symbolic or character 
based accountability you would be part of the responsible collective Kutz requires that 
agents meet both symbolic or character based accountability, and have quasi-participatory 
intentions, so your character alone cannot make you comphcit However, he is arguing 
that the kind of person you are is going to be important in attributions of responsibility 
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Kutz further expands this to include receiving benefit So, for example, if you hold a 
pnvileged position in society, by nature of your birth (be it racial, gender, or class based) 
receiving these benefits can make you comphcit in the actions that created the 
inequalities 
This type of accountability is vulnerable to many criticisms Beyond cries of 
"beware the thought police" we have eliminated any difference between performing a 
morally problematic act, and being capable of doing so or benefiting from it This method 
strays from the foundation of traditional individual moral responsibility as we will see m 
Chapter 3 Such a radical departure requires significantly more defence than is provided 
by Kutz In the end I put these concerns aside If the answer in collective responsibility 
cases is a kind of proportionate responsibility for members, it seems clear that those who 
are guilty by character will receive the least responsibility, if any at all 
There are a number of problems with Kutz's theory, the most important being that 
in the end Kutz himself is not convinced of its success in the case of harms caused by 
unstructured collectives like that of environmental damage It is telling that Kutz, when 
addressing the case of environmental harms artificially restncts the example, and yet still 
was not satisfied with the theory he was able to present The collective of Amencan car 
dnvers who have CFC-based coolant in their air conditioners is very dissimilar from the 
case of climate change The identity of the members is clear, the action they must take is 
clear, and the damage (1000 skin cancer cases) is clear However, this is not the true 
nature of environmental damages In order to identify a successful account, the true 
nature of the harm must be understood 
Putting aside the problems m Kutz's account, his quasi-participatory 
accountability has ment Kutz claims that we need to change the way we understand our 
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actions, and see them in a collective context Tracy Isaacs, who writes on collective 
responsibility, makes a similar claim, saying that when we look only at individuals and 
their actions and do not consider it in the context of the actions of others we fail to 
capture the nature and extent of the wrong 57 Isaacs argues that individual actions need to 
be understood as contributions to collective acts 58 This rethinking or change of our 
perceptions is an important step towards understanding large unstructured collective acts 
such as climate change But alone, such a suggestion for individuals to be reflective will 
not be enough 
Kutz's symbolic or character based accountability, as he himself argues, is not 
enough to provide the kind of responsibility that he wants, and has been promoting 
throughout his argument While many arguments have been made regarding benefiting 
from a wrong, and thus being somehow comphcit in the wrong itself,59 once again this is 
not enough When it comes to responsibility not all theorists are willing to hold agents 
responsible for their thoughts or characters In fact, one of the strongest critiques of 
collective responsibility is that it holds agents responsible for that which is out of their 
control60 While Kutz recognises the harm caused to the environment by unstructured 
collectives, even after artificially restricting the example he is hard pressed to provide an 
adequate account of responsibility to cover such cases The fact that Kutz's original 
theory of collective responsibility fails in cases of large unstructured collectives goes 
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unanswered by Kutz In order to use different accounts of responsibility when addressing 
different kinds of collectives an explanation must be provided Otherwise, Kutz is putting 
the cart before the horse - assuming responsibility in these cases, and then proposing 
different theories for different situations in order to show there is responsibility An 
adequate theory of collective responsibility will have to either explain why it differs 
between structured and unstructured collectives, or will have to apply to both 
Above I have identified a few key problems with Kutz's approach to 
environmental harms It will be hard under his account to identify members of the 
collective, the actions to be taken, and the damage to be avoided Why are these problems 
so intractable9 Each of the issues analyzed here is a key component of various theories 
that seek to hold agents responsible for harms such as climate change It is important to 
identify the responsible parties because we need to know who is responsible so that we 
can assign blame justly To explain, I am not aiming, like the environmental philosophy 
accounts above, to simply change the behaviour of those who can stop climate change 
Instead, climate change is just an example of a harm perpetrated, I argue, by a large 
unstructured collective My purpose is to develop a theory that will cover such large, 
unstructured collectives Thus, while some of these identifications may be less important 
for convincing people to stop polluting, they factor in accounts of responsibility, and must 
be addressed, even if only for the purpose of dismissing them later 
Some of these identity issues will cease if we accept a non-reducible account of 
collective responsibility, as I will discuss in Chapter 5 If the group is responsible, but no 
individual agent blameworthy as Margaret Gilbert argues, then the account itself may be 
able to be less rigorous While I argue against a non-reductive account, when it comes to 
large collectives that are constructed of semi-structured collectives (nations) certain 
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solutions may well be available Perhaps governments can be held responsible, with the 
belief that they will choose to enact policy that effectively holds their citizens responsible 
This solution has some practical clout, and I will return to it in later chapters There is 
also a possibility of proportional responsibility, that while all citizens of the world are 
comphcit, certain emissions attribute greater responsibility to some I will say more on 
this possibility in later chapters Any of the suggestions that leave no individual agents 
responsible will avoid these issues However, a non-reductive account is itself 
problematic I will discuss such accounts in more detail in Chapter 5 Next I turn to 
another issue that must be addressed - identifying the nature of climate change 
2.11 Climate change: Human Act or Natural Act? 
Climate change presents a real and immediate threat to many people around the 
world, from Saha in India, to the entire Republic of the Maldives, and may partly be 
responsible for the conflict in Darfur The victims are many and the harms are variable 
Climate change is caused by the existence of too many greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, which is caused by the use of fossil fuels Based on per capita calculations, 
this leaves a number of countries, Canada and the US included, at the top of the list of 
contributors 
The nature of climate change, including the identity of the perpetrators and 
victims, is complex, messier than the examples common in the philosophical literature on 
collective responsibility However, there are only two choices climate change (and thus 
the displacement, death, and suffering caused by climate change) is the fault of someone 
or some people, or is it the fault of no one To speak of climate change as being the 
responsibility of "us all" with no adequate theory to explain such a claim may be useful in 
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motivating a change in behaviour, but for the purposes of this dissertation, is far from 
adequate If there is no theory to determine responsibility for climate change that means it 
must be the case that no one is responsible for this harm 
For climate change to be the fault of no one would be to place it m the same 
category as most weather events or accidents The fact that a tornado demolishes my 
house and not yours is no one's fault Neither of us could have done anything to change 
the outcome You could argue that when Europeans first explored the Americas, and 
infected the local inhabitants with a variety of diseases including small pox (before this 
was used as a tactic against indigenous people) this was a blameless act The difference in 
susceptibility to certain diseases was unknown by both groups 
Tim Flannery argues in The Weather Makers that society nearly collapsed thirty 
years ago when industrial chemists began using CFCs They chose chlonne over bromine 
(a very similar chemical) for largely economic reasons, as chlonne was cheaper 
Bromine is forty-five times more effective at destroying ozone, and if BFCs had been 
used in aerosols and refrigerants in 1928 instead of CFCs, the ozone layer would have 
been destroyed long before scientists would have realised what was happening The fact 
that the ozone was not destroyed was luck, and had BFCs been chosen instead, the 
ensuing destruction would have been the fault of no one 61 This example has parallels to 
the case of climate change, particularly when it comes to the problems of knowledge for 
unstructured collective acts An argument can be made that without knowledge of 
outcomes, blame is mappropnate I will return to this topic in the next chapter 
The common denominator in the second two cases, of smallpox and BFCs is that 
those causing the action in question could not have known what was going to happen In 
61
 Flannery (2006) 216-217 
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the first case of the tornado, it was simply part of what it means to live on this planet In 
all cases collective responsibility or responsibility at all seems inappropriate 
The question is, is climate change like these cases? There is an argument that can 
be made to say that climate change, in the past, was similar The IPCC was established in 
1988, and produced its first Assessment Report in 1990 that led to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Until 2005 climate change was a topic for 
scientists, who themselves had not reached consensus Around 2005 scientists had largely 
reached agreement on climate change, and the public was slowly being informed In 2006 
the popularity of Al Gore's, An Inconvenient Truth demonstrates that there was a public 
awakening to the facts about climate change 
At current levels carbon dioxide has a residence time in the atmosphere of 5-200 
years The range is largely due to the many different rates of uptake by different removal 
processes Methane has a twelve year residence, and nitrous oxide has a 114 year 
residence That means that many of the greenhouse gases currently resident in the 
atmosphere were put there before the public knew of the causes of climate change, or the 
effects of certain practices There are strong arguments to be made against responsibility 
in the case of ignorance, and in this case not even personal ignorance, but ignorance of 
the collective as a whole I will be examining this issue in more detail in the next few 
chapters Despite initial ignorance, climate change is now an accepted part of our 
communal information The causes of climate change (or at least the human causes) have 
been identified, individuals and countries are aware of what actions need to occur to 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) 
Gnd-Arendal (2003) This website contains the full text and graphics from the three 
working group contributions to the IPCC Third Assessment Report "Climate Change 
2001" and the Synthesis Report April 2, 2009 
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lessen or stop the harm, and further, with the growing popularity of the term "climate 
refugee" we also know who is being victimized 
If we look at the harm of climate change, we can claim that certain collectives, 
possibly industrialised nations, know of their contributions to climate change, and have 
the ability to alter their behaviour The technology and the capital exists in most of these 
countries to drastically decrease, or eliminate, their contribution of greenhouse gases 
Further, m these same countries there is knowledge of the causes and victims of climate 
change The harm is over-determined, as the actions of any one person in these nations 
will make no difference, but if these nations together took action to limit their 
contributions, this would have a significant impact The nature of the unstructured 
collective of industrialised nations is dissimilar from the collectives examined in the 
philosophical literature on collective responsibility However, considering that this 
collective has caused the harm in question, and has reasonable knowledge of the outcome 
of these actions, it becomes clear that this is a case of moral responsibility 
2.12 Conclusion 
In 2000 256 million people were affected by disasters At the end of the 1990s 
there were 25 million "environmental refugees", there were more people fleeing natural 
hazards than conflict64 The report from the Federation of the Red Cross says, 
So 'natural' can be a misleading description for disasters such as droughts, floods 
and cyclones which afflict much of the developing world Recognising these 
disasters as often ww/natural, identifying the many human-made root causes and 
advocating structural and political changes to combat them, is long overdue 65 
World Disasters Report (2001) 6-11 
Ibid 12 
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Climate change is creating victims around the world, and it is caused by an extremely 
large unstructured collective The analysis of this chapter suggests that someone is 
morally responsible for the harm of climate change However, as is clear when examining 
theories of collective responsibility from Christopher Kutz and Margaret Gilbert, more 
work must be done to understand responsibility in the case of large unstructured 
collectives In the next chapter I will examine the traditional account of individual moral 
responsibility and explore its connection to moral responsibility for the actions of large, 
unstructured collectives 
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Chapter 3: Individual Moral Responsibility and the Control Problem 
3.1 Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to explore the concept of individual moral responsibility 
in order to add to my analysis of collective responsibility As explored in previous 
chapters most theones of collective responsibility fail as the collective increases in size 
and decreases in structure Further, most theones rely on "collectivizing" the conditions 
for individual moral responsibility Instead of an agent intending and acting these theones 
posit that the group intends and acts As discussed, this approach is open to cnticism, 
most notably because of the failure of these theories to apply to large, unstructured 
collectives, which, as I identified in Chapter 2, need to be accounted for The traditional 
theory of individual moral responsibility has an intuitive plausibility not afforded to 
theones of collective responsibility In this chapter I will focus on individual moral 
responsibility and, without attempting to "collectivize" it, see how it can apply in 
collective contexts 
To begin I will examine the traditional theory of individual moral responsibility as 
descnbed and defended by Anstotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, argued to be the first 
explicit construction of a theory of moral responsibility Anstotle identifies two 
conditions as integral to individual responsibility the control condition and the epistemic 
condition As philosophers interpreted Anstotle's account two camps of thought emerged 
In the first were those that interpreted Anstotle's account to be ment-based Under this 
interpretation responsibility (praise or blame) is only appropnate if the agent "deserves" 
such a reaction Proponents of this view also argued that free will must exist for there to 
be morality (incompatibilism) The second group argued that Anstotle's account was 
consequentialist, and that responsibility is appropriate when such a reaction will lead to a 
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desired change in the agent Proponents of this view claim that free will is compatible 
with determinism (compatibihsm) The debate between these two views of responsibility 
shaped most of the resulting philosophical debate on the topic ' In 1962 Peter Strawson, 
in an important article "Freedom and Resentment", argues that neither the merit-based 
nor consequentiahst view were correct, and that both distorted the concept of moral 
responsibility Strawson introduced a new way of approaching responsibility that focused 
on principles that are based on the reactive attitudes of participants (internal to the agent) 
as opposed to external conditions like those from Aristotle Following Strawson's radical 
claims many theonsts cntiqued his complete elimination of an external objective position 
from which to judge moral actions In John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S J 's 
Responsibility and Control (1998) these wnters propose a theory that gives Strawson's 
reactive attitudes a central role, but also includes the ability to objectively judge moral 
practices Fischer and Ravizza defend a ment-based view of compatibihsm I turn to the 
accounts of Anstotle, Strawson and Fischer and Ravizza to illuminate the current 
complexities of the argument for individual moral responsibility 
In later sections of this chapter, and in Chapter 4,1 return to Anstotle's two 
conditions and explore each in depth When applied in a collective context both of 
Aristotle's conditions raise pressing concerns For example, much has been wntten 
questioning how control should be construed The control condition is an issue for wnters 
like H D Lewis (wntmg after World War II) who argues that we can only be responsible 
for what we can directly control We cannot be responsible for the actions of others As 
this is a common issue in possible attributions of collective responsibility, I turn to 
1 1 will only be discussing the compatibihst/incompatibihst debate in order to provide 
context to the theones I am analyzing in this chapter To tread further into this debate is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation 
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arguments from both Larry May and Fischer and Ravizza to offer insight into how this 
problem may be solved for cases of collective responsibility In the next chapter I turn to 
the epistemic condition for moral responsibility, in particular examining what we can 
reasonably ask agents to know in order to hold them responsible 
The purpose of this chapter is to go behind the theories for collective 
responsibility presented in Chapter 1, and focus on what it means to be individually 
responsible After examining these conditions, I then move to see what they look like in a 
collective context The cntiques of the implausibility of collective responsibility are often 
motivated by concerns about control and knowledge in the collective context I argue that 
the conditions for individual moral responsibility can be applied to collectives, if we 
apply some of the solutions presented here The theory I will present in Chapter 6 will be 
an account of individual responsibility in a collective context 
3.2 Traditional Theories of Individual Moral Responsibility 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle presents one of the first detailed accounts of 
individual moral responsibility In Book III 1-5 Aristotle explores the foundations of 
moral responsibility He distinguishes between acts that are voluntary, involuntary and 
non-voluntary, claiming that acts that are voluntary receive praise and blame, and those 
that are not receive pity and pardon Although he spends a great deal of this section 
discussing what makes an act involuntary or non-voluntary (chiefly compulsion or 
ignorance) he also clearly states the characteristics of a voluntary act He says, " a 
voluntary act would seem to be one of which the originating cause lies in the agent 
2
 Aristotle 3 I 1109b30-l 110al6 
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himself, who knows the particular circumstances of the action" 3 The circumstances 
which the agent must know about would be that a particular action would cause a 
particular result For example, in Hamlet, Hamlet hears someone behind a curtain and, 
thinking it is Claudius who he believes killed his own father, he stabs the curtain It turns 
out that it was not Claudius, but instead Polonius behind the curtain and Hamlet has killed 
him In this example Hamlet does not know the circumstances of this action He did not 
know that by stabbing the curtain he would kill Polonius In Chapter 2 I discussed the 
case of the emission of CFCs into the atmosphere, and how, when this initially began, no 
one knew what consequences this would have on the atmosphere We did not understand 
the full nature of the action itself From this we can conclude that for Aristotle a person is 
morally responsible for X when she causes X, and where she knew that she would cause 
X, or possibly cause X 
With this initial characterization of responsibility Aristotle launches into a lengthy 
discussion of more complex cases For Aristotle, as for many wnters in moral philosophy, 
a moral agent is one who possesses the capacity for making decisions He writes, " our 
next task is to discuss choice, because it is felt to be very closely related to moral 
goodness, and to be a better test of character than actions are "4 With this emphasis on 
choice, ignorance and compulsion as excusing conditions requires more analysis 
Choice figures in both the causal and epistemological conditions for Aristotle 
Compulsion occurs where the causal connection from agent to action is compromised, 
thus leaving us to believe responsibility may be unwarranted Aristotle characterises 
compulsion in the following way 
3
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4
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It seems likely, then, that an act is compulsory <only> when its originating cause is 
external, and receives no contribution from the person under compulsion 5 
" [translator's emphasis] 
He clarifies 
What sort of acts, then, ought we to call compulsory? Surely we should call them 
compulsory without qualification when the cause is external and the agent 
contributes nothing to it, whereas acts that are in themselves involuntary but are 
preferable at a given time and at a given cost, and that have their origin in the agent, 
although they are involuntary in themselves, nevertheless are voluntary at the given 
time and cost They are more like voluntary acts, because actions belong to the 
sphere of particulars, and here the particular acts are voluntary 6 
In the above quote Anstotle makes a number of important distinctions First, if the agent 
is forced into an action (the cause is external to the agent), then this is an example of 
compulsion and the agent is excused from individual moral responsibility The second 
descnption is more interesting Anstotle argues that if the action has its origins in the 
agent, and is preferable to the agent, then the action is voluntary, and the agent may be 
individually morally responsible The first case of compulsion excludes cases where you 
force my hand to press the tngger of a gun killing someone However, the second case 
muddies the distinction by bnngmg in the agent's preference, their desires regarding the 
action Did the agent want the result9 For Anstotle, if the answer is yes, this has a beanng 
on whether compulsion can be an excusing condition This emphasis on the agent's 
preference or character is a topic that will be taken up again in Strawson's account of 
reactive attitudes This underlines the importance of intent in moral responsibility 
As for the epistemological condition, Anstotle takes a similar approach, he says 
Every act done through ignorance is non-voluntary, but it is involuntary only when 
it causes the agent subsequent pain and repentance For if a man has done any act 
through ignorance and is not m the least upset about it, although he has not acted 
5 Ib id3i l l l0b7-31 
6Ibid3ill0al7-1110b7 
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voluntarily (not knowing what he was doing), he has not acted involuntarily either, 
since he feels no pain 7 
Once again, it seems clear that Anstotle is concerned with the harm that occurs without 
the agent having control that causes an outcome that is unwanted by the agent In these 
cases the action originates in the agent, but they are acting through ignorance of the 
particular situation While the epistemic condition can be seen as connected to the control 
condition (you cannot have control if you are unaware of your actions/situation) I 
separate them here because the control condition is concerned with causal connections 
you do not control, for example if you slip and fall into a window The epistemic 
condition is focused on the agent making a mistake, for example if you are not able to 
read the sign "floor is slippery" before stepping on it Anstotle discusses the story of 
Oedipus as an example When Oedipus kills his father and marnes his mother, he does so 
believing they are other people The actions do originate in Oedipus, but the intent, or the 
choice, does not Oedipus is acting out of ignorance Oedipus may be responsible for 
regicide, but not patncide Anstotle labels these acts as "mixed", however he states that if 
overall the action is one the agent would not choose in these circumstances then the 
action is involuntary8 Thus, because Oedipus would never choose to kill his father and 
marry his mother under that descnption, the act itself is involuntary It is important to 
note that in this case the intent of the agent is used as a "tiebreaker" in mixed actions 
Moving to a more recent ethical account, Peter Strawson aimed to dissolve the 
conflict between determinism and responsibility Strawson argues that our "reactive 
attitudes" towards others, which includes anger, gratitude, sympathy and resentment, are 
natural Strawson then examines what impact the thesis of determinism would have on 
7 Ib id3i l l l0b7-31 
8
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our reactive attitudes 9 Gary Watson characterises Strawson's project in the following 
way 
Whereas traditional views have taken these attitudes to be secondary to seeing 
others as responsible, to be practical corollaries or emotional side effects of some 
independently comprehensive belief in responsibility, Strawson's radical claim is 
that these "reactive attitudes" (as he calls them) are constitutive of moral 
responsibility, to regard oneself or another as responsible just is the proneness to 
react to them in these kinds of ways under certain conditions 10 
For Strawson these attitudes denve from our participation in personal relationships, and 
the function of these attitudes express how much we care whether the actions of other 
people reflect good will, or lack of good will, towards us l 1 
Strawson also identifies the same two excusing conditions that Aristotle 
identified, he writes 
The agent was just ignorant of the injury he was causing, or had lost his balance 
through being pushed or had reluctantly to cause the injury for reasons which 
acceptably override his reluctance l2 
Watson illuminates Strawson's position by saying, " It works by denying the 
appearance that the other failed to fulfil the basic demand, when a valid excuse 
obtains, the internal cntena of the negative reactive attitudes are not satisfied "13 Here 
Strawson's interpretation of the same two conditions charactenses action slightly 
differently than Anstotle Strawson has provided an explanation for cases where an 
agent must perform an action they do not want to, but that, the performance 
nevertheless meets the cntena for being free For example, as is common in many 
action movies, let's say you are in a position where some kidnapper has your family 
9
 Strawson (1983) 63 
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 Watson (1987) 257 
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 Ibid 65 
13
 Watson (1987) 260 
103 
and you are given the choice of either letting your family die, or killing some third 
party In this example, while your action is freely chosen by you, the killing of the 
third party is different than it would be in a case without these circumstances You are 
reluctant to kill the third party, but this reluctance is overridden by care for your 
family Further, we will react to this person, if the circumstances are made known, 
much more positively than if they had simply decided to murder someone You may 
object that this situation is highly manipulative to the extent that we may want to claim 
that the agent was coerced Coercion often represents an excusing condition in 
responsibility However, what is important in the example is that the agent is provided 
with a choice, and does act intentionally Further, the example is intended to 
illuminate, not the role of manipulation, but the difference in reactive attitudes towards 
this person depending on their circumstances (rather than on the consequences only) 
Both ignorance and lack of control (lack of intention although causally connected) 
are considered excusing conditions for Strawson He also examines the situation of those 
we would not consider members of the moral community, those who are insane, or 
children up to a particular age 14 Strawson is exploring what are exculpating conditions 
in order to investigate our intuitions regarding responsibility within a determined 
framework Strawson asks us whether the thesis of determinism should cause us to view 
everyone in the same objectifying way that we do those we deem outside of moral 
consideration 15 We look at the insane person as someone to manage, to control and to 
speak on their behalf because they are not able to be members of the moral community In 
order to make such a distinction between the insane and those who we consider to be 
14
 Strawson (1983) 65 
15
 Ibid 68 
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moral agents, it must be the case that someone can make morally relevant choices For, 
like the insane person who lacks the proper connection to the external world, the lack of 
control agents have in a determined universe may land them in a similar situation where 
their choices cannot be considered morally relevant Strawson's reply is that embracing 
such a stance towards everyone is not something we can, " seriously envisage ourselves 
adopting "16 
Strawson's account of responsibility aims to be descriptive of human nature 
There is no independent notion of responsibility for Strawson, he claims rather that we 
believe ourselves to be responsible because of the practice of being held responsible 17 As 
Watson characterises it, " Holding responsible is an expression of the basic concern and 
the basic demand, whose 'legitimacy' requires neither metaphysical freedom or 
efficacy "18 
Strawson's account of responsibility began a debate on the necessity of objective 
principles in ethics 19 Previously, accounts of responsibility had mirrored Aristotle's, 
using rules that measured actions against an external concept of good and bad to 
determine agent responsibility Strawson challenged this approach and emphasized the 
importance of internal conditions that are dependent on the agents who are involved in the 
act itself For Strawson the goodness or badness of an action would depend on who the 
16
 Ibid 69 
17
 Watson (1987) 258 " In Strawson's view, there is no such independent notion of 
responsibility that explains the propnety of the reactive attitudes The explanatory pnonty 
is the other way around It is not that we hold people responsible because they are 
responsible, rather, the idea {our idea) that we are responsible is to be understood by the 
practice, which itself is not a matter of holding some propositions to be true, but of 
expressing our concerns and demands about our treatment of one another " 
18
 Ibid 261 
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 See Watson and R J Wallace m Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1994 Chapters 5 -6 for different versions of this argument 
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agents in this particular situation were Theorists that critiqued Strawson took issue with 
the insular nature of his account Fischer and Ravizza argue that it seems to be possible to 
criticize different practices of holding agents responsible from an external perspective 
For example, they claim that you might judge that either your own, or some other 
community's, practice of holding responsible ought to be modified Alternatively, you 
might identify problematic cases where a society holds agents responsible who, you 
argue, intuitively are not Without the ability to apply an objective or external standard 
of morality you will not be able to pass judgement on other societies or your own Fischer 
and Ravizza propose a "Strawsoman account" which includes consideration of reactive 
attitudes However they part ways with Strawson and include an external perspective in 
their account They argue that an easy move is to change from Strawson's claim that 
responsible agents are the recipients, as a matter of practice, of reactive attitudes, to the 
concept that agents are only responsible if they are the appropriate recipients of such 
attitudes By making this change Fischer and Ravizza keep reactive attitudes as primary 
to the account, but also are able to ground such reactive attitudes in an external account21 
In the next section I will discuss the account from Fischer and Ravizza who are 
responding to Strawson with a new merit-based version of compatibihsm While none of 
these theorists are writing about collective responsibility, if we proceed carefully, I 
believe their theories can have some interesting impacts on situations of collective 
responsibility and the issue of choice Fischer and Ravizza develop a view of moral 
responsibility that "takes its cue" from Strawson They do this by focusing on the feelings 
Fischer and Ravizza (1993) Perspectives 18 
21
 Ibid 19 
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and attitudes that we feel towards other people, as well as what they feel towards us 22 
Fischer and Ravizza charactense the Strawsonian approach to moral responsibility in the 
following way Someone is morally responsible in so far as she is an appropriate 
candidate for reactive attitudes, 
More specifically, someone is a morally responsible agent insofar as he is an 
appropriate candidate for at least some of the reactive attitudes on the basis of at 
least some of his behaviour (or perhaps his character) And someone is morally 
responsible/or a particular bit of behaviour (or perhaps a trait of character) to the 
extent that he is an appropriate candidate for at least some of the reactive attitudes 
on the basis of that behaviour (or trait of character )23 [author's emphasis] 
Fischer and Ravizza identify the two negative conditions (ways in which an agent can fail 
to be responsible) as ignorance and force They call these the "Aristotelian conditions "24 
Because they are concerned with freedom, Fischer and Ravizza put aside considerations 
of ignorance, and focus instead on force (or, on the other hand, control) They call this the 
"control condition" and describe it as specifying that the agent must not behave as she 
does as the result of undue force The agent must control her behaviour in order to be 
morally responsible for it25 
Like Strawson, Fischer and Ravizza are engaging in the debate regarding causal 
determinism and the possibility for moral responsibility Fischer and Ravizza argue that 
even if causal determinism is true, there is still good reason to think humans can be 
morally responsible for their behaviour, and at least sometimes m control of their 
behaviour Fischer and Ravizza identify two challenges from causal determinism The 
first challenge (the indirect challenge) claims that causal determinism means that agents 
22
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cannot have control over their behaviour, and therefore cannot be morally responsible for 
it The second challenge (the direct challenge) argues that causal determinism (rules out) 
moral responsibility (but not in virtue of eliminating control )27 Fischer and Ravizza 
argue against these challenges by analysing the notion that the kind of control that agents 
need in order to be responsible is the kind of control that requires alternative 
possibilities 28 Alternative possibilities appear to require a freedom that is often denied 
agents in a determined framework By analysing the type of control that is required 
Fischer and Ravizza can argue that the agent does have control, it is just a specific kind of 
control 
Fischer and Ravizza distinguish between two types of control guidance control 
and regulative control Guidance control includes the ability of an agent to freely perform 
an action, and to guide something in a certain direction The example Fischer and Ravizza 
provide is that of an agent steenng a car Regulative control includes the agent having the 
ability to choose an alternative action To have regulative control includes having 
guidance control Fischer and Ravizza argue that guidance control, and not regulative 
control, is required in order to be morally responsible If Fischer and Ravizza are 
correct, this eliminates the indirect challenge as no alternative is required 30 
Fischer and Ravizza further clarify their position by indicating that the difference 
between those we do not want to hold responsible (children, psychotics, those under 
hypnosis) and those we do has to do with the degree to which the agent is sensitive to 
Ibid 17 
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reasons in the appropriate way, to what degree they are "reasons-responsive" 31 Fischer 
and Ravizza discuss two kinds of reasons-responsiveness, strong and weak Strong 
reasons-responsiveness requires that an agent must take reasons to be sufficient, choose in 
accordance with the sufficient reasons, and act in accordance with this choice 32 Fischer 
and Ravizza dismiss this as required of a morally responsible agent because weakness of 
the will may keep an agent from fulfilling strong reasons-responsiveness, yet we will still 
want to consider them responsible Weak reason-responsiveness, on the other hand, 
requires that there exist some possible scenario or world, in which there is sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, and in which the agent would recognise this reason, and do 
otherwise Fischer and Ravizza argue this gets around the problem of the agent being 
weak-willed because although not all reasons will change the behaviour of the agent, 
some reasons will 33 
The account above is a much abbreviated version of what Fischer and Ravizza 
present Their full account contains many more subtleties and complexities than what I 
present here This part of their account is important because it identifies what Fischer and 
Ravizza mean by choice in their scenario where the agent need not have actual 
alternatives available To more fully explore Fischer and Ravizza's account, I want to 
look at the example below that they present, 
Imagine that Sam confides in his friend, Jack Sam tells Jack of his plan to murder 
the mayor of the town m which they live Sam is disturbed by the mayor's liberal 
policies, especially his progressive taxation scheme Whereas Sam's reasons for 
proposing to kill the mayor are bad ones, they are his reasons he has not been 
hypnotized, brainwashed, duped, coerced, and so forth Sam has deliberated coolly, 
and he has settled on his murderous course of action 
31
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Sam is bad, and Jack is no better Jack is pleased with Sam's plan, but Jack is a 
rather anxious person Because Jack worries that Sam might waver, Jack has 
secretly installed a device in Sam's brain which allows him to monitor all of Sam's 
brain activity and to intervene in it, if he desires The device can be employed by 
Jack to ensure that Sam decides to kill the mayor and that he acts on this decision, 
the device works by electronic stimulation of the brain Let us imagine that Jack is 
absolutely committed to activating the device to ensure that Sam kills the mayor, 
should Sam show any sign of not carrying out his original plan Also, we can 
imagine that Sam can do nothing to prevent the device from being fully effective, if 
Jack employs it to cause Sam to kill the mayor 
Sam and Jack both go to a meeting at the town hall, and Sam methodically carries 
out his plan to kill the mayor He does not waver in any way, and he shoots the 
mayor as a result of his original deliberations 34 
This example is adapted from one presented by Harry Frankfurt35 Fischer and Ravizza 
argue that in this case although Sam is fully morally responsible for shooting and killing 
the mayor, because of the device that Jack planted in his brain, it is not true that Sam 
could have acted otherwise 36 Fischer and Ravizza argue that in the case where Sam does 
shoot the mayor on his own (without the device being activated) Sam is reasons-
responsive If Jack were to activate the device, then this would no longer be the case 
Since Fischer and Ravizza only require an agent to be weakly reasons-responsive, it is 
enough that the decision was Sam's own, and that in another possible world, where there 
was sufficient reasons to do otherwise, Sam would have acted differently By relying on 
guidance control and requinng the agent be only weakly reasons-responsive, Fischer and 
Ravizza can provide an account of moral responsibility that can exist in a determined 
universe This differs from Strawson's account which relies on the idea that human beings 
simply are the kind of things that have reactive attitudes towards one another (and 
responsibility is the result of these reactive attitudes ) Fischer and Ravizza propose a 
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theory that grounds the appropriateness of reactive attitudes in metaphysical fact that 
therefore allows for the possibility of metaphysical freedom 
Fischer and Ravizza's account provides some interesting intellectual space to 
explore responsibility m cases which we may perceive as being less "free" I will return to 
their argument in the section on the problem of control which faces accounts of collective 
^7 
responsibility The above is intended to provide a bnef analysis of some of the literature 
on individual moral responsibility so that we can begin to see where collective 
responsibility may fit in The literature I have examined has followed from Aristotle's 
account which included objective conditions for individual moral responsibility, to more 
recent accounts that posit merit-based compatibihst theories which include the objective 
conditions but also include individual reactive attitudes as integral to responsibility 
Strawson's theory continues to be central in accounts of moral responsibility, even while 
it continues to be debated 
I examined these writers because they explore and debate objective conditions and 
individual reactive attitudes as relevant to moral responsibility This debate continues in 
the background of collective responsibility accounts Margaret Gilbert makes use of 
objective conditions of responsibility, while Christopher Kutz uses a variety of 
perspectives, including both an objective one in his complicity principle, and an internal 
one in his character-based accountability In order to understand the accounts of 
collective responsibility that I discussed m Chapter 1, accounts which I argued have a 
tendency to collectivise the conditions for individual moral responsibility, it must be the 
Fischer and Ravizza do not intend for their account to be used m this manner In a note 
Fischer and Ravizza write, 
"We shall be focussing on the moral responsibility of individuals Perhaps the 
theory will also be relevant to evaluatmg the moral responsibility of groups, but it is 
intended in the first instance to apply to individual responsibility " (10) 
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case that we understand what theory of individual responsibility is being collectivized As 
I argued, this approach works in cases of structured groups, yet fails as the group 
becomes less and less structured In particular, it is highly problematic when looking at 
the groups I am focusing on in this dissertation large, unstructured collectives However, 
there may yet be parts of these theories that can be salvaged in an account of collective 
responsibility, depending on the theory of individual responsibility being used 
The conditions for individual moral responsibility, while debated, are on much 
firmer footing than any of the theories for collective responsibility This is evident in the 
wide acceptance of Aristotle's conditions in one form or another 38 In this way the 
tendency to collectivize these conditions becomes clear, there is a sense in which such 
conditions could lend legitimacy to collective responsibility itself In the literature 
surveyed for this dissertation, including that on collective responsibility, there is a 
consensus that both ignorance and coercion present, m some circumstances, excusing 
conditions While the specifics of both ignorance and coercion are highly debated, they 
are viewed as the "sticking points" when it comes to responsibility In later sections of 
this chapter and the next I will explore each of these conditions I will address the 
situation of coercion as the problem of control (or control condition), and the situation of 
ignorance, as the problem of knowledge (or epistemic condition) 
There is a further similarity between these accounts that I want to explore, and this 
is the possibility of "character based" responsibility, something that I first discussed in 
Chapter 1 as part of the analysis of Kutz Fischer and Ravizza and Strawson all bring 
individual responsibility back to the individuals Strawson argues that, 
38
 Here I do not intend to imply that there is consensus around Aristotle's conditions A 
knowledge and causal condition are common in the literature on responsibility, but how 
we interpret such conditions is varied 
If someone's actions help me to some benefit I desire, than I am benefited in any 
case, but if he intended them so to benefit me because of his general goodwill 
towards me, I shall reasonably feel a gratitude which I should not feel at all if the 
benefit was an incidental consequence, unintended or even regretted by him, of 
some plan of action with a different aim 
We should consider also in how much of our behaviour the benefit or injury 
resides mainly or entirely in the manifestation of attitude itself 39 
Fischer and Ravizza characterise their own account as taking its cue from Strawson's 
article, and include in the section quoted above (beginning of section 3 2) that 
responsibility is based on the behaviour of an agent, or a character trait Chnstopher Kutz 
in his account of collective responsibility makes a similar claim As I discussed in 
Chapter 1 Kutz adds two new qualifications for responsibility m order to expand his 
theory to cover harms caused by large, unstructured collectives One of the qualifications 
is symbolic or character based accountability, which is based on the idea that if an agent 
accepts a benefit from an action, they are condoning the actions that produced the 
benefit40 Character-based responsibility, as determined by the actions an agent takes and 
intentions they have, can be more far reaching than other types of responsibility While 
we have to be careful not to equate the person who has evil thoughts with the person who 
does evil deeds, character-based responsibility begins to hold people responsible for who 
they are Are you the kind of person who enjoys the suffering of others9 Do you associate 
with groups that seek to oppress others'? The answers to these questions can be linked to 
an agent's character, thus character-based responsibility is responsibility based on who 
one is 
In Chapter 1 I questioned Kutz's move to include character or symbolic based 
accountability, claiming that Kutz needs to explain why such a move is necessary in order 
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to cover large, unstructured collectives It also seems that by using character or symbolic 
based accountability, many more people will be members of harm causing collectives On 
the other hand, Strawson's claim about reactive attitudes is very compelling, and the idea 
that the intention of the agent affects the nature of the harm is intuitively plausible There 
is something morally relevant about the agent who is a "bad person" or who happily 
benefits from an injustice that they did not cause (at least not intentionally) This suggests 
that causal contribution alone may not satisfy our needs for a theory of collective 
responsibility I will return to this in Chapter 6 
In this section I looked at several theories of individual moral responsibility, and 
to summarize I will briefly focus on the abstract features that are common to all Ideally, 
responsible agents are those who have intentionally done harm or wrong Responsibility 
needs to be flexible, in that it can take into account actions we feel should be excused, 
however it should also use objective principles or a set of moral rules that are universally 
applied In order to investigate this topic further I will have to look at each of the 
"Aristotelian" conditions, and first I turn to the control condition 
3.3 Problem of Control 
3.3.1 Two Critiques 
To begin my investigation of the control condition I will examine two critiques of 
collective responsibility that focus on the agent's causal relation to the harm The first is 
from H D Lewis who focuses on the problem of holding one agent responsible for the 
actions of another, something which seems inevitable in cases of collective responsibility 
The second critique is from Jan Narveson who argues that agents should, at least, control 
their membership in collectives, if they do not control their actions themselves However, 
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Narveson argues, in many cases group membership is not voluntary, so agents lack even 
this more subsidiary type of control 
One strong critique against theories of collective responsibility is that an agent's 
ability to control her actions is compromised under the collective account And this is 
only going to become more serious as the collectives become larger and more loosely 
structured H D Lewis argues in "Collective Responsibility" (1948) that collective 
responsibility leads to the possibility of being responsible for the actions of someone else 
He writes, 
For if we believe that responsibility is literally shared, it becomes very hard to 
maintain that there are any properly moral distinctions to be drawn between one 
course of action and another All will be equally good, or equally evil, as the case 
may be For we shall be directly implicated in one another's actions, and the praise 
or blame for them must fall upon us all without discrimination 
For Lewis, to be responsible for the actions of someone else (whom you cannot control) is 
not acceptable He begins with the claim that if there is one ethical principle of which he 
is certain, it is that you can only be responsible for yourself Further, Lewis claims that 
you cannot even choose to take on the responsibility of another 42 Lewis goes on to claim 
the push for collective responsibility is based on a confusion that affects our ideas of 
value We say, "sharing in the greatness of a nation", but Lewis argues this means that the 
"excellence attained by our nation" allows us to presume that all of us have been 
subjected to the same influences, and have some of the same qualities for which the group 
is being commended 43 
Lewis claims that our common usage of the idea of the collective is a linguistic 
tool only It is merely a shortcut to describe a group of individuals What we are or 
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achieve is affected by our relations to others This acknowledges the social nature of 
humans, but, Lewis contends, the worth of our expenences and actions depend directly on 
their own nature 44 Further, we cannot take on responsibility for one another He says if 
we could this would imply that, " we could become directly worse (or better) persons 
morally by what others elect to do- and that seems plainly preposterous "45 
This is similar to the famous critique of morality from Thomas Nagel (1979) in 
"Moral Luck" He discusses a situation m which an agent is held morally responsible for 
an action or consequence, and yet the action or consequence is out of the control of the 
agent While normally this would describe a situation such as coercion, which would 
usually excuse an agent from responsibility, Nagel argues that the control condition for 
responsibility leaves room for moral luck m the form of external influences Further, 
moral luck can come into play in many ordinary situations Nagel says, " But what we 
do depends in many more ways than these [coercion, ignorance, etc ] on what is not under 
our control - what is not produced by a good or bad will "46 This is the result, in part, of 
the role consequences have in moral determination, and the fact that whether we succeed 
or fail at a task we are attempting often depends to some extent on factors beyond our 
control 
There are two types of moral luck that are relevant to the discussion here, resultant 
moral luck and circumstantial Resultant moral luck describes a situation in which the 
moral judgement of a particular action of the agent depends on some situation beyond 
their control Nagel uses the example of driving a car recklessly If the driver hits 
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someone they are responsible for manslaughter, if not, then just for reckless dnvmg It 
cannot be the case that we hold the driver in both cases responsible for manslaughter 
since no one died in the second version, while, it is morally important (or seems so) that 
someone was killed in the first version The second kind of moral luck that is relevant 
here is circumstantial moral luck This addresses the case that certain circumstances put 
agents in a position to make a morally relevant decision, the circumstance itself being out 
of the agent's control The example Nagel gives is of Germany He writes, 
Ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany had an opportunity to behave heroically by 
opposing the regime They also had an opportunity to behave badly, and most of 
them are culpable for having failed this test But it is a test to which the citizens of 
other countries were not subjected, with the result that even if they, or some of 
them, would have behaved as badly as the Germans in like circumstances, they 
simply did not and therefore are not similarly culpable 
This case of circumstantial moral luck is most similar to the cases that Lewis is 
concerned about, although he also makes reference to resultant moral luck as well 
Lewis does not identify moral luck as the issue, but like Nagel, sees the control 
condition as problematic m certain morally relevant situations While Nagel does not 
address collective responsibility directly, his case of German citizens is relevant to this 
discussion What is interesting to note is that the control condition poses problems for 
accounts of individual moral responsibility as well as collective responsibility, and 
therefore when I discuss potential solutions to these issues they will be relevant to both 
the collective and individual case 
Nagel's account of moral luck identifies situations where the agent's moral 
status is affected (or determined) by something external to the agent, for example 
being born German or not, or there being a pedestrian in the road, or not Lewis also 
47
 Ibid 720 
48
 Ibid 724 
focuses on external influences on moral status, arguing that membership in collectives, 
and actions of collectives, are not within the control of the agent Where Nagel accepts 
that luck cannot be entirely removed from responsibility, but that this does not negate 
responsibility, Lewis argues that what make us better or worse moral agents needs to 
be determined by us 
Lewis claims that the movement towards collective responsibility prejudices our 
moral thinking on outward actions 49 When we evaluate the actions of a collective, we are 
looking at actions, and not intentions It seems that a collective with bad intentions 
(whether individually or collectively held) will escape notice in accounts of collective 
responsibility unless they manifest in some outward action While I agree with Lewis that 
there is such a tendency to view collective action in such a way, I am not convinced that 
this is more than a procedural fact when we look at collectives, rather than a bias in the 
theories themselves How we proceed when using an account of collective responsibility 
depends on the account, and while this is a problem for certain accounts, it need not be 
As I have discussed collective action is not a collective copy of individual action There 
are differences, and this may simply be one of them 
Lewis looks at the example of a burglary There are multiple agents involved in 
the burglary including a planner, a novice, and the driver of the getaway vehicle Lewis 
says that each of these people may be implicated in the crime, and thus be said to share 
responsibility for it However, it would be a mistake to say there was a single criminal 
operation that took place ("the burglary") and blame for the operation rests equally on all 
concerned Lewis does not want to lose the difference in the actions of various agents in 
this collective Lewis says, "What has to be stressed is that the guilt of each is strictly 
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proportionate to his part in the joint undertaking It is not one crime that we have but 
many "50 For Lewis, responsibility must be different depending on the agent Lewis' main 
concern is that agents will be implicated in the wrong actions of the collective, and if 
viewed as a collective act there will be a smoothing over of individual contributions 
Lewis does not argue that the agent driving the getaway car is not responsible for 
something wrong, but rather that their responsibility should differ from that of the 
"mastermind" behind the crime 
However, Lewis also argues that society can bear responsibility For example, 
take a mother who steals a loaf of bread to feed her starving children Lewis argues 
against the idea that society could be responsible for this crime, insofar as it failed to 
supply for the woman's needs But he also contends that the woman is not alone in her 
responsibility He writes, 
The guilt of the poor woman is lessened, if not eliminated altogether, by her 
circumstances But she alone is to blame, if blame there is to be, for what she 
herself has done Others are also to blame, but for something else, namely for their 
part in allowing her to remain in desperate need But they are responsible for this as 
individuals, and strictly in proportion to what each might have done, directly or 
indirectly, to ameliorate her lot51 [author's emphasis] 
While it appears here that Lewis is arguing for a strictly individualistic conception of 
responsibility, this passage sounds like an argument for collective responsibility Lewis 
acknowledges the role society-at-large can have in creating circumstances in which 
people must steal to survive And he is willing to attnbute blame to society - as long as it 
is done individually What exactly this would look like is confusing, especially if the 
creation of the circumstances that led to the stealing of the bread is systemic in nature and 
exists throughout society Lewis does not expand on this idea Perhaps he would argue 
50
 Ibid 27 
51
 Ibid 28 
119 
that the leaders in society would bear responsibility in virtue of their positions But, to 
read the quote literally means that everyone within society will bear responsibility for 
systemic social ills, exactly in proportion to what they have done or failed to do 
How can such responsibility be proportioned accurately, and not rhetorically or 
symbolically9 Is Archie, a stockbroker in this society, responsible for upholding these 
social institutions9 And what does this responsibility amount to9 Is Archie responsible for 
living in the society9 For failing to do something9 But even this is complicated, because 
changing the society may take the actions of many, but helping the single woman would 
take the action of only one This leads to the next question, is Archie responsible for his 
part (whatever that may be) until someone, not necessanly Archie, provides food for the 
woman9 And why is it that if Archie does nothing, but someone else acts, he is not 
responsible, and if he does nothing and no one else acts, he is9 This conclusion is what 
Lewis fears, the idea that an agent can be better or worse off, morally speaking, because 
of the actions of another This is also a case of Nagel's moral luck Taking a large social 
harm like classism withm society and picking it apart often dissolves the harm 
How to determine collective responsibility on the individual level is an important 
question, and too big to be analysed here I will return to this problem in Chapter 5 when I 
discuss reducible and non-reducible accounts of collective responsibility For now is it 
enough to acknowledge the intuitive plausibility of Lewis' claim that we are responsible 
in proportion to our individual involvement, while knowing that measuring such 
involvement, if possible, will be no simple task 
Lewis is troubled by what the individual could do, when in a collective He is 
writing this article after World War II Using the example of Germany, he says that 
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But allowance must clearly be made for tradition, outlook, and environment, for the 
difficulty of anticipating the course of events (and it is easy for us afterwards, and 
from outside, to be wise about these), for the very limited influence which the 
individual, even if he is of heroic mould, can normally have on the policies of a 
ruthless totalitarian government 
But in the meantime, let us be fair to him, wherever he is found, by relating the 
question of guilt, not to some abstract entity in which he and all other individuals 
are merged, but to what we can reasonably estimate could have been expected of 
the individual, who is the sole bearer of guilt and merit, in the particular situation 
confronting him 
Lewis here is emphasizing the sense of injustice we feel for holding an agent responsible 
for an action of which she had no control, and could not stop What about the morally 
good German m Germany immediately prior to World War IP In such a case it seems 
that the agent has no ability to rectify the situation if "Germans" as a whole are to blame 
At least, no non-heroic (and possibly life threatening) options Lewis argues that if this is 
what collective responsibility amounts to, it is far removed from our "everyday" 
common-sense ethics This is a strong statement, and I agree that in some circumstances 
the Germans may not be responsible, however, more needs to be said on this If agents 
become responsible for collective acts because of their membership m collectives, then 
how do agents become members9 
Jan Narveson in "Collective Responsibility" (2002) argues that collective 
responsibility is, " a dangerous device, generating insoluble problems and entailing the 
mistreatment of individual people "53 Narveson's argument is aimed directly at 
irreducible collective responsibility, which I will be turning to in Chapter 5 Here I will 
discuss his concept of the level of voluntariness of group membership Narveson 
distinguishes four types of groups, each with varying levels of voluntariness to 
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association Voluntariness to association is concerned with how agents become members 
of collectives If the collective is a corporation, then the question of voluntariness would 
have to do with whether the agent chose to work for the corporation, and whether they 
have choices in regards to other employment In the case of larger collectives, like that 
causing climate change, this becomes more complicated, and will have to do with how 
membership is initially determined, and how accessible are the means to exit the 
collective Narveson's focus on voluntariness of membership has to do with the 
importance of individual control The two respects in which he is measuring the 
voluntariness of association are the ability to leave the collective, and the ability to join 
the collective A fully voluntary association would be one in which only those wishing to 
enter belong, and whoever wishes to leave is free to do so He describes the fourth group 
thus, 
Finally, there is the type which is voluntary in neither respect we cannot choose to 
cease to be white, say Political Liberalism holds that fully involuntary groups 
have no special rights over their members Your fellow white females, say, may not 
impose any requirements on you that you do not accept on your own volition Even 
family membership imposes no duties that the rest of society may properly 
enforce 54 
Voluntariness of membership, the ability to enter and exit group membership, is 
important to Narveson for reasons of control If you cannot control your membership in a 
group, and you cannot control the actions of the group, then you can end up responsible 
for an action that was not within your control This violates the Aristotelian control 
condition Narveson emphasizes the importance of excusing a member of a collective for 
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a collective harm when the individual has distanced themselves from the group, perhaps 
by "objecting firmly and publicly" to the actions of the group 55 
Narveson is particularly concerned that collective responsibility will hold people 
responsible in the wrong ways (or to the wrong degree) He writes, 
A group may be said to "oppress" another group if many individuals in it 
characteristically, or at least significantly often, mistreat members of the other 
group - e g by hacking them to pieces, as with the Tutsi/Hutu massacre And 
individuals in that group who do nothing of the sort, and perhaps exert themselves 
to prevent other members from so acting, or try to shield the oppressed from their 
actions, simply are not guilty, and may not properly be thought to be so 56 
Here Narveson wants to distinguish between levels of involvement in genocide Later he 
talks of the Nuremburg Tnals, and particularly of the case of Heinrich Himmler Himmler 
was one of the most powerful men in Nazi Germany, and served as Chief of the German 
Police and Minister of the Interior, overseeing police and security forces, including the 
Gestapo For Narveson, looking at the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis, there is no way 
to hold the leaders especially responsible, or responsible for a much greater harm For 
Narveson it makes no sense to hold Himmler responsible for the collective act of 
genocide Instead, Narveson argues we can hold Himmler responsible for, " any number 
of individual crimes including that of supporting evil policies to the utmost "57 
Narveson makes a very interesting claim which points back to Kutz's notion of 
symbolic or character based accountability He says 
If someone voluntarily joins a certain group that is known, by the joiner, to be bent 
on evil, and he joins it sincerely, then we must presume that that person shares in 
CO 
the attitudes that motivate the evils in question 
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Here Narveson is making reference to responsibility based on the attitude of the agent 
Further, this points back to the idea of control, but also of knowledge Does the agent 
know what the collective is up to when they join it7 If they do, then responsibility appears 
to follow If the collective has the right level of voluntariness, m joining agents seem to 
be exercising a certain level of control This could, potentially, rescue the control 
condition, at least in circumstances where the nature of the collective and its actions are 
known I will return to this in the next chapter when I examine the epistemic condition It 
is interesting to note that Narveson requires that the agent voluntanly join with the harm 
causing group, but does not require that the agent voluntanly act in concert with the other 
members This, again, emphasizes the importance of the agent's character, as well as the 
importance of knowing the action in question 
The cntiques from Lewis and Narveson focus on the same fear of being 
responsible for actions that the agent has no ability to halt or control Lewis may be 
willing to claim social responsibility for systemic social ills as long as we come up with a 
way to hold individuals responsible Narveson, on the other hand, views "society" as an 
involuntary group, and would not do even this If responsibility requires the kind of 
control that both Lewis and Narveson are arguing for, then most agents in collectives will 
not meet the causal condition and the actions of the collective will not affect their moral 
status Further, as in the case of climate change from Chapter 2, it appears that collective 
responsibility will not be able to address large, unstructured harms 
The problem of control is important, and before proceeding with any account of 
collective responsibility, I need to put these concerns aside To do this I will look at two 
arguments, one from Larry Mary, and one from Fischer and Ravizza 
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3.3.2 Two Solutions 
Larry May participates in the discussion on collective responsibility, however his 
focus is on "shared" responsibility and "co-responsible" agents, and not on collective 
responsibility While co-responsible agents are not the same as collectively responsible 
agents, the accounts are similar I will discuss May's argument here because it provides 
some insight into the problem of control for collective responsibility 
May defends an existentialist position on responsibility This position claims that 
membership in a group that causes great harm implicates each member of the group, 
whether they contributed or not59 This has implications for the control principle, in that, 
as Lewis was concerned above, it seems to be the case you can be responsible for that 
which you cannot control, including the actions of others 
May distinguishes between being morally blameworthy (1 e guilty), and being 
responsible May quotes Karl Jaspers who argued that metaphysical guilt is guilt for who 
one is, and not what one has done, and further that this guilt does entail some kind of 
responsibility May argues that there are, " levels of being morally responsible which 
are less severely accusatory than being morally guilty, namely, those that involve shame 
and moral taint "60 He argues first that metaphysical guilt arises from each person's 
shared identity (when you are a member in a group this shapes who you are ) And second, 
metaphysical guilt arises from the fact that a person could have (but did not) respond 
differently when faced with the harms committed by the other group members It is based 
on who one chooses to be 61 May writes 
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The choice of whether or not to be indignant is something which occurs deep m the 
psyche and is almost always a choice that is open to us If we merely passively 
accept injustices then we choose to align ourselves with them, and this is what 
makes us both metaphysically guilty and morally responsible, although not 
necessarily morally guilty, for these injustices 62 
May identifies that many of the factors of an agent's membership may be out of the 
agent's control What remains in the agent's control, according to May, is how the agent 
positions himself in terms of the collective Citing Karl Jasper's account, May 
distinguishes between being guilty for who you are and being guilty for what you have 
done The guilt that is at issue for being who you are is metaphysical guilt, which may or 
may not include moral guilt This distinction is intended to show there are levels of being 
morally responsible, such as metaphysical guilt, which are less accusatory than moral 
guilt May explores connecting agents to groups by their metaphysical guilt 
Metaphysical guilt arises out of, 
each person's shared identity, out of the fact that people share membership in 
various groups that shape who these people are, and that each person is at least 
somewhat implicated m what any member of the group does But metaphysical guilt 
is not merely based on group membership Rather it arises out of the fact that a 
person did not but could have (and should have) responded differently when faced 
with the harms committed by his or her fellow group members 4 
Metaphysical guilt is guilt partly for who you are (facts that you may have little control 
over), but also what you choose to do, and who you choose to do it with Since May 
indicates that such guilt is less accusatory than moral guilt, it seems that the line between 
them is at the intention of the agent The wrong you do as part of a group, when the 
wrong was not the explicit intent of the group, warrants only metaphysical guilt The 
wrong you intend to do, either alone or with others, warrants moral guilt This distinction 
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makes it clear that many cases of large, collective harms will fall under metaphysical guilt 
and not moral guilt for May While I am not endorsing his particular distinction, this does 
provide a method to distinguish between degrees of responsibility for collective harms 
May clarifies that is it not mere membership that determines responsibility, but how one 
acts (or reacts) both in terms of behaviour and attitude, to the group 65 
Here May has sidestepped the issue of control over collective behaviour, and 
brought it back to what will be in the control of the agent, her own actions and attitudes 
While it is easy to see how the actions or reactions of the agent will either implicate or 
exculpate, May's position on attitudes of the agent is important, and requires further 
analysis May writes 
Racism is, so psychological studies claim, a function of the socialization as well as 
other forms of social interaction that occurs within groups Yet it is common for 
people to say that they feel guilty for such things as the racial violence perpetrated 
by fellow community members where racist attitudes are commonplace Merely by 
sharing attitudes m common, why is it that some members of groups also feel a 
sense of shared responsibility for what some other members do as a result of having 
these attitudes'? the feeling of moral responsibility may still be linked to one's 
choices For people make choices about how to regard, or respond to, the dominant 
attitudes in their communities, and even how to react to the attitudes which they 
themselves have been initially socialised to form by their communities Such 
reactions form the basis for possible changes in who one is 66 
May's analysis of attitude, as opposed to simply focusing on action or inaction, is 
important because of how it defines the collective that it can apply to Racism is a 
systemic social harm, and racism, as opposed to a particular racist action, is the result of 
the actions of a large, unstructured collective However, May does not want collectives to 
be " mere aggregates " so he descnbes them as having a shared culture which make the 
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group, " more than the sum of its parts " My interpretation of May's description of 
such collectives is that large, semi-structured collectives can be responsible, but that 
potentially large, unstructured collectives cannot Large semi-structured collectives, 
recalling from Chapter 1, include collectives such as states The common culture and 
group solidarity is what allows May's collectives to hold responsibility What I want to 
take forward in my analysis here is May's focus on the control an agent has over her 
actions/inactions within a group, and the responsibility he attributes to agents for their 
attitudes The latter is particularly important As discussed in the section on Aristotle, 
doing an act accidentally (or not meeting one of the conditions) would only be excusable 
if the agent did not want the outcome Here, in May we see a return to this focus on 
whether the agent's desires are aligned with their actions as relevant to responsibility 
This idea will return again throughout this chapter and the remainder of this dissertation 
So what do you do, according to May, if you are in one of the offending 
collectives9 In particular, if we descnbe such groups as semi-structured collectives9 May 
says that obviously if you are a member of a group, "Germans" you cannot cease to be 
ethnically German May says that what the agent can do is disavow or condemn the 
actions or beliefs of the group He says, " Such acts of language or mind may break the 
chain of responsibility between individual and community " May argues that cutting the 
link between oneself and the group will affect one's moral identity 69 
May illustrates this by looking at the case of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s 
where German people were committing atrocities against Jewish people May clarifies 
that you cannot look at all German people and claim they are guilty by association The 
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claim should not be that all Germans are guilty by virtue of being German However, 
some German people were aware of what was happening, and could have acted In some 
cases this action could only have been to denounce what was going on May concludes 
that in these cases moral taint is appropriate He says, " taint is appropriately seen as a 
form of moral responsibility for who one has chosen to be "70 
In May's account we see a few solutions to the problem of control that is faced by 
accounts of collective responsibility The first is this return to, once again, some kind of 
character based or symbolic accountability While this did not work as presented in 
Christopher Kutz's theory, it has returned in many of the accounts of responsibility 
looked at in this chapter And there is a reason for this It matters to us, morally speaking, 
who you are, and why you are acting as you are Further, you can control this part of 
yourself much more so than you can control anything in the external world 
Further, May offers some options as to how to make the required disassociation 
with the group You can disavow the actions or intentions of the group, and you can 
change you attitudes These actions may or may not be burdensome for the agent In 
some cases the agent may be faced with the potential for personal harm if they are to 
speak up against the group But in many cases, this will not be true Further, if it is the 
case that the agent cannot speak up because of fear for her own safety, this may well fit 
into similarly exculpating conditions like that of coercion A question that remains is what 
happens if an agent cannot disassociate herself from the group Perhaps the group has a 
history of killing those members who speak up against them, or perhaps there are no 
alternatives Typically such a situation would excuse an agent's actions If this is the case, 
then the work that needs to be done is determining in what situations the burden upon the 
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agent eliminates possible alternatives First, more needs to be said on what conditions 
need to exist for an agent to act freely, and I turn to Fischer and Ravizza next to examine 
this in more depth 
In a previous section of this chapter I outlined Fischer and Ravizza's account of 
individual moral responsibility in a determined universe To refresh, Fischer and Ravizza 
claim that if an agent has guidance control, which is the ability and freedom to guide 
something in a certain direction, and not regulative control, which would require the 
ability to choose a different alternative, then the agent can be responsible 71 Further, the 
guidance control must be at least weakly reasons responsive in that there must be, " a 
possible scenario in which the same kind of mechanism operates and the agent does 
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otherwise " Recall the example quoted above of Jack and Sam and the mayor By 
focusing on whether Sam acts from his intention to shoot the mayor, Fischer and Ravizza 
have provided a way to keep individual moral responsibility in a determined framework 
Fischer and Ravizza's analysis offers some interesting possibilities for the 
argument surrounding collective responsibility, in particular the control condition The 
arguments of Lewis and Narveson hmge on the inability to control your own contnbution 
to the harm in which you end up implicated While Fischer and Ravizza themselves do 
not use their account in the following manner, I will now move to see how their theory of 
individual moral responsibility may answer the problems raised by Lewis and Narveson 
Fischer and Ravizza identify the epistemic and control conditions from Aristotle, 
and characterise the control condition thus 
We shall call this second condition, the "freedom-relevant condition", or perhaps 
the "control condition" It specifies that the agent must not behave as he does as the 
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result of undue force, that is, he must do what he does freely Alternatively, one 
could say that the freedom-relevant condition specified that the agent must control 
his behaviour in a suitable sense, in order to be morally responsible for it 73 
In the case of individual responsibility, as demonstrated in Fischer and Ravizza's example 
of Sam and Jack, Sam will be morally responsible for the assassination of the mayor if he, 
in fact, carries out his plan because of his desire to kill the mayor If Sam changes his 
mmd, and instead assassinates the mayor because the electronic device in his brain forced 
him to, Sam would not be morally responsible because he had no choice The freedom 
that is relevant to Fischer and Ravizza is not due to the existence of alternatives (Sam not 
killing the mayor) but rather due to the intent Sam had, and that, in a different universe 
where there was no electronic switch in his brain, Sam could, with different reasons, 
choose to act differently 
How does this same reasoning look in the case of collective responsibility'? In the 
case of structured collectives, both large and small, it is easy to imagine an individual 
implicated in an action that could not be performed, nor stopped, by the individual alone 
Take the example of a large structured collective, a corporation Corporation X produces 
a number of consumer products, including phones, cookware, and landmines These 
landmines are sold to third world countries A midlevel engineer in Corporation X knows 
that her research is going to both the production of the phones and the landmines 
However, the engineer cannot control who Corporation X sells the landmines to It 
appears that the engineer has no control over the outcome 
This is an example from Christopher Kutz, and was discussed in Chapter 1 I 
brought up the example initially to highlight the problems with the "just doing my job" 
mentality that can be adopted in these circumstances Kutz's conclusion is that as long as 
73
 Ibid 13 
131 
the decision to work for Corporation X is voluntary, and information about the company's 
activities is available, every employee will be responsible to the victims of the land 
mines However, Kutz is a clear proponent of collective responsibility My question is 
how does this example work under Fischer and Ravizza's account7 
Does the engineer have guidance control over her actions9 Guidance control 
would include the ability to freely guide her actions The engineer has the choice whether 
to work for Corporation X (which she knows sells land mmds to third world countnes) In 
another possible world the engineer's problem with selling the land mines could cause her 
to leave her job, or never accept it in the first place Although once at the Corporation, the 
engineer cannot control the movements of the Corporation itself, she can choose whether 
or not to participate And if she attempts to leave, and cannot, then like the case of Sam, 
she would no longer be in control in the relevant sense As long as she makes no move to 
change, she is responsible 74 
Here as long as the agent is not constrained in all senses (unable to leave the 
collective) then the agent is responsible for the collective action The engineer does not 
need to control the actions of the collective, only her own actions Important to note here 
is that in the example the engineer does know what the Corporation is doing, and how she 
In the case of the engineer some writers will include consideration of the difficulty of a 
change in employer If the engineer needs this job to feed her family, does this affect the 
voluntariness of her membership (employment)9 For Fischer and Ravizza this 
consideration is not important What we are examining is whether, with knowledge of the 
activities of the corporation, the engmeer decides to continue to work at the same 
corporation And further, that this decision is in lme with her desires If so, then she will 
meet the condition for responsibility This analysis is not about whether change in 
employment would be difficult, but rather if the agent who knows the consequences of 
her action can continue to work at the same job and have this decision be in lme with her 
desires The engineer may have a desire to support her family, and a desire to do so 
despite the consequences of that particular employment While this decision may be 
understandable, it is also the responsibility of the agent 
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is contributing These are important epistemological constraints, which I will discuss m 
much greater detail in the next chapter 
Moving from structured collectives (and it seems intuitive that the case for a large 
structured collective will be mirrored in that of a small structured collective) I will move 
on to the case of unstructured collectives I will focus again on the case of the large 
unstructured collective, not because I argue that what works in the large case will work in 
the smaller case, but instead because in small unstructured collectives, like that of the 
strangers helping someone who has fallen on the ice, the collective act requires all 
members to act, and they each know of one another's contribution Therefore these 
collectives more strongly resemble structured collectives then large unstructured 
collectives where the members are unlikely to know of one another I will look at two 
examples The first is that of racism within society, returning to the excellent example 
provided by Larry May (quoted above), and then moving to the case study for this 
dissertation of climate change 
May's example of racism (which applies also in the case of sexism, classism, etc ) 
characterises racism as a "function of socialisation" that manifests as a collection of 
attitudes held by a group Often (although not always) harms and violence result from 
such attitudes when they belong to the more powerful group within a society As such, 
systemic racism can be considered a harm perpetrated by one collective against another 
Even a cursory glance through world history reveals that such racist attitudes have led to 
war, slavery and genocide 
There are a few key aspects of racism within a society that I want to identify 
Racism within a society is not something one can easily escape (unlike the engineer who 
can quit her job and find other employment) The agent who is a perpetrator of racism 
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would likely have to leave her home Additionally, certain kinds of discrimination are 
common globally which will further limit options of avoidance In such circumstances 
although this is not impossible, one could (and many have) made the argument that the 
wrong must be sufficiently severe to require such a drastic step to avoid responsibility 
Further, racism differs because most people enter into racist groups without full 
knowledge of what the group is doing I will leave the discussion of knowledge for the 
next chapter, but the culpability of an agent will be affected by this In some cases, such 
as nations, an agent will be born into the group One last issue, it is unlikely that one 
agent can change the actions of the collective The only control they have is over their 
own actions and possibly their attitudes However, regardless of these complexities, like 
the example of climate change, it is not correct to call such harms no more than random 
acts of nature They are caused, and do therefore confer responsibility 
Bella is a citizen of Country X, a country that is deeply divided along racial lines 
Bella is in the "powerful" race, and has witnessed many racist acts against those in the 
"less powerful" race Bella does not engage in any overtly racist acts, but she does 
nothing to mitigate them either Is Bella responsible for systemic racism in Country X? 
Would Fischer and Ravizza argue that Bella has guidance control9 The answer to this 
question requires further analysis of Bella On the surface we simply do not have enough 
information The stakes are high - either Bella has the required control and is responsible 
for systemic racism, or she is no more than a victim herself, this case equivalent to the 
one where an electronic device causes Sam to shoot the mayor 
When Bella witnesses, but does not participate in racist actions, what does this 
mean9 I will put aside the question surrounding mitigation here While acting as a witness 
may seem harmless, and for other acts it may well be, for racism it can be part of the 
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harm Bella knows there is racism in Country X When she witnesses, but does not 
participate, is she responsible for the consequences of this9 She is acting m alignment 
with her desires, and therefore has guidance control As a witness Bella is perceived by 
those more active in the group to be supportive This support changes what the 
perpetrators are willing to do As May claimed, racism can be the result of shared 
attitudes, and it is clear that Bella shares some of these attitudes with the offending 
collective Under the above description Bella does possess Fischer and Ravizza's 
guidance control 
Let's change the example slightly Bella ensures that she does not perform any 
racist acts and she speaks out against racism within her society In this case is Bella still a 
member of the collective9 She has, in the words of May, distanced herself through acts of 
language and mind from the offending collective She no longer can be described as a 
silent collaborator, but is instead a vocal opponent Bella cannot change her own race 
(and thus cannot alter privilege accorded on such grounds) but has she moved out of the 
responsible collective9 This is an important question because Bella is still physically in 
the same geographic location She has not left Country X Are her actions and attitudes 
enough9 
Fischer and Ravizza do not have an answer here They are concerned with 
whether Bella has guidance control, which she does The only question left is does Bella's 
presence in Country X contribute to the harm9 And this is unclear However, it is 
important to note the answer is not obviously yes So while Bella cannot control the 
actions of Country X (which was Lewis' concern) and is implicated in part by her race 
(which was Narveson's concern) she does have control over her attitudes and support of 
the offending group, and this may be enough control to be responsible 
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I want to turn to the case of climate change As discussed, this is the case of a 
large, unstructured collective, and is of the most difficult type of collective for the 
theories in collective responsibility to address What makes it further complicated is that 
the very nature of climate change is complex, and it is difficult to determine what counts 
as a contributory action and what does not However, as discussed in Chapter 2, climate 
change is caused by human actions, it victimizes identifiable people in the world, and it 
could be stopped (or mitigated and eventually stopped) by human action The collective 
for climate change will be large, perhaps including most of the population of the world 
To explore the control conditions for the collective harm of climate change I will 
begin with an example of two people, Michael and Hannah Both live in Country Z which 
is one of the top ten contributors of carbon emissions Michael's life resembles that of the 
average citizen before information about climate change was revealed He does not hate 
the environment, but he drives a truck (which is not fuel efficient) and his life could be 
marked in the steps he has not taken no fluorescent lights, he does not recycle, he does 
not carpool, etc Hannah, on the other hand, is concerned about her carbon footprint and 
that of her country Hannah has taken every measure available to decrease her potential 
emissions including, carpooling, driving a hybrid, buying local, etc The collective of 
which they are both members, either defined as Country Z or the collective of top ten 
contributing countries, is slowly increasing overall carbon emissions Are Michael and 
Hannah members of this collective? And if they are members, do they meet the control 
condition? 
From the discussion in this chapter I have identified two ways to link members of 
collectives to one another One is a causal contribution As discussed in Chapter 2 all 
carbon emissions are harmful now as they are occurring past the point where the 
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atmosphere can safely absorb them In this case, both Michael and Hannah are implicated 
To live any way other than carbon neutral will mean you are making a causal contnbution 
to the harm The second link to the collective is that of attitude Excessive carbon 
emissions and failure of society to change are due, in part, to the prioritization of certain 
luxuries (for example, frequent flights, produce from other countries, etc ) and other 
attitudes These attitudes can manifest in a number of ways, including the prevalence of 
commuting hours to work every day, use of bottled water, and overemphasis on animal 
protein for health These actions are condoned by society both socially and with the 
structure of services and products available As discussed m Chapter 2 the reduction of 
beef consumption in the US would significantly decrease methane emissions (which are 
also causing climate change ) However, a society that supports beef farmers and fails to 
provide alternatives to beef makes change for individuals hard The same will hold for 
those who do not want to commute to work every day If you work in a city where the 
cost of living is too high for your salary, you have to choose between commuting and 
finding other employment While the causal contributions cannot be fully separated from 
the attitudes that support them, there are many people in such collectives who could be 
said to possess the attitudes m question even when their causal contributions are minimal 
Putting aside issues of knowledge, Michael is contributing both via his actions and 
through his attitude He controls each of these Michael is acting the way he is because of 
what he believes Hannah provides a more difficult scenario Hannah produces far less 
carbon than would be her "carbon share" (see Chapter 2), however, she is not living 
carbon neutral Further, she commutes to work in her hybrid car, which supports the 
commuter lifestyle Is Hannah responsible? While her actions are in line with her desires 
(unlike when Sam shoots the mayor because of the electronic device) she is limited in 
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what she can do Hannah's actions implicate her in the collective act, but what options 
does she have? 
Recall Fischer and Ravizza who would say that this is the wrong question As 
long as Hannah is acting in response to her desires, then she has guidance control 
Alternatives are not required However, the case for climate change is far more complex 
than that of Sam and the mayor Hannah wants to live in a world without climate change, 
and she wants to do whatever she can to achieve this Hannah does not view moving her 
family to an isolated farm, far from society, in which they can live off their organic farm, 
etc , as an option While this would result in carbon neutrality for Hannah, she does not 
even consider it To be truly successful in removing your contributions from the 
collective, both causal and attitudmal, requires a drastic change for the agent Therefore, 
Hannah does not see herself as choosing between the isolated farm and her current 
situation Rather, Hannah desires carbon neutrality but cannot achieve it She has taken 
steps, but not nearly enough to achieve her desire 
The question becomes, does Hannah's case more closely resemble that of Sam 
who shoots the mayor, or of Sam whose electronic device makes him shoot the mayor? 
The answer depends on whether you consider Hannah's actions to be in line with her 
desires Hannah presents one of the problem cases for climate change She is trying to 
change her life to stop the harm in question, but has not removed herself from 
contributing If the requirements on agents are so severe that those, like Hannah, cannot 
succeed, the case looks bad for climate change But, can we say that Hannah did not have 
control over her actions? That she desired carbon neutrality, but even as she reaches for 
that goal, she cannot accomplish it? There is no electronic device in her brain to prevent 
her, but it could be argued that circumstances themselves provide the same action for her 
If we want to say that we can only have a duty to perform the possible, then Hannah may 
not be responsible 75 These details are part of the reason why the case for climate change 
is so complicated In Chapter 6 I defend a view of collective responsibility that will 
identify Hannah as responsible but also provide accessible options for her to remove 
herself from the responsible collective Without providing such options an account of 
collective responsibility cannot overcome the critiques of Lewis and Narveson, and will 
not be compelling 
Before moving forward in this discussion I want to consider a related problem, 
this one not directly responding to the control condition, but still focusing on the control 
an agent has Depending on the theory of collective responsibility that is being used, we 
will have to look at what demands such a theory places on agents, and whether the 
demands are themselves too much to require, such as Hannah becoming completely 
carbon neutral Liam Murphy (1993) seeks to answer a similar problem when he proposes 
a theory of beneficence (where agents are required to promote the good) Often 
beneficence is considered too demanding on agents Murphy aims to rescue this concept 
by examining the problems in the theory and proposing a method to limit required 
beneficence Such principles of beneficence are not collective responsibility issues, 
unless, of course, beneficence is recognised as an essential virtue What I am interested in 
here is Murphy's argument to limit what is required of agents in the case of beneficence 
because such an argument may also be relevant when asking, as in the example of 
Hannah above, what duty may be required of agents 
I am relying here on Immanuel Kant's discussion of Free Will where he argues that if 
we ought to conform, it must be possible for us to do so (84n6) 
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The demands of beneficence are that agents must act to help (or mitigate harm) 
imposed on others The example Murphy uses is world poverty In a perfect situation 
agents will act in concert, each taking their share of the burden to limit or eliminate the 
harm However, problem situations arise when not all agents act m this way Murphy 
argues that beneficence, as characterised by consequentiahsm, seems to require that each 
agent will need to comply with the theory, shouldering her share of the demands of 
beneficence, as well as taking on as many of the shares of non-complying agents as would 
be optimal76 This means that the agent in a situation that is collective (as most beneficent 
situations that Murphy focuses on are), needs to take on the burden of the agents who are 
not taking on their fair share This makes the principle of beneficence very demanding, as 
it could be the case that one agent bears the burden for what rightly belongs to an entire 
nation, or nations Being the kind of agent to recognise the need to be beneficent seems to 
have placed them in a position where they cannot meet the requisite demands This is 
going to be similar in the case of collective responsibility When Lewis and Narveson 
argue against collective responsibility because of the limited control agents have over 
their actions, it is because stopping collectives or reversing collective action is too 
demanding on the agents 
Murphy argues that beneficence needs to be seen as a cooperative project, and that 
when the expected compliance of some agents decreases this should not increase the 
burden on remaining agents 7? To achieve this he proposes the following Cooperative 
Principle 
Each agent is required to act optimally- to perform the action that makes the 
outcome best- except in situations of partial compliance with this principle In 
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situations of partial compliance it is permissible to act optimally, but the sacrifice 
each agent is required to make is limited to the level of sacrifice that would be 
optimal if the situation were one of full compliance, of the actions that require no 
more than this level of sacrifice, agents are required to perform the action that 
makes the outcome best78 
Murphy is relying on a consequentiahst ethic in presenting his theory, but the principle 
above is interesting when we look at it in light of what it might offer to my analysis of 
collective responsibility If I were to propose a similar condition, that each agent is 
required to perform acts to mitigate or eliminate a collective harm to the point where the 
individual sacrifice of agents is equal to that which would be required if all agents in the 
collective were acting together, this might make significant progress in satisfying 
concerns about agent control Sacrifice will still be required, and in some cases of 
collective action, the sacrifice may be very demanding, but each agent is only being asked 
to sacrifice based on their membership in the collective, and on the assumption that all 
agents m the collective will be acting similarly This removes some of the possible 
attributions of responsibility that would be determined by the actions of others 
Murphy limits his principle m cases of special obligations The example he gives 
is the often used example of a child drowning in a pond in front of you In such a case it is 
not appropnate to calculate what beneficence you are required to show when determining 
what your correct action should be Your relationship (being able to aid the child) may 
very well create special obligations which will require a certain moral response 79 
However, it seems that Murphy's condition will be particularly useful in the case of large, 
unstructured harms, such as climate change, because in this case the victims are more 
distant from the perpetrators, and special obligations may not apply 
Ibid 280 
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Murphy's account of beneficence offers an interesting possibility for an account 
of collective responsibility There is something appealing about the idea that each agent 
will only be responsible for their share of an action in a world in which everyone 
complied In Chapter 2 I discussed the possibility of dividing up the use of carbon sinks 
among the global population, providing a kind of "carbon allowance" for each individual 
In such a circumstance agents would only be responsible for the harm of climate change 
if they exceeded their carbon share 
While this solution is appealing, it abstracts too far from the particulars of this 
case All carbon emissions are occurring past the point of harm While it may be the case 
that an agent is currently contributing no more than their share, this argument will not be 
satisfying for those who are victimized Murphy's account works wonderfully in the case 
of beneficence because the idea of beneficence is that agents are acting virtuously While 
you could argue that there is a level of beneficence that is required of all agents, this 
requirement is part of being a morally good agent In the case of collective responsibility 
we are dealing with something an agent is already doing that is harmful Agents are 
working collectively, and by doing so they are creating harms 
The example that Murphy uses in his account of beneficence is world poverty I 
find his account useful because it is possible, under my descnption of collective harms, to 
analyse certain kinds of world poverty as situations of collective responsibility depending 
on how this situation is framed For example, much has been written on the state of Africa 
today and links have been made to actions from the West as a cause of current economic 
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instability and poverty in Africa While I am not going to make that argument here, if 
such an argument were successful, then Murphy's account of beneficence would quickly 
turn to one of collective responsibility 
Murphy's account of beneficence deserves our attention because it addresses the 
concerns of Lewis and Narveson in a very appealing way This theory is not satisfying in 
the case of climate change, however his ideas will be useful in Chapter 5 where I argue 
for a reductive account of collective responsibility What we can ask of individuals within 
the collective is at the heart of Lewis and Narveson's concerns about the control condition 
in collective situations, and must be addressed in a successful account In this section I 
have looked at possible solutions from May, Fischer and Ravizza, and Murphy The 
abstract features that are common in all of these theories are that they attempt to solve the 
problems presented by Lewis and Narveson by redefining what is meant by control By 
using Fischer and Ravizza's guidance control we can more easily address the case of 
Michael The case of Hannah is more complex, however, I do think Fischer and Ravizza's 
account offers insight here as well Without requiring agents to remove themselves from 
society we may be able to understand the important difference between Hannah and 
Michael Perhaps this difference can be captured in how we define membership in 
collectives, or perhaps through, as Lewis suggests, levels of complicity 
3.4 Conclusion 
Our concept of moral responsibility includes limiting such responsibility if the 
agent cannot control or cannot know what they are doing In accounts of individual moral 
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responsibility this means that agents are not morally responsible for their mistakes or 
actions that are the result of coercion When these conditions are applied in collective 
contexts they can initially excuse all actions because individuals cannot control the 
collective By revisiting the control condition and requiring that agents be in control of 
their attitudes, and requiring that they act on their desires, agents can have control in 
collective contexts 
The epistemic condition for individual moral responsibility is also problematic in 
collective contexts I turn to this problem m the next chapter 
81
 In this chapter I have relied on a classical compatibihst descnption of the world, and of 
an agent's freedom within it I have found the compatibihst accounts compelling not only 
for their descnption of choice, but also for what such accounts can offer to the debate on 
collective responsibility where the agent is often charactensed as being unable to control 
their actions when participating in groups 
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Chapter 4: The Problem of Knowledge 
4.1 Introduction 
My aim m this chapter is to continue the discussion of the conditions of individual 
moral responsibility In the previous chapter I examined the control condition, looking 
both at the problem it posed for collective responsibility and possible solutions to that 
problem In this chapter I focus on the second condition for moral responsibility, the 
epistemic condition While most accounts focus on the control condition when it comes to 
responsibility, both conditions are equally important to attributions of moral 
responsibility George Sher, whom I will discuss at length in later sections of this chapter, 
identifies this deficit in theories of responsibility and claims that most theories rely on the 
"searchlight view" of knowledge which restricts responsibility to that which agents are 
aware of While Sher argues that this is problematic when it comes to individual moral 
responsibility, it is also going to be problematic when it comes to collective responsibility 
because agents are often unaware of either their contribution to, or their membership in, 
responsible collectives 
In this chapter I will begin with a discussion of the problems posed by the 
epistemic condition in both individual and collective contexts Returning to Aristotle, I 
examine the distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts, and the role of ignorance 
in attributions of responsibility Next, I turn to two philosophers to expand the discussion, 
Lynn Hankinson Nelson and George Sher Nelson argues that knowledge is held by 
communities instead of individuals In her account she identifies the group as the primary 
epistemic agent, and restricts the knowledge that individuals have to that which is 
contained in the groups to which they belong Sher argues against the widespread use of 
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the "searchlight view" for knowledge, and proposes a replacement theory which better 
fits with our intuitions regarding ignorance 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an analysis of the epistemic condition to 
compliment that offered in the previous chapter for the control condition, and to explore 
some alternatives when it comes to the epistemic condition when dealing with collective 
responsibility 
4.2 The Problem of Knowledge 
Along with the control condition, the epistemic condition can affect attributions of 
responsibility Much as we do not want to hold agents responsible for what they could not 
control, we see what agents could know as playing an important role as well in 
attributions of responsibility Intuitively we do not want to hold agents responsible for 
acting on bad information For example, if you were to tell me the Minister of Finance is 
a horrible person and unfit to do her job, and I reveal to you that the Minister is my 
mother, while you may feel guilty, I am likely to interpret your action kindly (or without 
blame) because you did not know my relation to the Minister I would not see your 
comments as a personal insult This returns to Peter Strawson's claim, discussed in the 
previous chapter, that my reaction depends on the context of the act (your intent) While 
ignorance can excuse, it does not always Exactly what is going to count as ignorance 
requires careful analysis 
Recall Aristotle's characterization of a voluntary act " a voluntary act would 
seem to be one of which the originating cause lies in the agent himself, who knows the 
particular circumstances of the action " In the previous chapter I discussed the first 
criterion presented here, the idea of that the cause must originate in the agent, or the 
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control condition In this chapter I will look at the second criterion for individual moral 
responsibility What needs to be the case for the agent to know the circumstances of her 
action*? 
Aristotle defines actions as voluntary, involuntary or non-voluntary These titles 
are important, because voluntary moral actions are those that can receive praise and 
blame, while involuntary ones receive pity and pardon ' This is similar to Strawson's 
reactive attitudes which can be used as a tool to determine responsibility In order for an 
act done through ignorance to be involuntary (and not non-voluntary) it must cause the 
agent subsequent pam and repentance To perform an immoral act through ignorance and 
not be upset about it, for Aristotle, is to admit that the agent is not against the act 
Therefore, when an agent repents of an act done through ignorance, it is said to be 
involuntary 2 Like the example above, ignorance excuses your personal insult only if you 
feel regret once learning the nature of my relation to the Minister 
Aristotle clarifies that the ignorance in play here cannot be chosen He argues 
An act is not properly called involuntary if the agent is ignorant of his own 
advantage, for what makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in the choice (this is 
a cause of wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for this people are blamed), 
but particular ignorance, 1 e of the circumstances and objects of the action, for it is 
on these that pity and pardon depend, because a man who acts in ignorance of any 
such detail is an involuntary agent3 
This definition of ignorance is very specific In such cases the action originates in the 
agent, but they are acting m ignorance of the particular situation For example, as 
discussed m the previous chapter, when Oedipus kills his father and marries his mother, 
he does so believing they are other people The actions do originate in Oedipus, but the 
1
 Aristotle 1109b30-1110al6 
2
 Ibid 1110b7-31 
3
 Ibid 1110al7-b31 
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intent, or choice, under this description, does not Oedipus is acting out of ignorance 
Further, Oedipus is in pain when he discovers the truth 4 Oedipus is not ignorant of the 
universal, in this case the moral rule or principle that identifies patricide as morally 
wrong Aristotle holds agents responsible for being ignorant of moral principles, but 
excuses them for ignorance of particulars (that this man was Oedipus' father) 
Aristotle is emphasizing the character of the individual If an action is done out of 
ignorance and the agent "feels bad" then this is involuntary, and not the proper target of 
individual moral responsibility If the agent acts out of ignorance, but does not "feel bad"-
m fact, if they feel elated at the outcome- then they retain responsibility Ignorance is only 
excusing if the agent did not intend or want the outcome This brings up the question as to 
how important the mental state of the agent is compared to their causal connection 
Consider the following example Your friend is visiting in your home, and is startled 
when your dog barks She ends up tripping into a table holding your prize vase which tips 
to the floor and breaks Does it matter if the agent is happy or sad she broke the vase9 The 
agent did not intend to break the vase, but under Aristotle's account there is something 
amiss in the situation when she is happy that the vase is broken This emotional reaction 
to an accident changes the agent's moral standing in regards to the event While I am not 
suggesting that Aristotle's account supports some kind of "thought police", or the idea 
that thinking a bad thought is equal to acting on it, what I am emphasizing here is that if 
not "feeling bad" implicates an agent, this leads to the question of whether wishing harm 
on others is as bad as doing harm to others This emphasizes the character of an agent and 
places it in the centre of attributions of responsibility 
4
 Ibid 3 1 11109b30-l 110al6 
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It is important that the agent have the right kind of reaction to a harm they cause, 
in the case of breaking the vase it is important, if the agent is going to be excused, that 
she wish the vase were not broken We can interpret this as being part of the universal It 
seems as if a moral principle, or some kind of moral standard which could be captured in 
a universal, has been broken An agent who breaks the vase, accidentally, but is happy, 
has shown some relevant disregard for a moral standard They have an inappropriate 
relation to the harm, and to the victim of the harm And to do so is not excusable under 
Anstotle's account This means that character has an important central place for Anstotle, 
but that character is being measured in a particular way, that is, in relation to a standard 
I am not advocating for a purely Aristotelian account of the epistemic condition 
for moral responsibility, however, his outline of the problem of ignorance can begin my 
discussion of this issue What might happen in the collectives we are discussing if 
ignorance can keep members from being responsible9 In the small, structured collective 
of two people painting the house, or the small, unstructured collective of strangers 
helping out someone who has fallen, ignorance cannot play a role Because of the size of 
the collective, and the input required from each agent towards the collective goal, it will 
not be the case, under normal circumstances, that any member could be ignorant I have 
stipulated that this is only the case under "normal circumstances" because it is possible 
for the members to be mistaken (they could be manipulated) For example, one painter 
could have told the other that they were painting the house as an act of charity, but in fact 
this was a he, and the house belongs to the painter himself In this case, the details of the 
collective action are deliberately kept hidden from members of the collective Any blame 
for the act would be attnbuted to the manipulator 
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In the case of large, structured collectives things become less clear While again, 
deliberate manipulation from an agent in the collective could result in the collective 
unintentionally performing certain actions, I will put this possibility aside I believe that 
in such a case, we would look to the manipulator as the person who caused the harm, not 
the collective which was misled I want to return to Christopher Kutz's example of the 
mid-level engineer who works at a company that produces land mines that are sold to 
third world countries In the case as described in the previous chapter the engineer knew 
that the company was producing these land mines, and did not approve But, modifying 
the example slightly, suppose that the engineer does not know about the activities of the 
company, but that the activities of the company are not hidden (thus, no manipulation of 
the collective ) In this case the engineer could accurately claim that she did not know the 
company was producing land mines The engineer simply goes to work every day, and 
works on the project in her area She is morally against land mines, but was not aware 
that she was, in fact, contnbuting to their production Is ignorance in this case an excusing 
condition9 
If we consider the case from Aristotle's position on individual moral 
responsibility, it may be The engineer is upset by her contribution, which is, for 
Aristotle, an important condition She seems to be aware of the universal as well in that 
she finds selling land mines to third world countries to be a morally bad thing But what 
level of knowledge can we reasonably expect from individuals who are in a collective9 I 
will return to this question throughout this chapter 
Moving on to large, unstructured collectives the question of what agents can know 
becomes more complex Many of the large, unstructured collectives that I have discussed 
so far exist because the actions of the many contribute to a collective outcome not 
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achievable by a single person However, many of the large, unstructured collectives also 
consist of individuals who only see their action as individual, and not as part of a bigger 
action This is not the same as not knowing about the landmines This has to do with how 
we see ourselves in the world Both collectives responsible for systemic racism and 
climate change consist of many individual and unconnected acts from driving a car to 
hiring one person over another While it might be true that my driving my SUV everyday 
for four hours contributes to carbon emissions that are, in turn, causing climate change, I 
do not identify my action in that way I know that I alone am not causing climate change 
And I do not think of myself as a member of a collective in such a way that I need to be 
aware of, and act in accordance with (or against), the actions of some collective When it 
comes to unstructured collective actions there is no team, no playbook by which members 
decide on a course of action, and therefore individuals can plausibly deny being members 
of a collective and contributing to a collective outcome 
Knowledge of one's actions, and of the consequences and potential harms of those 
actions, becomes much more complicated at the collective level Under Aristotle's 
account, most large collective actions where people were not aware of their contribution, 
and did not intend it (felt remorse), will be excused If we are to follow Aristotle's theory 
here, we eliminate many collectives from consideration for collective responsibility If we 
are willing to excuse the engineer of her actions because she did not know of her 
contributions to the landmines due to being unaware (although in no way misled or 
deceived) then much collective responsibility will fail to meet the epistemic condition I 
can dnve my SUV every day without blame because I do not know about the IPCC report 
on climate change, and I have no idea how my driving could possibly melt ice in the 
arctic When you hire candidates who are the same gender and race as you, you are not 
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doing so as a member of a racist and sexist society You see your actions as isolated, so 
lack the important qualities required to meet the epistemic condition It may be the case 
that each of these agents see what they are doing as wrong when considered as a single 
action (although many will not) But none of them view it as a part of a collective action 
This failure is due, in part, to a lack of knowledge about the collective implications of 
individual acts We return to Kutz's fear that agents will adopt a "just doing my job" 
mentality This, in turn, will allow collective harms to continue 
In individualistic cultures, or certainly when we think of ourselves globally, it is 
hard to think of us all as members of a collective This failure is not, I will argue, the 
same as not knowing the Minister is my mother, or Oedipus' failure to know the man he 
just killed was his father This failure to see the collective nature of our individual acts 
suggests that we need to explore more deeply what knowledge looks like m a collective 
context How much should we know? What criteria are there9 
I will explore this question of adequate knowledge by turning to the following 
concerns First, we must decide whether each individual in these collectives is going to 
need to know the entirety of her individual contribution, or the actions of the whole 
collective Further, it must be determined if this will be a condition for membership m the 
collective itself This is an important question because there will be many cases with 
large, unstructured collectives where the agent may not know of her individual 
contribution to the collective act, or about her membership in the collective, or neither 
Returning to the example of systemic racism in a society, an agent may be aware that 
such racism exists, but not be aware that her actions support it In the case of climate 
change, the agent may know that she dnves more than others, but not how this is a piece 
of the action of a much larger (and thus much more powerful) collective 
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Secondly, it is problematic to claim that acting with ignorance and feeling upset 
by the outcome (as opposed to happy with the result) eliminates responsibility There are 
times where the ignorance of the agent is the fault of the agent, and should not excuse the 
agent from responsibility for the resulting harm If a fireperson fails to learn about proper 
fire safety, and then during a fire fails to rescue someone because of this lack of 
knowledge, we would not say that his remorse indicates he is not to blame His lack of 
knowledge is blameworthy, and the outcome of someone dying m a fire is a foreseeable 
result I will return to the idea of what is foreseeable and what is reasonable for an agent 
to know I will argue that there will be many times when agents who are participating in a 
collective are upset by the actions of the collective However, often they are not unaware 
of them How much do agents need to know for us to conclude that they have met the 
epistemic condition7 This is where I turn next 
4.3 Collective Knowledge 
In the example of Oedipus we ask, did Oedipus know his own identity7 He did 
not, so we conclude that he is not responsible Things are more complicated when it 
comes to collective actions Did the midlevel engineer know about the landmines7 At 
what point should she know7 If the knowledge is available, is it up to the agent to find 
out7 And in the case of climate change, when will (or did) the evidence of climate change 
constitute knowledge7 The question for collective responsibility is whether the agent 
could or did know, which includes considerations of whether the knowledge existed yet, 
and whether the collective "knew" 
In the rest of this chapter I will examine two very different theoretical approaches 
to this question The first I will examine is that of Lynn Hankinson Nelson who argues 
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that the group, or collective, is the pnmary knower If Nelson's theory succeeds, than our 
discussion moves from concerns about what an agent could or did know, to what the 
group can or did know After looking at Nelson I will examine George Sher's argument 
for a new epistemic condition, one he defends in opposition to what he identifies as the 
most commonly accepted version of the epistemic condition, the "Searchlight View " 
Sher's epistemic condition moves beyond what knowledge is immediately available to an 
agent and considers what it might mean to speak of what a reasonable agent ought to 
know Neither Nelson nor Sher are speaking to the epistemic condition in light of 
collective responsibility, but each of their theories offer insights into how the epistemic 
condition could be viewed in a collective context that will address the concerns I noted 
above 
In many accounts in feminist epistemology5 knowledge is considered something 
communal Knowledge is the result of how we are in the world Many feminist 
epistemologists claim that an agent's social situation and location play an important role 
m her ability to know Although there is no widespread agreement on the details, the 
general claim is accepted by many Elizabeth Anderson characterises feminist 
epistemology as being, " about the ways gender influences what we take to be 
knowledge" 6 As we explore such influences, we can also question how race, economic 
position, age and other identifications affect what we take to be knowledge This claim 
has many implications The question posed by Nelson is if knowledge is influenced by 
5
 For the purposes of my argument in this chapter I will be treating feminist epistemology 
as a homogenous subcategory of epistemology and feminist philosophy There are many 
differences between feminist epistemologists For my argument I am only concerned with 
the main characteristic such theories have in common, mainly that the knower is situated 
in a particular location, and that location and power relations to other knowers impact 
how agents know 
6
 Anderson (1995) 50 
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such factors, then who is the knower*? In traditional accounts the primary knower is the 
individual Nelson proposes that the primary epistemic agent is the community 
I know that my walls are green, that I am human, and that I am a nice person 
None of these are contentious, or particularly interesting, claims In a Cartesian 
framework these knowledge statements are questionable because I may be mistaken, or 
have been manipulated Even the first claim, one based on my senses, could be untrue To 
test the veracity of this claim I, independently, turn inwards and examine the methods I 
used to come to these conclusions In a feminist epistemology framework the questions 
raised by these statements are different The statements are now evaluated against what is 
known in the relevant social group Do these statements and methods of evidence cohere 
with those of the larger social group*? What matters to the feminist epistemologist is 
whether my method for determining this, the standards of evidence being employed, are 
in line with those of the relevant society Am I using socially validated methods of 
evidenced Feminist epistemologists contend that their theory more closely resembles the 
world, and further that the sohpsistic Cartesian knower is implausible 
To support the feminist epistemologists' claim that their theory more accurately 
describes the world, consider the following example 
Carmita has worked for eight years in Cornell's department of nuclear physics, 
first as a lab technician, then as an administrator One of the professors was unable 
to keep his hands off Carmita He would jiggle his crotch when standing near her 
desk, and brush against her breasts when reaching for papers At a Christmas party 
he cornered her in an elevator and planted unwanted kisses on her mouth After 
this, Carmita tried to avoid him, and put in for a transfer This stress brought on a 
number of physical symptoms She eventually had to quit her job When asked 
why, Carmita didn't know what to say, or how to describe what had happened 
Later Carmita was sharing her story with a class of women and they realised they 
had all experienced something similar They decided to hold a 'speak-out' about 
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this thing that as of yet had no name They finally decided upon calling it 'sexual 
harassment'7 
In this example Carmita first experiences "sexual harassment" before it has become part 
of the knowledge base in her epistemological community Although she sensed there was 
something wrong, she did not come to fully know what had happened to her until starting 
a dialogue with others in the community, and collectively coming to know about sexual 
harassment What is jarring about this example is that it happened within our time, and 
that as progressive or liberal as you might feel, it is possible that there are unnamed 
occurrences in our midst that we do not know about, and our only response is a sense of 
unease 
You may argue that what is at stake in Carmita's case is the language, the term 
"sexual harassment", and not knowledge of its occurrence Carmita knew X had 
happened, she just did not have a word for it yet But what did Carmita know? That the 
professor had performed the acts in question? Yes That it had been an unwanted sexual 
advance? Possibly That it was a systemic problem? No For Carmita what she knew the 
professor had done did not constitute evidence of sexual harassment It did not constitute 
evidence for anything larger than the occurrence itself By coming together and making 
the connection between certain kinds of acts and "sexual harassment" the group created a 
new way to identify and know of something that had gone unclassified and unexamined 
It is important to note that under this account the Professor also did not know the nature 
of his own acts He also lacked the vocabulary and cognitive concepts to identify the act 
as "sexual harassment" 
7
 This example is adapted from S Brownmiller, (1990), In Our Time, Memoir of a 
Revolution New York The Dial Press 280-1 
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Miranda Fncker (2007) examines the case of Carmita and identifies it as a special 
kind of epistemic injustice, hermeneutical injustice Fncker defines this term as a wrong 
that is done to the agent in her capacity as a knower, " Hermeneutical injustice is the 
injustice of having some significant areas of one's social experience obscured from 
collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective 
hermeneutical resource " For Fncker, she wants to emphasize that such injustice, which 
leads to cases like that of Carmita where she cannot understand a harm that she is 
expenencing, are tied to the power (or powerlessness) of agents in the group, and 
therefore impacts the members of these groups in different ways Therefore, while the 
person harassing Carmita also does not know what sexual harassment is, his place of 
power withm the group means that such a lack of understanding did not harm him, but it 
did harm Carmita a great deal9 
Fncker descnbes an example of a woman who experiences postpartum depression 
in the sixties when postpartum depression (as well as most forms of depression) was ill 
understood in society In the example the woman, much like Carmita, gathers in a group 
of other women and begins to discuss this condition Dunng this discussion the woman 
finds her interpretation of her own expenence is altered Fncker says 
then Wendy Sanford's moment of truth seems to be not simply a hermeneutical 
breakthrough for her and for the other women present, but also a moment in which 
some kind of epistemic injustice is overcome The guiding intuition here is that as 
these women groped for a proper understanding of what we may now so easily 
name as post-natal depression, the hermeneutical darkness that suddenly lifted from 
Wendy Sandford's mind had been wrongfully preventing her from understanding a 
significant area of her social expenence, thus depriving her of an important patch of 
self-understanding 10 
8
 Fncker (2007)155 
9
 Ibid 161 
10
 Ibid 149 
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Again, we see as in the case of Carmita, that by coming together and discussing their 
experiences these women created a new way to identify and know of something In this 
case it was not something that was unnamed (as was sexual harassment) but rather 
something that was misunderstood because of existing social stigma against depression 
Flicker focuses on the hermeneutical injustice that these women are suffering I want to 
explore the way in which they came to know about a feature, a very important feature, of 
their lives 1! In both the case of Carmita and Wendy Sandford, they came to know in a 
social way, not in isolation Alone both women became convinced that either there was 
nothing wrong, or what was wrong was something abnormal and shameful about them 
By gathering in a social group they were able to understand their experience, both the 
details of what had happened to them without blaming themselves, and also the normality 
and commonality of their experience This is something that had not been available to 
them as individuals This social knowledge creation is important in Nelson's account, and 
leads her to make radical claims about the identity of the primary epistemic agent 
Nelson defends the idea of a new kind of knower - the community She claims 
that the community is the primary epistemic agent She says, "Communities are the 
primary loci- the primary generators, repositories, holders and acquirers of knowledge" 12 
When Nelson speaks of the community knowing, the community is not merely the 
aggregate of individual agents The community is not equivalent to " me and you and 
1
' Hermeneutic injustice, as Fncker has identified it, will still present a problem in my 
account of knowledge Potentially such a position could support the claim that knowledge 
can only be generated by communities (as Nelson argues ) I am not arguing this here 
Instead, I am using Fncker's account to highlight the social nature of knowledge in order 
to understand what the epistemic condition may look like in cases of collective 
responsibility, particularly large, unstructured collective acts The problem of 
hermeneutical injustice in these groups needs further attention, however it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation 
12
 Nelson (1993) "Epistemological Communities" 124 
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you and you " but rather is collective m a sense that cannot be divided 13 And it is this 
collective that knows This claim is in opposition to traditional epistemological claims for 
Cartesian individualism, where the individual can know independent of any others (in fact 
you might argue that it must be independent of others) Under Nelson's account the 
individual is not on par, epistemically speaking, with the epistemic community Rather, 
the individual only knows derivatively The individual agent is epistemically dependent 
on her community 14 
This change in primacy of individual and community requires further exploration 
Recall the feminist epistemologist position which emphasized the role of an agent's 
situation and location for knowledge Nelson interprets this need particularly strongly 
She argues that when I claim to know P, the truth value of this claim is dependent on the 
criteria of the community I am making that claim in, or to 13 When I say that I know P, 
that claim is not being made in a vacuum, but rather is being made in a certain situation 
If we interpret the feminist epistemologists' need to account for the situatedness of the 
knower m a weak sense, we may only be committed to acknowledging a social influence 
on knowledge In the strong sense the claim "I know P" is only true because of the 
epistemological community's criteria Nelson interprets situatedness in the strong sense 
and as such is forced to claim that epistemological communities are the pnmary 
epistemological agents 
While it may be counterintuitive to claim that the community, and not the 
individual, is the pnmary epistemic agent, there is a certain logic to this line of reasoning 
13Nelson (1990) Who Knows 291 
14
 Nelson (1993) "Epistemological Communities" 124 
15
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In the literature it is often claimed that knowers must be self-sufficient, meaning they 
need to have access to all the conditions of knowing well This is the atomistic view 
These conditions need not be readily available to the agent, but they must be available in 
some sense It is under this type of account that we can require that an agent turn inwards 
and investigate her own knowledge The case put forth by feminist epistemologists is that 
our standards of evidence and knowledge are social, and that withm different 
communities, groups and circumstances, different methods of evidence are required This, 
in its simplest form means that when you tell me it is five o'clock I can know that it is 
five o'clock because I live in a society where, most of the time, people tell the truth when 
asked the time And that in my society, your telling me the time is acceptable evidence for 
my knowing the time Whereas if you were to tell me you had discovered how to float ten 
inches above the ground, I am not going to take your word on it I require additional 
information and evidence in order to believe you, but also if I were to say that I knew that 
you had floated, the evidence standards would be much higher than they were for 
checking the time 
If we accept the atomistic knower and that standards for evidence and knowledge 
are social, it can be argued that the only agent that has access to these standards would be 
the community If the standards of knowledge are socially embedded then they are not 
located within or with the individual agent In fact, the agent ends up checking her 
knowledge criteria against those of the community in which she wants to claim 
knowledge If I come from a community that typically uses crystal ball gazing to 
determine the constitution of the human body, mto a community that uses medical science 
which includes dissection, then in order to convince people in this new community that 
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vitamin X is the cure to cancer, I will have to appeal to their standards of evidence 
Absent claims that some standards of evidence are simply better than others (which, while 
generally speaking is true, it is not true that we can say our standards are the best 
standards of evidence without worrying about hubris), it will have to be the case that the 
agent applies different methods to gain knowledge in different communities Thus, the 
community, which is self-sufficient in a way that the individuals withm it are not, must be 
the primary epistemic agent This conclusion is the outcome of the above argument, and 
while it sounds odd, it is logically entailed 
If Carmita's story is analysed in terms of Nelson's theory, the explanation of what 
happened would proceed along these lines Even if Carmita was sure that something 
wrong had happened, she would not possess knowledge until the community standards of 
knowledge and evidence had changed 16 Thus, until Carmita met the other women, 
perhaps not even until they had found a name for the nameless act, did Carmita know In 
order for the knowledge of the epistemological community to change, an epistemological 
sub-community had to gather and construct new evidentiary links that led to knowledge 
Nelson says, 
we experience the world through the lens of going projects, categories, theories 
and standards, and all of these are generated by communities Based on our 
experiences, we can each contribute uniquely to what we know- but none of us 
knows what no one else could 17 
Thus, until sexual harassment had gone through this process, no one could "know" of 
its occurrence, or its definition Now, while knowledge is reserved for that which has 
gone through this process, this does not cut agents off from other, lesser forms of 
information Perhaps it will be enough for agents to believe, but not know of such 
16
 Nelson (1990) Who Knows 255 
17
 Nelson (1993) "Epistemological Communities" 142 
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things I will explore this possibility more m what comes next While we can know 
what no one else does, Nelson argues that we cannot know what no one else could 
And this is because the evidence must be available to all withm the community 
(meaning that standards of evidence are social) This is the result of externalising what, 
under the traditional atomistic view, were individual and internal criteria Once again, 
we cannot know what no one else could, but there is some room here for belief, or 
some other relation to information 
This is a strong claim It appears that if Carmita did not go through the above 
process, then not only could she not know that sexual harassment had occurred to her, 
but also, it seems one must conclude that nothing wrong actually happened 18 This is 
why Fncker names this situation an injustice The wrong that has been done to Carmita 
is evident when she becomes aware of the nature of her own experience The wrong 
that has been done to Carmita, apart from the actual harm of the practice of sexual 
harassment, was a harm to her as a knower As I argued above, Carmita does know 
that something wrong happened to her, but her understanding of the situation leaves 
her blaming herself, or otherwise mistaken as to its cause Additionally, she does not 
know how this fits into a larger picture So while she may know what the professor is 
doing and that she finds it highly problematic for her doing her job, what she does not 
know is that this is common and that, for example, it is creating certain employment 
barriers to women everywhere 
This analysis pulls apart two different types of information and the agent's 
relationship to them It is not clear whether Nelson would embrace this interpretation 
Here I do not mean that without knowledge the action itself did not occur, but without 
knowledge the context of the act does not exist and the perpetrator cannot have intent 
The knowledge that is lacking is of the "wrongness" of the act, not the act itself 
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But it seems to me that unless Carmita believed that women are the kind of agents who 
are treated the way that the professor was treating her, and that such treatment should 
be endured or enjoyed by women, that she did know that something was wrong Her 
evidence for the wrong that was happening to her was her direct observation and 
reaction to the treatment A more complicated case might be one where Carmita was 
blocked from a particular job, say becoming a professor herself, during a time when 
few, if any women were in such positions At the time the reason for being turned 
down for the position is that it is generally accepted that women were to be the 
primary care-givers, that men would not be able to properly perform their jobs in the 
presence of women, etc, etc If Carmita herself believes this depiction of women, 
which since it is socially embedded, she would, then it would be very difficult for her 
to have evidence, even for herself, that a wrong had occurred 
In the first case of Carmita and the professor, it seems that she does have some 
evidence that a wrong has taken place, and so even if the sub-committee never forms 
her evidence means that the wrong has occurred The second case is more difficult 
Unless we posit some claim about the "correct" treatment of women, or fairness and 
justice, under Nelson the wrong itself will disappear If the wrong is not recognised, as 
a wrong, then it cannot enter the communal knowledge base The case of Carmita will 
parallel cases for sexism, racism, ageism, and classism within society In all these 
cases, there were times where the mistreatment of the group was embedded in society 
such that there was "evidence" used to justify a difference in treatment Whether this is 
a fatal problem for Nelson remains to be seen 
Initially Nelson's position may appear extreme, as it requires abandoning the 
epistemic pnmacy of the individual However, Nelson is not alone For example, Helen 
163 
Longino says that the social is a " validating element in knowledge"19 and Heidi E 
Grasswick claims that the best way to understand knowers is as "mdividuals-in-
commumties "20 These positions are more moderate than Nelson's, but they contain the 
same elements, and are, in a sense, a response to the general claim put forth by feminist 
epistemologists Although Nelson has explained Carmita's story, she has also placed the 
individual agent in a passive position in regards to not only community knowledge, but 
also their own For Longino and Grasswick this view of the individual poses a problem 
As a picture emerges to explain Nelson's claim that epistemological communities 
are the primary epistemic agents, what remains unclear is the nature of these 
communities Nelson says, 
As I see them, epistemological communities are multiple, historically contingent, 
and dynamic they have fuzzy, often overlapping boundaries, they evolve, dissolve, 
recombme, and they have a variety of "purposes" and projects which may include 
(as a priority) the production of knowledge 21 
These epistemological communities have a transitory nature We often belong to more 
than one community This means we have multiple standards of knowledge and evidence 
that we are subject to, and that we can evaluate these and choose which groups we want 
to be members of22 Nelson claims that epistemological communities can be recognised m 
terms of shared knowledge standards and practices 23 She notes, "There are, of course, no 
litmus tests for identifying epistemological communities Not only are such communities 
dynamic, but there is no simple critenon for determining their boundanes " However, this 
does not mean that there is no structure to these groups Nelson says two communities 
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may form a coalition without becoming one community For example, feminists and 
fundamentalists may work together to develop a policy about pornography They may 
share this one goal, but they are too different to become one group 24 This analysis 
indicates that Nelson is likely to claim that in our society there are multitudes of these 
epistemic groups 
If we look at Nelson's theory without identifying what she intends by the term, 
"epistemological community," a strong interpretation that leaves the individual passive 
seems inevitable If the group knows, then the group is active, and it has power over the 
individual We know what we do because of our membership in communities This will 
have implications for responsibility and control However, in Nelson's description of her 
groups and their transitory nature, a second weaker interpretation arises Although the 
individual can know only denvatively from the groups of which she is a member, she also 
has the ability to move from group to group, and through a valuation of the modes of 
knowledge, to choose which group, or groups, to belong to This description of the 
individual is more active The group may construct meaning and knowledge, but there is a 
power the individual possesses, which allows her to choose Carmita chose to join that 
group of women, and to use that community's standards of knowledge 
I am going to look at three short critiques of Nelson to see where we might fit the 
individual m such an account This is important because it leads to a discussion of what 
the individual should or can know, which will lead back to the discussion of the epistemic 
condition 
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4.4 Three Critiques of Nelson 
Helen Longino and Heidi E Grasswick both critique Nelson, but support her 
overall project of emphasizing the impact of agents' social situation on knowing Louise 
Antony cnticises Nelson's move away from the Cartesian knower, claiming that while we 
can get knowledge through our interactions with others, in principle we do not require 
such interaction I will explore the arguments of these three wnters to flesh out the theory 
of what an individual can know when we consider the social possibilities for knowledge 
Helen Longino (2002) supports the feminist epistemological claim about the 
importance of treating epistemological agents as social individuals, instead of as isolated 
Cartesian individuals When discussing the role of values in science, she argues, "The 
social is not a corrupting but a validating element in knowledge "25 However, here 
Longino parts ways with Nelson Longino pulls apart the two concepts of belief and 
knowledge Nelson claimed that how beliefs are formed shows us how knowledge is 
formed She claims that we would only attnbute beliefs to an agent if they cohered with 
the larger social framework Beliefs are, like knowledge, constrained by evidence 26 
Longino distinguishes between belief and knowledge, and claims that knowledge is 
subject to social influences, but belief is not Where Nelson would say that a scientist 
with a revolutionary idea that does not cohere with the knowledge practices of the 
community does not know, Longino claims that while they do not know P, they do 
believe P The individual has the necessary and sufficient cognitive ability to generate 
ideas The epistemological community, which allows for critical reflection with others, is 
required for knowledge production, which includes a process of generation and 
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validation By making this distinction, Longino is giving the agent the ability, 
independent from the collective, to generate beliefs This individual and independent 
control places Longino's agent in a less passive position in respect to knowledge than 
Nelson 
In Longino's criticism of Nelson she claims that Nelson's view is too restrictive, 
and leaves us to wonder how there can be critical reflection in, or between, such 
communities Where Longino identifies the sociality of cognitive communities as 
occurring through the interaction of the members of those communities, Nelson binds her 
members together with common concepts, categories, etc , that allow them to view the 
world in the same way, to have a shared expenence Longmo defends interaction, 
claiming that her model requires diversity among the community members What makes 
the group a group is that everyone appeals to the same set of public standards m their 
critical discursive interactions She claims that in Nelson's model the shared view may 
permit diversity of beliefs, but unity m methods of evaluation 2 Belief formation will be 
guided by social influences, and the shared expenence of members, and similar (or same) 
view of the world will work together to shape these beliefs However members are 
restncted to only using public standards 
The strength of Longino's criticism lies in her attack on Nelson's seemingly 
passive individual agent Instead of relying on shared epistemological community 
standards of knowledge to even have beliefs, Longino's agent believes things based on 
her own cognitive apparatus and ability In a community she interacts cntically and 
reflects This descnption sounds much more enabling However, if we return to Nelson's 
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description of her epistemic communities, and recall that individuals can contribute to 
them, can evaluate their methods of knowledge production and evaluation in respect to 
membership in other groups, and can choose to move from group to group, Nelson's 
agent is restricted by the standards and knowledge of these communities, but not to the 
point of inaction Longino's theory would offer the agent greater independence than 
Nelson 
The apparent persuasiveness of Longino's argument lies in the idea that we can 
have beliefs independently of any community However, it is questionable if this is true 
There is likely going to be some relation of dependency between an agent's beliefs and 
the community, at least when considered in the framework of feminist epistemology 
Perhaps we need to view the agent differently, in a way that acknowledges the collective 
(or social) context they occupy Heidi Grasswick (2004) argues for viewing agents as 
"mdividuals-in-commumties" claiming that this shift will more accurately capture our 
relation to knowledge 
Grasswick argues that feminist epistemologists are reacting against the idea of the 
"atomistic knower", a "generic and self-sufficient" individual30 In the search for 
alternatives, Grasswick identifies Nelson's theory of the epistemic community, but claims 
that this theory cannot work, and instead promotes her own theory of the "mdividual-in-
community "31 Grasswick claims that Nelson's theory fails to properly consider the role 
of social relations and power dynamics in her epistemic theory, and secondly that it fails 
to show how we can improve knowledge-seeking, a view of epistemic agency that can be 
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exercised more or less well The first missing criterion emphasizes not only the social 
nature of knowledge, but also differences in power relations between agents in 
communities, and the effect of these differences on their position in regards to 
knowledge Grasswick, like Longmo wants the individual knower to be more active and 
in control of her knowledge than Nelson's agent, but also wants to keep the idea that there 
is a social dimension to knowledge 
Grasswick outlines Nelson's argument in the following way If we are to keep the 
idea that knowers must be self-sufficient (have internal access to all the conditions of 
knowing well), a characteristic of the atomistic view, and we accept that standards of 
evidence and knowledge are communal, the feminist claim, then the only agent that could 
have this access would be the community Thus, the community must be the knower 33 
Grasswick rejects her own interpretation of Nelson's argument claiming that the self-
sufficiency thesis is part of what feminist epistemologists are discarding, at both the 
individual and social level While typically self-sufficiency is considered part of the 
model of a good knower, it runs counter to claims from feminist epistemology which 
include an acknowledgement of our deep epistemic dependence on others Grasswick 
claims that if we accept the deep epistemic dependence of knowers, that knowledge is 
gained when individuals are members of multiple communities, then we cannot accept the 
isolation required in the self-sufficiency thesis 34 Thus, if an epistemic community knows 
that P, and is self-sufficient in the way described above, it cannot be the case that 
knowledge is ever the result of individuals participating in multiple communities 
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Grasswick is claiming that by embracing the self-sufficiency thesis Nelson is threatening 
her conception of multiple and overlapping epistemic communities 
It is difficult to determine the success of this criticism Grasswick has declared 
that Nelson's theory requires that the epistemic community be self-sufficient To 
charactenze it as such, and then attack the theory on these grounds, could be no more than 
a straw person argument Grasswick claims that the self-sufficiency thesis is an essential 
assumption in Nelson's argument, however she also points out that there is much 
evidence that Nelson did not view communities m that way Grasswick says, 
However, by accepting this interpretation, we return to the problem of trying to 
understand how her [Nelson's] holistic theory of evidence provides support for her 
stronger claim that primary knowers are communities, not just the weaker claim that 
knowing must occur withm a communal context 36 
So it seems clear that Nelson supports the idea of a multitude of overlapping epistemic 
communities, but she does not clearly comment on the resulting knowledge generation 
However, there are ways to interpret Nelson that avoid Grasswick's criticism For 
example, we could claim that there is an epistemic community of which all humans are 
members We could argue that there is an array of shared values and m particular, 
knowledge practices, that are common to the human species For example, the idea that if 
I touch my desk that is evidence that the desk is hard Observation is considered evidence 
for knowledge While this type of knowledge is not the type I am examining here, it does 
appear to be universal in nature The various epistemic communities that Nelson is 
concerned with may then be considered sub-communities If we interpret the 
epistemological community as one among many and possibly overlapping, and also 
embedded m this larger human community, does this eliminate Grasswick's second 
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criticism that Nelson's theory fails to show how we can improve our knowledge seeking 
practices'? To eliminate these concern agents need to be able to reflect on their 
membership in communities In this case there would be the one mam epistemological 
community that was self-sufficient And if we were to treat the groups (sub-communities) 
in the same manner we do individual agents in an epistemic community, then interaction 
and knowledge generation could occur between groups It is unclear whether this 
embedded approach is actually substantively different from the multiple and overlapping 
communities approach It may only move the problem back one step without changing or 
solving anything 
Grasswick's theory of knowers as mdividuals-in-communities retains the idea that 
knowers are primarily individuals while rejecting the generic and self-sufficient aspects 
of the atomistic knower She replaces these characteristics with those of situatedness and 
interactiveness 37 Grasswick begins with a discussion of the developmental aspect of 
knowledge She notes the important role of social interaction for the development of 
epistemic agency, but claims that she believes this shows that the conditions for agency 
•JO 
are social, not as Nelson claims, that the agent is the community Grasswick also claims 
that the individuals-in-community view carries the implications that good knowing 
involves critical engagement with other individuals-m-commumties 39 The power of the 
individual-in-community view lies in the fact, according to Grasswick, that by thinking of 
knowers in this way, mdividuals-m-communities build social relations right into the 
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epistemological framework It acknowledges the differences between knowers, yet they 
must engage with each other 40 
Grasswick, like Longino, has identified the key worries that Nelson's theory 
raises And like Longino, Grasswick aims to give power over knowledge back to the 
individual Upon close examination it is difficult to tell if Grasswick is fundamentally 
disagreeing with Nelson If we bracket Grasswick's characterization of Nelson as a 
proponent of the self-sufficiency thesis, then Grasswick seems to be providing a 
complementary, not contradictory, view A contradictory view would emphasize the 
individual as an atomistic knower to a similar degree that Nelson claims that the group is 
the primary epistemic agent Louise Antony defends such a view 
Antony (1995) claims that feminist epistemologists have identified a commitment 
to individualism as a problem in epistemology 41 Antony identifies individualism as 
including three doctnnes, individual knowers are epistemically interchangeable, humans 
are epistemically self-sufficient, needing only themselves to acquire knowledge, and 
methodological individualism - the claim that the individual is the primary knower On 
this model, there can still be social knowledge, but such knowledge is derived from the 
knowledge of individuals 42 Antony defends an account of individualism that, she argues, 
will address the concerns of the feminist epistemologists without requiring an account 
like that of Nelson's where individual knowledge is derived from that of the community 
Antony defends a weak version of the self-sufficiency thesis, that humans in 
principle do not require interaction with others She claims that this is all that traditional 
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epistemology needs to be committed to Antony backs up this claim, saying that no one 
would want to deny that we get some knowledge individually She introduces the 
example of a "wild child" who has been denied human contact for many years While we 
know that the cognitive development of such children will be impaired, these children 
still have some perceptual knowledge and memory Antony claims, "It would be 
dogmatic to insist that these children don't really possess knowledge "44 Antony claims 
that if we interpret "knowledge is social" in a weak sense, that knowledge is often 
developed m social contexts, this is not in conflict with her methodological individualism, 
for the individual is still primary Antony claims if we interpret "knowledge is social" in 
the strong sense, as supported by Nelson, we cannot account for knowledge m the case of 
wild children 45 In Antony's theory there is an acknowledgement of a social influence on 
knowledge, but the account remains individualistic 
Antony's wild child argument provides an interesting problem for Nelson Usually 
when the self-sufficiency thesis is raised, the examples are theoretical, for how can we 
observe knowledge generation or acquisition by an isolated individual? The example of 
the wild children provides a real example of individuals outside any recognised epistemic 
community and dares Nelson to say these children cannot know Antony posits the idea 
that agents can possess knowledge to different degrees, which means we will not have to 
say that the wild children either do or do not have knowledge For the wild children to 
have a lower degree of knowledge than other agents would recognise that the wild 
children have a way of knowing (accepted evidence and procedures), and this way may 
cohere with that of the larger society This can apply to knowledge based on the senses 
43
 Ibid 65 
44
 Ibid 74 
45
 Ibid 74-75 
173 
What they cannot know may be things that require inference beyond what can be 
observed, or knowledge that is gleaned through the testimony of others Under this 
account the wild child can know the grass is green, as are the leaves on the tree (or rather, 
that the colour of the grass and the leaves is the same ) This saves us from claiming that 
the wild child exists in a knowledge vacuum of some kind 
When evaluating Antony's criticisms, if sympathy for the poor wild children is 
put aside, we must consider if denying them knowledge is a true description If such a 
wild child were brought into a society, their knowledge claims would only be recognised 
as such if they cohered with the knowledge acquisition and generation standards of the 
society It is true that such a child may know that this stick is pointy She determined the 
veracity of the belief by touching it with her finger Upon feeling a sharp point the wild 
child took this as evidence that her belief in the pointy nature of the stick was true When 
this is explained to the society we understand the claims, and consider it knowledge as 
well - but we do this because she has the same knowledge practices as we do It may be 
the case that all societies share this particular process of validation when it comes to 
pointy sticks 
If, alternatively, the wild child said she knew the stick was pointy because she had 
a dream, then we would not say that she has knowledge Antony is claiming that since 
certain sense perception based knowledge of the wild child is likely to cohere with our 
community standards, it does not make sense to deny that these wild children have 
knowledge of these things, at least to some degree However, it seems that all we are 
committed to is to claim that the wild children have beliefs, but like Longmo, these 
beliefs will not be knowledge without interaction withm a social group Described this 
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way the wild child does not appear harmed by being unable to know things Wild children 
possess something different, beliefs perhaps 
When Nelson insists that "What I know depends inextricably on what we know, 
for some we"46 it is difficult to replace the comfortable image of the individual knower 
with a communal one This "we" cannot even be thought of as an aggregate of many 
individual knowers This "we" is something entirely different While in certain cases, like 
that of Carmita, Nelson's theory offers certain explanatory powers, many concerns 
remain This account is important because when I move on to discuss the epistemic 
condition for responsibility how we understand the agent's relation to knowledge will be 
relevant While each of the theorists discussed defend a different position regarding this 
relation there are certain key elements that are the same, the most important being that 
they all believe that there are social influences on knowledge While there are problems 
with Nelson's account, it remains compelling, so I turn next to a more detailed analysis of 
the idea of the community as a knower 
4.5 Lessons from Nelson 
After a thorough analysis of Nelson's epistemic community there are a number of 
problems that remain While I agree with some of Nelson's reasoning and her emphasis 
on the social aspect of knowledge, her move to declare the group the primary epistemic 
agent is too radical Nelson's argument appears to assume that knowers are self-
sufficient She observes that the standards of evidence and knowledge are social From 
this she concludes that the only agent who could be self-sufficient would be the same 
community that holds the standards of knowledge The challenge to Nelson's argument 
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comes at the claim that the community is an agent in the relevant sense, a conclusion we 
are only led to by the use of language which suggests the community holds the standards 
of knowledge much like you may hold the knowledge of your life Holding needs further 
explanation, because knowledge is not something that can be held in a physical sense To 
hold knowledge is to have it at the ready A calendar holds the knowledge of what day of 
the week October 24, 2010 will fall on You hold the knowledge (barring memory issues) 
of your parents, your hometown, the name of the football team at your high school, etc In 
the same way, according to Nelson, a community can hold knowledge Under Nelson's 
account this would mean that a community holds (or has) all the information about how 
knowledge can be gained (evidence), and contains information that is commonly known 
If a community can hold knowledge, it is easy to claim that it can also be the primary 
epistemic agent 
I will not take issue here with the self-sufficiency thesis, but only with Nelson's 
application of the thesis To be self-sufficient in this way the knower needs to have 
internal access to all the conditions of knowing well When we are considering an 
individual agent this means the agent needs to have the right kind of connection to their 
own internal states (1 e be sane, or not a child, etc ) But what does this mean when we are 
looking at the group as the agent9 Where are these standards of evidence9 Who needs to 
have access9 Everyone9 Just one agent9 This becomes much more confusing Much like 
the arguments I have made earlier m this dissertation against collectivising individual 
moral responsibility to create a theory of collective responsibility, the same arguments 
hold here as well The collective is not just a larger version of the case for the individual 
agent A group does not function like a single agent We may use language to suggest 
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united actions which make it appear to be an endorsement of such a view, but in this case 
I would suggest it is no more than a linguistic shortcut 
Further, I have contrasted collective responsibility that is reducible to the 
individual with that which is not (a project that I turn to in more detail in the next 
chapter) Nelson's understanding of knowledge may lend itself to a case of non-reductive 
collective responsibility, but would not function in a theory that is, in fact, reducible to 
the individual If the collective is the pnmary epistemic agent, then we are moving away 
from concerns of the agent's knowledge If we insist that, as Margaret Gilbert says, the 
collective can be responsible without any of its members being responsible, then the 
collective is the main concern While such a focus on the collective will alleviate 
concerns from the previous chapter on agents being responsible for what they cannot 
control (since they will, in fact, be responsible for nothing), it does not move the 
discussion forward 
When Nelson, and others, argue that the community knows, what they mean, it 
seems to me, is something quite different than what we mean when we say that an agent 
knows When the community knows Nelson intends to say that there are methods to 
knowing that are particular to particular communities For example, there may be a 
religious group which includes visions or dreams as evidence of certain facts (usually 
religious facts), and another group, say of scientists, which would not include such 
visions and dreams as evidence (in particular for scientific facts) In different 
communities different kinds of evidence are required for different kinds of knowledge 
claims 
This notion, at least on first glance, appears less contentious than the claim that 
the community is the pnmary epistemic agent However, there are problems even here 
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While we acknowledge that different communities use different standards of evidence, it 
is another argument altogether to claim that knowledge just is what that community says 
that it is In this way knowledge becomes relative to the community you are in And like 
all theories which are relative in this way, the theory then becomes vulnerable to 
criticisms such that without the ability to judge the value of knowledge practices there 
cannot be progress with knowledge (there cannot be better or worse kinds of evidence, for 
example) 
There is another issue What happens when there are dissenters within a 
community? There may be cases where we identify an agent as being correct in the face 
of certain community traditions or standards of knowledge Consider the following 
example in pre-civil war America a white landowner, Miss White, is approached by one 
of her slaves, Dessa, who tells her she is suffering abuse at the hands of one of Miss 
White's nephews At this time the testimony of slaves, especially against someone who is 
white, is not considered an appropriate source of knowledge It does not cohere with the 
methods of gathering evidence in the community At this time slaves are not considered 
"people", and are not participants m the community that holds both the standards of 
evidence and the knowledge For Miss White to take Dessa's testimony as evidence of 
wrongdoing would be like taking a dream as evidence against her nephew In this case, if 
Miss White is to act on the testimony from Dessa she will be doing so without adhenng to 
the knowledge practices of her community 
If we are to adopt Nelson's view of epistemological communities, that leads us to 
the conclusion that Miss White cannot know that Dessa is being abused, and therefore 
any acts on her part would not be based on knowledge Further, this means that if Miss 
White were to dismiss Dessa's claims she would be acting as a reasonable agent Many of 
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us balk at this conclusion While there may be space for some excuse for agents who did 
not go against the traditions of their community and understand that slaves were, in fact, 
people, we do not want to call them "reasonable agents" And if Miss White were to 
believe Dessa, we want to say more than she was acting on something that was, for her, 
epistemically equivalent to a dream or vision 
Jonathan Bennett (1974) tackles a similar problem in his article, "The Conscience 
of Huckleberry Finn" where he looks at the relationship between a young boy and a 
slave Bennett is writing about the relationship between sympathy and morality (or bad 
morality) Sympathy includes the feelings we have for others, for instance pity or 
compassion Morality is the set of rules that we use to determine right or wrong action 
Bennett examines the example of Huckleberry Finn who is conflicted about helping Jim, 
a slave, escape Huck is m much the same position as Miss White Huck reasons that he 
should not help Jim escape because Jim's owner never harmed Huck, and without such a 
situation Huck reasons he is stealing from Jim's owner, reasoning compounded by the 
fact that Jim intends to either buy his wife and children, or steal them, a cnme Huck feels 
he would be complicit in 47 Huck's morality provides him with reasons to turn Jim in, but 
his feelings for Jim, his feelings of sympathy, are in conflict with these reasons In the 
end, after wrestling with this problem, Huck does help Jim to escape, however, he 
interprets his own action as an example of being weak and wicked In the conflict 
between sympathy and morality, sympathy won 48 
Bennett's characterization of Huck's struggle is very similar to that of Miss 
White For Huck, as for Miss White, their reasons are restricted to the standards of their 
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societies For Huck, even Jim's praise of Huck for keeping his promise does not give 
Huck any reason for acting to help Jim, for to Huck in his morality promises to slaves are 
unlikely to be binding 49 Again, this is similar to Miss White who would not be able to 
accept evidence from a slave against a non-slave, at least not as a reason to choose a 
particular behaviour 
Bennett's account coheres with Nelson, in that both see the agent as "stuck" 
within a particular morality Bennett's descnption of Huck is enlightening in that it shows 
his struggle between sympathy and morality, and the problem disregarding one's morality 
can have on the agent Huck views himself, in helping Jim, as acting without reason 
Bennett wants it to be the case that agents will have some hope He admits that our own 
moralities may be bad, and require revision much like we may believe Huck's does 
Bennett's solution is to aim to keep his own " morality open to revision, exposing it to 
whatever valid pressures there are—including pressures from my sympathies "50 
This analysis shows that agents are most comfortable acting in accordance with 
their reasons, and these reasons will be socially determined However, there is 
information (be it belief or knowledge) out there that is presented to agents in other ways 
Recall the case of Carmita While Nelson's theory does offer an explanation of what 
happened between the time Carmita first experienced sexual harassment, and when the 
group names the act in question, this only identifies a certain kind of knowledge Carmita 
did not know the full nature of the act that was happening to her, but she did know that 
something was happening and that she did not like it To be fully ignorant the example 
would have had to be that Carmita went through her life, unaware of such harassment or 
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anything negative happening towards her, and then when she gathered with others she 
came to know what had occurred This is not what happened in the example Carmita just 
did not fully understand what had happened, she did not know that she was not alone But 
she did know that something had happened to her, and that it was negative 
Nelson emphasizes the social nature of knowledge Nelson, and feminist 
epistemologists in general, have identified something about knowledge that must be 
considered Agents' access to knowledge is connected to the communities they occupy 
What we have to refrain from saying is that it is the community that knows The 
individual remains the primary epistemic agent, but they do have a location and this is 
relevant to epistemic considerations Here I am endorsing an account like Longino's 
which retains the key elements of Nelson's account without claiming that the group is the 
primary epistemic agent In particular, it may be the case that only certain kinds of 
knowledge are available at certain times, the most obvious example being scientific 
knowledge The knowledge that the Earth is round was not available to all people at all 
points throughout human history, and as such, agents at certain times in history, or in 
certain communities, will not be evaluated against that knowledge 
The above claim is quite complicated At certain points m human history certain 
"truths" were known about other cultures and races and sexes which allowed poor 
treatment of these people The knowledge in the community supported such acts As in 
the above example of Miss White, we would be reluctant to completely excuse such 
actions, regardless of prevailing attitudes which are based on the knowledge of the time 
On the other hand, we may want to excuse actions, such as certain types of carbon 
emissions, before the science of climate change had been discovered, or before it became 
widely accepted Knowledge is socially determined in that social groups determine the 
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rules of knowledge generation and creation, rules that provide agents, who appeal to 
them, with compelling reasons to act This role of social groups cannot be dismissed 
However, it does not contain the whole story of the relationship between agents and 
knowledge Further, the social group does not know, is not a knower, and definitely is not 
the primary epistemic agent Such a move is just another version of collectivizing the 
conditions for individual moral responsibility to get an account of the collective But the 
collective is not a version of the individual, and cannot be treated as such 
Moving forward I will work with the idea that social groups play an important role 
in knowledge I turn next to a new version of the epistemic condition proposed by George 
Sher With the background from the above discussion Sher provides an analysis that can 
provide an epistemic condition for collective responsibility and include considerations of 
the role of social groups in the knowledge agents can and do possess 
4.5 George Sher 
George Sher (2009) argues that our traditional conception of the epistemic 
condition is deficient, a view he calls the "searchlight view" because it restricts 
responsibility to only those things that the agent knows about, things that are withm their 
"epistemic sight" so to speak Sher claims that when it comes to moral responsibility most 
writers focus on the control condition and ignore the epistemic condition such that it has 
received far less analysis Sher characterises the searchlight view in the following way 
an agent's responsibility extends only as far as his awareness of what he is doing 
He is responsible only for those acts he consciously chooses to perform, only for 
those omissions he consciously chooses to allow, and only for those outcomes he 
consciously chooses to bring about what the agent is responsible for is not his act 
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or omission simphciter but only those aspects of it and its outcomes of which he is 
aware 51 
According to Sher an agent does not need to know that act X involves the contraction of 
particular muscles, but rather that the act is a he, that it will hurt someone's feelings, or 
endanger career prospects This expands the account to ensure that agents do not need to 
have a high level of knowledge of certain causes and effects, they simply need to know it 
is the case that certain effects follow certain causes Even with this expansion, the 
searchlight view limits what we can claim that agents know in order to hold them 
responsible Under this view the agent must be aware of their actions and the potential 
outcomes in order to meet the epistemic condition 
Sher argues that the searchlight view is the default view of the epistemic condition 
in theories of individual moral responsibility He claims that if we restrict ourselves to 
knowledge gained only through the searchlight view then agents will not be responsible 
for, " any act, omission, or outcome whose moral or prudential defects can be traced to 
his lack of imagination, his lapses in attention, his poor judgement, or his lack of 
insight "52 Sher provides the example of someone who waves around a gun that is loaded 
If the gun goes off and someone is killed, according to the searchlight view, they are not 
responsible The agent did not intend to shoot anyone, and did not believe that waving the 
gun around would cause that to happen Sher calls this a lack of imagination, and this lack 
means it never occurs to the agent that someone may get shot, and therefore he does not 
meet the epistemic requirement for moral responsibility 
Sher argues that the searchlight view conflates two different and incompatible 
perspectives on action These two perspectives consist in the engaged perspective that we 
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occupy when we ourselves act (which the searchlight view appeals to directly) and the 
detached perspective that we occupy when we consider other people's acts In order to 
move beyond the example of the person with the gun, we have to move beyond the 
engaged perspective in which the agent lacks the imagination to see the potential deadly 
outcome Instead we shift to a more removed perspective that includes ideas like what the 
agent should have known53 Perhaps including that a certain level of care is required when 
handling firearms Sher argues that when determining responsibility we often move to 
this more detached position, and we normally include information that was not within an 
agent's awareness Returning to the example of the loaded gun, we are left with a puzzle 
We want to hold this person responsible, but we cannot do so according to the searchlight 
view alone Further, Sher adds that we want to say that the agent who waves around a gun 
which unintentionally goes off is responsible, but the person who thought she was handed 
a prop gun -which was, in fact, a real loaded gun— is not responsible For Sher the 
searchlight view offers no help here 
Throughout Sher's argument he provides examples that fit into three categories 
lapses in attention, examples of poor judgement, and agents who perform acts that they do 
not see as wrong In the first category, lapses in attention, Sher looks at examples where 
an agent was distracted and forgot her dog was locked in a car, where an agent daydreams 
while driving a ferry and hits some rocks, and an agent who is guarding a particular area 
and falls asleep In each case during the lapse in attention the agent will not meet the 
epistemic condition Sher argues that in these cases we typically want to hold the agents 
responsible by returning to some earlier point in time and claiming that they should not 
have allowed the lapse in attention to occur In response, Sher argues that the problem 
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with this attempt to save the searchlight view is that there is no point at which we are 
conscious of allowing such a lapse to occur Under the searchlight view these agents 
would not meet the epistemic condition, and thus could not be responsible Sher argues 
that this answer does not cohere with our beliefs about responsibility 
Sher's examples of poor judgement include cases where the agent acts voluntarily 
and the outcome is the result of poor judgement Sher describes an example where the 
agent believed she was home alone She hears a noise and rushes to shoot the burglar who 
turns out to be her son The agent allowed feelings of panic to determine her action In 
another example an agent who is babysitting a colicky baby attempts to make the baby
 ( 
sleep by putting vodka in the infant's juice The baby is subsequently rushed to the 
hospital In both of these cases the agent acts out of poor judgement These examples are 
both of negligence Their failure seems to be that the agents acted below some standard of 
reasonableness that we expect from everyone However, this is not an available option 
under the searchlight view 55 
In the final examples Sher describes agents who perform acts that they do not see 
as wrong He provides a number of examples where the agent is convinced that they are 
acting correctly, when, in fact, they are acting harmfully towards others In these 
examples we might want to make claims about what a reasonable agent might have 
known, or what connection an agent should have with the world around them But to do 
this would be to move beyond the purview of the searchlight view 56 A key charactenstic 
in Sher's examples is that in all the cases we are drawn to the idea that the agents are 
responsible, at least to some degree However, despite such reactions, none of these 
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agents would be responsible under the searchlight view I have focused on these examples 
because they offer interesting insight into the issues facing the epistemic condition in 
cases of collective responsibility I want to be clear that Sher is not wnting his account to 
be considered in questions of collective responsibility, and he makes no mention of such a 
usage I am applying his theory to the problems of collective responsibility that I have 
identified throughout this dissertation In what follows I will look at how the searchlight 
view, and Sher's epistemic condition, may, or may not, work in a collective context 
I am going to look at three examples where an agent would, under collective 
responsibility, potentially be considered responsible for a harm that mirrors Sher's three 
categories In these examples I am looking at the group as a whole, but I think one could 
easily identify individuals within the group as well 
Lapse of attention George and Mary are painting a house when it begins to rain 
They quickly move all their paint, stain, remover, and other chemicals inside the 
garage George and Mary start talking with their customer, who is telling them all 
about how he came to own the property It stops raining, but George and Mary 
continue to talk with the customer The fumes from the paint and chemicals build 
up in the enclosed space, and the family dog, who also uses the garage during the 
rain, ends up passing out 
Poor Judgment Company X is in a rush to complete a particular order They are 
short on time, and short on staff, so they put aside their usually regulated hiring 
practices and hire a team that is known to those who own the business Company X 
believes that such hiring practices are more for show than for effect, and can be 
disregarded when in a hurry 
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Do not see it as wrong Agents all over the globe participate in actions that cause 
extensive carbon emissions Since no single agent causes climate change, no agents 
see their particular actions as contributing to the wrong 
Of these three examples, "lapse in attention" most closely resembles Sher's example of 
lapses in judgment for an individual agent In Sher's examples he is trying to show that 
when we look at these cases, we may believe the agents to be responsible, but, according 
to the searchlight view, they would not meet the required epistemic condition In the 
painting example your intuitions likely lead you to a similar conclusion (that George and 
Mary are responsible) In the Company X example, and that of climate change, the 
feeling that the agents are responsible is less strong These three examples are not only all 
examples of collective harms, they are also examples that come from three different types 
of collectives The first is a small, structured collective, the second a large, structured, and 
the final is a large, unstructured collective It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the first 
example, which includes a small, structured collective, most closely resembles Sher's 
account which focuses on individual moral responsibility 
In order to address these problems, Sher proposes a new epistemic condition 
Since the searchlight view does, indeed, seem problematic at the level of collective 
harms, I will turn to this condition and see what impact it makes on this problem The 
epistemic condition Sher proposes is the following 
When someone performs a wrong or foolish act in a way that satisfies the 
voluntariness condition, and when he also satisfies any other conditions for 
responsibility that are independent of the epistemic condition, he is responsible for 
his act's wrongness or foolishness if, but only if, he either 
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(1) is consciously aware that the act has that feature when he performs it, or 
else 
(2) is unaware that the act is wrong or foolish despite having evidence for its 
wrongness or foolishness his failure to recognise which 
(a) falls below some applicable standard, and 
(b) is caused by the interaction of some combination of his constitutive 
attitudes, dispositions, and traits57 
Sher himself identifies his solution as more complex than the searchlight view, but he 
defends it on the grounds that it solves many problems encountered when we use the 
searchlight view alone and provides answers to our problem cases 
Sher's reference to the "voluntariness condition" is simply the control condition, 
in order to be responsible an agent must meet both the control and epistemic conditions 
for moral responsibility The first clause of the condition is the searchlight view Sher 
keeps it as part of the description, adding in the further condition (2) to identify and 
address the problem cases The searchlight view is perfectly acceptable as all agents it 
identifies as meeting the epistemic condition do appear to meet the condition The 
problem arises in that it fails to include some agents we see as responsible The second 
clause in the condition is intended to address agents who lack the awareness that is central 
in (1) (2a) captures the idea that certain agents should have known better, this is the 
"reasonable agent" standard that we often apply to agents 58 For example, in Sher's case 
of the dog in the car, the owner gets distracted and forgets that the dog is locked in the car 
on a hot day This is a case where we would say that the agent should have known better 
Ibid 88 I am deliberately excluding Sher's account of individual responsibility for 
good and prudential acts Sher argues for an approach to such acts that uses a different 
version of the epistemic condition than that for foolish and wrong acts Since the focus of 
this dissertation is on collective harms, I have restricted my analysis of Sher to his 
discussion of wrong and imprudent acts 
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What was lacking was a certain kind of common sense In forgetting about the dog, the 
agent fell below the reasonable standard 
The second part of the second condition, (2b) qualifies which agents will be held 
responsible for falling below the applicable standard, those agents whose lack of 
awareness is due to some combination of their own constitutive attitudes, dispositions and 
traits In (2b) Sher is focusing on the psychological features that make us the individuals 
we are 59 For example, in the case of the sitter who uses vodka to soothe the colicky baby, 
the character of the sitter is somehow worse than normal, there is something defective 
about her reasoning When the sitter decides to give vodka to the baby it is not because of 
a lack of information— that this would be a bad idea is common knowledge— but rather to 
certain flawed patterns of thought on the part of the sitter Sher surmises it might be due 
to the sitter's impulsiveness, or a tendency not to consider the consequences of her 
actions In these cases the agent, the whole agent, is the source of the failure to appreciate 
the connection between the facts of which she is acquainted, and the wrongness of her 
act 60 Sher further points out that these are not flawed people in that they are entirely 
unable to function, but that something in their character has led them to perform the act in 
question In the problem cases Sher describes the agent will be responsible if we employ 
this epistemic condition 
Before moving to look at how this impacts the discussion of collective 
responsibility, the move Sher is making requires more analysis Sher is embedding a 
reasonable person standard into his epistemic condition but he qualifies this condition by 
requiring that the reason for failing to meet the standard be because of the agent Now, it 
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is not because of something the agent did or did not do in regards to the act in question, 
but because of how they have developed their reasoning skills, their attitudes and 
dispositions over the course of their life Sher is claiming that agents are responsible for 
their attitudes, etc , and therefore are responsible for the consequences of having such 
attitudes, in this case, for the resultant lack of knowledge 
By modifying his epistemic condition to include such cases Sher succeeds in 
holding the agents from his examples responsible for their actions or inactions However, 
it is important to note how controversial this move may be Consider the case of the 
individual who was severely abused as a child and who grows up and becomes abusive 
towards others Theorists have debated the impact such childhood conditioning could 
have on attributions of responsibility as an adult The examples that Sher provides are 
not of the same kind as the one I just described, however, he does not rule out such 
examples It seems accurate to descnbe the abusive agent as one who while being abusive 
falls below an applicable standard Upon examination it seems that this failure is due to a 
combination of his constitutive attitudes This would mean that childhood conditioning as 
it impacts and forms an agent's constitutive attitudes is the responsibility of the agent 
Depending on your intuitions in such a case, it could be that by expanding from the 
searchlight view Sher actually includes too many cases as appropriate for moral 
responsibility 
For the debate on whether childhood conditioning (or other social power relations) 
affects ability to be responsible see Paul Benson "Feeling Crazy Self-Worth and the 
Social Character of Responsibility" in Relational Automony Feminist Perspectives on 
Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar eds New 
York Oxford University Press, 2000 72-93, Cheshire Calhoun "Responsibility and 
Reproach" Ethics 99 (Jan 1989) 389-406 and Susan Wolf "Sanity and the Metaphysics of 
Responsibility" Responsibility, Character and the Emotions Ferdinand Shoeman, ed 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987 47-62 
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One way to avoid such a problem would be to make some allowances for 
instances of childhood conditioning (or other mental conditions which could include 
cases such as post-traumatic stress, or limited mental capacity) If Sher intends to hold 
agents responsible in so far as agents participate in the creation of their characters, then it 
seems that a history that was not within the agent's control that influences him presently 
may be an excusing condition Typically, in cases of collective responsibility the kind of 
concerns that I have raised do not apply, so I will leave further discussions of them for 
another time 
How does Sher's epistemic condition work in my examples of collective 
responsibility? In the first example of the house painters they were not responsible under 
the searchlight view, because as the dog was being exposed to fumes, George and Mary 
were busy talking with their customer They had forgotten about the fumes However, as 
house painters they are well aware of the chemical nature of their matenals, and the build-
up of dangerous fumes in an enclosed space, such as a garage, would be considered 
common knowledge for both George and Mary In this sense they satisfy (2a) because a 
reasonable agent or agents in their position would have acted differently Expanding on 
the example we could say that the reason they forgot was because they love talking to 
their customers because it is a great way to get a referral for another job In this way it 
seems they have fallen below the reasonable standard because of a problem with their 
attitudes, and so they satisfy (2b) and are responsible Therefore, under Sher's account, 
they meet the required epistemic condition The only effect the collective nature of the act 
has on this case is that both failed in the same way, and they both should have known 
Corporation X's hiring practices as the result of time constraints is also going to 
satisfy (2a) Corporation X allowed time to act as a distraction, and then devalued such 
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regulated hiring practices in light of other concerns (time) Corporation X also satisfies 
(2b) because of the underlying attitudes that allowed them to quickly devalue the hiring 
practices While Corporation X should (or did) know why such hiring practices were in 
place (presumably to ensure fairness, eliminate bias and prejudice, etc ), they put this 
information to the side In employing poor judgement, Corporation X allowed such 
considerations to be devalued to achieve another end, project completion 
In the above I have treated Corporation X as if it was a single agent As discussed 
throughout this dissertation collectives are not simply collective versions of single agents, 
they are complex, and although similar in some respects, very different in others I will be 
discussing collective responsibility and proposing a theory in Chapter 6 If we were to 
look at the responsibility of Joan, a manager m Corporation X who organized and 
managed the hiring process, we could evaluate her against Sher's epistemic condition 
She would satisfy (2a) because she has fallen below the applicable standard, and her 
reasons for so acting (speed, etc ) would mean that she satisfies (2a) because of her own 
constitutive attitudes, thus also satisfying (2b) and meeting the epistemic condition 
There will be employees of Corporation X who will not be involved in the hiring 
process and may be, quite legitimately, unaware of what is happening This supports 
Lewis' critique that collective responsibility should provide an analysis of differentiated 
responsibility so that not all members of a collective are held responsibility to the same 
degree The role the manager has m the process places her in a unique position regarding 
the harm I want to note this idea of differentiated responsibility as being intuitively 
plausible, and I will return to it in Chapters 5 and 6 
The third example was climate change In this case the disparate nature of this 
collective leads me to consider that it is not the case that all members will satisfy any of 
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Sher's conditions, but rather that different members will satisfy different conditions For 
example, there are some people who know when they buy an SUV that this act is wrong 
because of its contribution to climate change These agents will satisfy (1) There are 
others who are aware that leading chmatologists and the IPCC has identified the causes of 
climate change as carbon emissions, yet believe that it is all a hoax While it may appear 
that the lack of complete consensus leaves room for reasonable and justified scepticism, 
in accordance with our discussion on the collective such scepticism would be based on 
sympathies or feelings or beliefs, and not knowledge We do not require complete 
scientific consensus m our collective for something to count as evidence There may be 
an argument about how many scientists are enough, and this is a topic I will return to in 
Chapter 6, however, at this point in my argument the evidence for climate change meets 
the requirements I have laid out These agents will satisfy (2a) and (2b) Agents who idle 
their cars for 20 minutes, or who never carpool because they always put other priorities 
before lowenng carbon emissions will also meet (2a) and (2b) In a situation like climate 
change it could be the case that agents will have different kinds of epistemic relations to 
the harm In fact, it may be that such a solution will be successful for a number of 
differently sized or organised collectives Sher's epistemic condition can successfully 
apply in all the kinds of collective, and includes agents the searchlight view could not 
account for By including what agents should have known with what they were aware of, 
Sher has expanded the scope of the condition without including those we would not 
consider responsible 
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4.5 The Epistemic Condition and Social Knowledge 
Both Nelson and Sher offer interesting theones of knowledge and insights into 
what counts as knowledge, and both have an impact on the epistemic condition that I 
discussed in the case of collective responsibility from Chapter 1, and will return to m 
Chapter 6 I am not using theones that are designed to address collective responsibility 
for two reasons first, these theones apply in a collective context (or can be so applied) so 
use of a theory specifically intended for collective responsibility is not necessary A 
different theory is often proposed because the collective is treated as a collective version 
of the single agent, and therefore a new and different (collective) version of individual 
responsibility must be used However, if we consider the collective as something 
different, something unique, then we can return to looking at the agents qua members of 
the collective, instead of looking at the collective as a collective agent Secondly, if I use 
theones intended to determine individual responsibility this will be helpful both in terms 
of plausibility, and in reducing the theory to the individual, as I will discuss in the next 
chapter 
What I want to explore in this section is how the two theones discussed above may 
work together when it comes to collective responsibility I outlined many flaws in 
Nelson's account, but the idea that knowledge is somehow social, remains I had much 
more success in applying Sher's account to collective responsibility, but I want to explore 
whether elements from Nelson may add to Sher's epistemic condition when applied in 
collective contexts 
Sher's epistemic condition for responsibility references knowledge that is 
available For example, under (1) the searchlight view, we can argue that knowledge that 
is within an agent's awareness is going to be limited to what can be known by the 
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community which they inhabit An agent from a community two hundred years ago 
cannot have "carbon emissions cause climate change" anywhere within their awareness 
If the knowledge is not available withm their community, then it will not be within the 
agent's awareness This does not add to Sher's conditions, but rather provides context for 
what is meant by "awareness" As discussed, even if some fact is known by a community 
that does not mean that it will be in any particular agent's awareness So while agents 
cannot know what is not knowable, they also may not be aware of what is knowable 
Condition (2) has more potential for interaction with Nelson's theory In (2) Sher 
discusses the agent "having evidence", or falling below a standard Evidence, according 
to Nelson, is determined by the epistemological community an agent belongs to, and it 
stands to reason that if there is a standard against which we judge an agent, it likely has 
social implications In this case will it make sense to invoke Nelson's theory? 
The problems with Nelson's theory remain, as discussed in a previous section of 
this chapter And for this reason, I will not "plug in" Nelson's theory to Sher's epistemic 
condition in order to account for the social aspects of knowledge Instead I take from 
Nelson an appreciation for the social aspects of knowledge, especially in cases of 
collective responsibility, but I will not employ her theory in part or in whole My reading 
of Sher's epistemic condition is that it can be applied in cases of collective responsibility 
It is true that withm certain groups (or time periods, or collectives) certain information 
will be considered common, and this must be considered when applying responsibility to 
collectives Margaret Gilbert identified "population common knowledge" as the kind of 
knowledge that will exist in certain areas, for example perhaps within a certain city it is 
population common knowledge that everyone can speak both Spanish and Portuguese 
This is not information that is known by everyone (m all collectives), and it will figure 
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into what we consider the reasonable standard for agents when looking at the epistemic 
condition The social character of knowledge is important to all discussions of the 
epistemic condition, and particularly so in the case of collective responsibility However, 
Nelson's account cannot be added to Sher's Instead I will keep Nelson's arguments in 
mind when considenng the context in which Sher's conditions must be met, a topic that I 
return to in Chapter 6 
4.6 Individuals in Communities 
There is another epistemic issue that I have not yet raised but need to address 
before finishing my analysis of the epistemic condition It seems to be the case that in 
order for agents to truly understand collective responsibility and collective actions they 
will have to see themselves as members of collectives, or as Grasswick calls it, 
"individuals-in-communities " What happens if agents do not see themselves this way9 
Can this alone be an excusing condition, because if you do not see yourself as a member 
of a collective, you do not see your actions as contributing to the collective outcome 
Grasswick's theory of individuals-in-communities is intended to be a blending of 
the atomistic view of the knower with that of the feminist epistemologists' situated 
knower What Grasswick ends up with is a theory where the conditions for agency are 
social What I want to argue for here is not Grasswick's conception of the knower, but 
rather take a similar look at agents in general To see collective harms, and to accept 
collective knowledge, you have to accept the collective itself Agents have to see 
themselves as members, their knowledge constrained by their communities, and their 
actions part of a larger picture If agents cannot see themselves this way, it is questionable 
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as to whether agents can truly know of the circumstances of their collective actions This 
is an important part of the knowledge criterion 
I would argue, however, that agents do see themselves this way, at least in terms 
of the smaller or structured collectives Members of teams, employees of Corporations, 
and citizens of nations all see at least part of who they are as being tied to membership in 
these types of collectives It only becomes questionable when we look at large, 
unstructured collectives In this case, as Christopher Kutz characterised environmental 
harms, it is the result of, " knowing but uncoordinated activity of disparate 
individuals " The collective responsible for systemic social harms such as racism, 
sexism and climate change appear at first to be different But what is really different9 In 
the list of teams, employees and citizens, membership in these collectives is deemed to be 
positive I like to think the greatness of my nation, or team, means that I either 
contributed to that greatness, or that I am also great m some way The second list is of 
harms perpetrated by collectives, including discrimination and climate change Here 
members do not want to be members This may explain the initial intuitive issues with 
identifying with unstructured collectives 
I argue that the ease with which individuals can see themselves as members of 
collectives, even if not large, unstructured collectives, provides space that individuals 
could see themselves as members of large, unstructured collectives There is nothing 
hardwired in human nature that precludes this possibility And since we understand 
membership in collectives, in general, it also means that knowledge of our part in 
collective actions is part of our collective knowledge While it may be the case that some 
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agents do not know of their participation in collectives, it seems clear that such 
knowledge is both possible, and that it is a requirement of rationality The collective and 
conditions for membership will have to be identified (like in the case of climate change) 
but once they are, then agents do know that they are members of the collective in 
question 
4.7 Conclusion 
I have argued for a way to interpret the epistemic condition that will be successful 
in both individual and collective cases of responsibility Sher's epistemic condition can 
apply in problem cases in collective responsibility, much like it can address the problem 
cases in individual responsibility In particular, if we do not require that all agents withm 
a collective satisfy the epistemic condition in the same way, we will be able to account 
for differences in knowledge m collectives, especially those that are larger or less 
structured And yet, the knowledge remains individual, with simply an acknowledgement 
of the social implications and attributions of such knowledge 
This chapter has made progress in determining how the epistemic condition could 
work in a collective context, and by being able to assess the satisfaction of the epistemic 
condition on an individual scale, it also avoids some of the problems encountered in my 
discussion of the control condition While we may understand action in a collective 
context as the collective acting (and each agent playing their part) we understand the 
epistemic condition as something that is individual The collective does not collectively 
know about the action, but each agent has, or does not have, that epistemic relation to the 
harm in question This will ease the task of reducing harms to the individual, at least as 
far as the epistemic condition is concerned 
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In the previous chapter I argued that there are compelling reasons that 
responsibility should not be equal for all members in the group when it is clear that they 
each contnbuted different amounts to the outcome I turn to the issue of the reducibihty of 
collective responsibility in the next chapter 
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Chapter 5: Reductive Collective Responsibility 
5.1 Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to explore what happens to individuals if they are 
members of responsible collectives Does collective responsibly reduce to individual 
responsibility9 Or is it possible that individuals in a collective are innocent while the 
collective is to blame9 As explored m previous chapters, theories of collective 
responsibility are much more varied and debated than their individual counterparts 
However, as I argued in Chapter 3, if we are to revisit individual moral responsibility in 
determining collective responsibility, then it would be strange to have the outcome be that 
no individuals are responsible 
To explore this question of responsibility I begin by examining both sides of the 
debate in the literature on collective responsibility I examine non-reductive collective 
responsibility that posits that the collective is responsible, and this cannot reduce to 
individual members I return to Margaret Gilbert from Chapter 1, who argues that beyond 
leaders, members of collectives are judged based on whether they fall below their 
individual obligations To provide additional analysis, I also examine the arguments of 
David E Cooper who characterizes collective actions as more than the sum of their parts, 
and Virginia Held who argues that random collectives can be held responsible, but only 
under a non-reductive account 
Next I turn to an examination of the argument for reductive collective 
responsibility, focusing on Christopher Kutz and analysing the reductive aspect of his 
account Kutz argues that it is imperative, in order for collective responsibility to have 
any impact in the world at all, that it be reductive To add to this analysis I also look at the 
accounts of R S Downie who challenges Cooper's description of collectives, and Jan 
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Narveson who requires reducibihty in order for collective responsibility to meet the 
control condition 
In the second half of this chapter I examine possible methods to reduce collective 
responsibility, looking at varied arguments including those from Howard McGary who 
ascribes responsibility based on an agent's willingness to disassociate from the group, 
Robm Gildert who proposes levels of responsibility for collective harms, and Tracy 
Isaacs who proposes re-description of harms to capture the collective nature of individual 
actions in collectives Finally, I return to the question of character-based responsibility, 
and examine how it might help with this question In Chapter 1 I introduced different 
categories of collectives, from a small structured collective of two people dancing to 
large, unstructured collective like that which is causing climate change Many of the 
theones discussed in this chapter do not, and cannot, address all types of collectives I am 
putting aside this concern until Chapter 6, and focusing only on their position in the 
reductive/non-reductive debate 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the debate between the reductionists and 
non-reductionists when it comes to collective responsibility The writers chosen for 
analysis are at the forefront of the ongoing debate Conclusions drawn from this chapter 
will influence theones proposed in Chapter 6 
5.2 The Reductive/Non-Reductive Debate 
In Chapter 3 I discussed H D Lewis' cntique of collective responsibility Lewis' 
concern was that collective responsibility led to the possibility of an agent's moral worth 
being determined, one way or another, by the actions of another Lewis descnbes a 
burglary In the example there is a group of agents and each are assigned a job for the 
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burglary One planned the burglary, one is there to provide the "muscle", and another will 
drive the getaway vehicle Lewis argues that it would be a mistake to claim that "the 
burglary" was a single criminal operation for which all involved can be equally blamed 
Lewis says, "What is to be stressed is that the guilt of each is strictly proportionate to his 
part in the joint undertaking It is not one crime that we have but many "' Lewis argues 
collective responsibility must be able to attribute different levels of responsibility to 
agents depending on their contribution to the harm 
Lewis' criterion is intuitively appealing It seems clear that there is an important 
difference between the agent who planned the burglary, and the one who merely drove 
the getaway vehicle But while the difference may be clear, what they would be each 
responsible for is much less so Is agent B, the dnver, responsible for just dnving the car1? 
This seems wrong, because the dnver was clearly part of the burglary There is an 
important difference between the dnver of a getaway vehicle in a burglary, and someone 
who is just dnving down the street We could descnbe agent B as being responsible for 
aiding and abetting cnminals (the master planner and others) The problem with this 
answer is that aiding and abetting assumes that agent B was not apart of'the cnme Now, 
in some circumstances this may be a true description of events But if agent B met up 
with the other cnminals and was a part of the planning process (thus shared intent) then it 
seems that agent B is not responsible for dnving the getaway vehicle while the others are 
responsible for the burglary itself Agent B must also be responsible for the burglary 
This is where the situation becomes complex If we could divorce the actions of 
individual agents from the "collective act", then attributions of responsibility would be 
relatively simple But the action of the agent is what it is because of the action of the 
'Lewis (1948) 27 
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collective Agent B was not merely driving a car, or driving some friends, or helping 
some cnminals Agent B was part of a team whose objective was a burglary And as such, 
Agent B, if responsible, must be responsible for the collective action of the burglary The 
question is what does it mean to be responsible for a collective act? 
In the literature on collective responsibility this question has led to two very 
different arguments for collective responsibility On the one hand writers such as 
Margaret Gilbert, David E Cooper and Virginia Held have argued that collective 
responsibility is not reducible to individual responsibility For these writers we can talk 
about the responsibility of the collective, but we cannot move from such discussions to 
one about the individuals The group of cnminals performed the "burglary", but it does 
not make sense to ask what agent B's individual responsibility for the collective act is On 
the other side of the debate are wnters such as Christopher Kutz, R S Downie, and Jan 
Narveson 2 For these wnters if collective responsibility cannot be reducible to the 
individual, then collective responsibility itself is unintelligible 
In this chapter I will explore both sides of this debate Up to this point in the 
dissertation I have discussed the problems with collective responsibility, including the 
problem with collectivizing the individual conditions for moral responsibility I have 
examined collectives of different sizes and levels of structure And I have proposed a 
return to a kind of responsibility for such collectives that relies on individual conditions 
for moral responsibility by understanding the collective context some agents occupy 
However, in order to proceed I need to determine whether such responsibility is reducible 
to the individual or not The answer to this question bears on the level of ngour required 
2
 Narveson argues against collective responsibility, but claims that if there is collective 
responsibility, it must be reducible to the individual 
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by an account of collective responsibility, as well as what determinations of collective 
responsibility will mean 
If a reductive account of collective responsibility is possible for harms such as 
climate change, then this means that a discussion of each person's "carbon share" (see 
Chapter 2) is relevant to discussions of responsibility More generally, it means that 
individuals will be responsible for being participants in harm-causing collectives If a 
non-reductive account of collective responsibility is the answer to the problem of 
responsibility for large, unstructured collectives the result will be that, in the case of 
climate change, certain countries or most of the global population will be collectively 
responsible for climate change, but that no individual will be responsible This has the 
potential to affect the type of theory proposed because in the first case being identified as 
a member of a harm-causing collective has implications on each person's moral status 
Since the harms in some cases are already occurring, such as climate change, it may 
require a drastic rethinking of responsibility in such a case If a non-reductive account is 
philosophically sound then while we will change our views of responsibility for such 
harms, it will not affect individual agents' moral standing 
The above is intended to underline the seriousness of the debate between reductive 
and non-reductive collective responsibility This is the question that I turn to in this 
chapter I will begin by examining the arguments on both sides of this debate 
5.3 Argument for Non-Reductive Collective Responsibility 
Margaret Gilbert (2006) proposes a theory of collective responsibility and argues 
that collective responsibility must be non-reductive Gilbert asks, 
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If moral responsibility for some state of affairs, S, is appropriately ascribed to some 
population of persons, P, what is the relationship of population P's moral 
responsibility to that of each member of P? Does P's responsibility imply, for 
instance, that each individual member is personally responsible for S, or at least to 
some extent responsible for it? 
In the above Gilbert has used "population" instead of "collective" because she wants to 
include what she considers "social groups" (collectives), and "aggregates", although she 
quickly discards the latter as inappropnate for moral responsibility For Gilbert, my large, 
unstructured collectives do not fit her classification My large unstructured collectives 
will not constitute Gilbert's plural subjects (see Chapter 1), but they are more than a 
description of unchanging characteristics of agents, so do not fit the description of 
aggregates either Gilbert does not provide a definition of social groups or aggregates, but 
instead compares their descnptions families, workgroups, platoons and sports teams are 
social group, the population of people named "Susan" would be an aggregate 4 Gilbert 
distinguishes between these groups because she thinks the answer to her above question 
will differ for each Her focus is on social groups (I will use collective in what follows) 
As I argued in Chapter 1, Gilbert's account of social groups (and plural subjects) cannot 
apply to large, unstructured collectives 
Gilbert begins by distinguishing between individuals who were members of the 
harm causing collective at the time of the harm, and those who became members after 
She focuses on the first group, claiming 
What does the blameworthiness of the collective's act imply about the personal 
blameworthiness of any one member of that collective^ From a logical point of 
view, the short answer is nothing5 [author's emphasis] 
3
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5
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Gilbert goes on to explain that it depends on the details of each individual agent's 
situation She suggests that those members who participate m determining the nature of, 
or promoting the performance of, a particular collective action, are more likely (although 
not necessarily) to be blameworthy 6 Further, Gilbert says that if the ignorance of other 
members is not culpable, " any personal blameworthiness of theirs must be for 
something relatively tangential to that act "7 Gilbert's descnption of a collective implies 
that a collective is something quite distinct from its members She argues that the 
collective's act can be blameworthy while none of the members bear personal 
blameworthiness It is as if the collective has become its own agent under Gilbert 
Gilbert's theory would excuse a great number of agents in a collective, if not all 
In particular, if we are speaking of the acts of a state (as Gilbert does when she refers to 
Nazi Germany), citizens, although their actions helped to create a certain outcome may 
well be excused from responsibility Gilbert writes of those agents who, " acted as 
well as anyone could expect of them " and had " done all they could reasonably be 
expected to do to prevent its happening " Gilbert argues that it is possible that all 
members of a collective may be relatively blameless She writes 
The one who gave the order to perform the blameworthy collective action - if there 
is such a person - may have been under personal pressures that would at least to 
some extent excuse his action Each member of a governing body may, too, have 
been faced with such pressures, when that body decided on a particular policy 
Those who complied with the order of a governing body may have reasonably 
assumed that it was aware of facts unknown to them that justified this particular 
action Those who failed to speak out against the collective action, knowing that it 
6
 The focus in my theory of collective responsibility will be on attributions of 
responsibility for collective harms, and not blameworthiness for these harms I am 
discussing blameworthiness in this chapter only insofar as it is part of the theones being 
discussed 
7
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was under way and realizing that it was wrong, may have been under considerable 
pressure not to speak out And so on 9 
Gilbert concludes that we cannot make any claims, a prion, about individual 
responsibility in such cases 10 
Gilbert looks at two cases which she argues illustrate situations where our 
intuitions lead us to believe the members would not be responsible In the first the leader 
of a collective deliberately hides the nature of the collective action from the members in 
the collective He tncks them into performing a collective act that is not what they believe 
it is I addressed this situation in Chapter 3 with the example of a team of house painters 
who are tncked into painting the lead painter's house If agents are being manipulated, 
they could not know what they are doing (assuming, of course, that such knowledge is not 
available to them) In such a case responsibility falls on the manipulator The second case 
Gilbert explores is one where an agent does what she can to stop the collective action I 
have considered this case in previous chapters, although it remains an open question 
Many collective acts cannot be stopped or altered by a single agent if the collective is of a 
certain size What is available to the agent may be "acts of language or mind" Such acts 
are intended to disavow the actions of the collective and distance the agent from the harm 
As Larry May says, " Such acts of language or mmd may break the chain of 
responsibility between individual and community " ' ' Gilbert's two key problem cases for 
theones of collective responsibility are not that difficult to resolve The first is addressed 
when we determine the epistemic condition, and the second is addressed when 
considenng how one can exit a collective (or cease being a member) These are necessary 
9
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features for a successful theory of collective responsibility, but a theory with these 
features can address these cases 
What is important at this stage to note is that we must be cautious when it comes 
to excusing conditions If an agent is ignorant (and not wilfully ignorant), then they may 
not have control over their action (the exact details to be determined by applying the 
causal and epistemic conditions) However, Gilbert uses the example of a protestor who 
exclaims, "What we are doing is evil'" If the protestor were to say this, while continuing 
to participate in the collective action, it seems the agent cannot, as Gilbert argues, be 
excused from blame At best this agent is acting hypocritically While some actions will 
be beyond the scope of what an individual agent can accomplish, it seems that only in 
very rare cases will no actions be available For an agent to declare that, "The West's 
dependence on oil supports corrupt and evil regimes who ignore basic human rights," 
while driving their SUV is hypocritical They are declaring the evil of an action they are 
performing An act of language cannot alone eliminate blameworthiness, recall May 
combines action with language If the agent has taken steps, but cannot completely 
remove all instances of crude oil use from their lives that may be enough to avoid 
blameworthiness However, protesting alone will not be enough 
Gilbert's argument for little (or no) personal responsibility in light of collective 
responsibility stems from her fears about choice, and ultimately the control the agent may 
or may not have She writes about agents who do not have a choice regarding the 
collectives of which they are a member And even as agents gain independence, she notes 
the degree of difficulty that leaving such collectives may include She writes 
As she matures, as the member of a particular family and as a member of the far 
larger collective, Betty will no longer be so vulnerable to individual people who 
might oppose her wishes Perhaps all she needs to do to exit the large collective in 
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question is to leave a particular geographical area Nonetheless, she may have little 
money, and several young children to care for Her parents and other relatives all 
live here too It may be unreasonable to expect her to leave the area She may fairly 
be said to have little choice but to stay Her continuing membership in the collective 
when she is a mature woman may not be blameworthy either 
Gilbert concludes that agents may not be responsible for becoming or continuing to be 
members of harm causing collectives, and they may not have performed, or be 
blameworthy for any action that contributed to the collective act Nonetheless, while the 
agent is not individually responsible, she is in a position to say, "We are to blame" 13 
In both the quotes from Gilbert m this section she identifies agents who are under 
pressure to conform to group expectations, who exist with little power in society, and/or 
who identify very strongly with the group In these cases to act in opposition to the group 
is characterised as very costly to the agent Their position in the group may also affect 
their knowledge of the group's actions Recall my discussion from Chapter 4 where I 
looked at the case of childhood conditioning in regards to the epistemic condition This 
case is troubling, especially if we focus on the agent m a harm-causing collective But 
what happens if we shift our focus to the victims9 
Let's take the example of Betty and add details The harm the collective is 
perpetrating is racism Jonah is a member of the race that is being targeted by Betty's 
group Jonah suffers mental abuse at the hands of Betty's collective, he is excluded from 
different political and social organizations in the larger society, and he has been denied 
employment All of these occurrences have removed opportunities from Jonah that are 
considered important to agent wellbeing Further, Jonah has suffered mental anguish over 
the treatment Jonah may ask Betty to stop her behaviour (this assumes Jonah is aware of 
12
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being targeted, which not all people will be) In light of the harm to Jonah are Betty's 
excuses really convincing9 It would be difficult for her to stand up to her group and it 
might cost her some of her relationships with the members However, unless Betty has no 
choice (in some morally relevant sense) her excuses seem inappropriate considering the 
harm she is participating in 
In the case of an agent whose agency has been compromised we will consider 
excusing them from responsibility But, it will not be the case that all situations of 
collective responsibility are ones in which all members have compromised agency By 
turning to the perspective of the victim the excuses of the perpetrator lose their 
plausibility In the case of climate change the argument that I cannot decrease my 
greenhouse gas emissions because I need to live in the suburbs, or need to buy a fuel 
inefficient car, etc , are unconvincing when the citizens of the Republic of the Maldives 
ask me to cut my emissions because their entire nation will otherwise be under water 
While the perspective of the victim does not alter the theory, by invoking such 
perspectives Gilbert's argument fails to be mtuitively convincing What remains is that to 
be responsible agents, even agents in a collective, will have to meet the conditions for 
responsibility Agents whose agency has been compromised will not meet these 
conditions, however, most agents who are members of collectives will 
Where Gilbert rests her argument for the irreducibility of collective responsibility 
on the social situations agents occupy, David E Cooper relies on the idea that the 
collective act is more than the sum of its parts This is a claim that I have made 
throughout this dissertation Cooper argues that if collective action is more than the sum 
of the action of the individual members, then it makes no sense to reduce it to those 
members Like Gilbert, Cooper claims that collectives can bear responsibility, but 
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members cannot Unlike Gilbert, Cooper is not concerned with the agency of the 
individuals, but rather with the nature of collective acts 
Cooper (1968) says, "The obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed to 
collectives, as well as to individual persons "14 He goes on to describe collective 
responsibility thus 
Very often the person who ascribes Responsibility is not willing or able to mention, 
explicitly, individuals Nor, if he could, would his statements mentioning 
individuals be equivalent in meaning to his statement about the collective This is 
because the identity of the collective does not consist in the identity of its 
membership 15 
Cooper is rests his argument on the idea that if the collective act is more than the sum of 
its parts, then collective responsibility itself cannot reduce to individual responsibility 
For example, if my swinging a bat alone is different from my swinging a bat in a game of 
baseball, then Cooper would argue I cannot simply take "swinging a bat in a game of 
baseball" and determine my individual contribution since without the collective the nature 
of the act is altered Further, particularly in the case of teams, the collective continues as 
the individual members change For example, while the players of the Toronto Blue Jays 
have changed many times since 1977 the team, or collective, is still the Blue Jays Cooper 
argues that if the collective were determined by its members, then, this would have the 
bizarre consequence that, had one of the individuals belonging to the collective not been a 
member, the meaning of the statement about the collective would have been different16 
So, instead of having one team, the Blue Jays, there would be many teams, each one 
reflecting a different set of players 
14
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Cooper uses the example of a failed tennis club as a collective Cooper posits that 
someone speaking on behalf of the failed club might explain it like this 
The committee certainly tried People were prompt to pay their subscriptions In the 
early days everyone played a lot of tennis, and came along to the 'socials' You 
can't blame them for not continuing to come, for they were always miserable 
failures Everyone tried hard, for sure There was just something missing - esprit de 
corps, if you like People tried to be friendly, but it was all artificial There was 
always a certain tension No, I can't honestly say that any person failed to do what 
1 7 
was expected of him [author's emphasis] 
Cooper's descnption of the unsuccessful tennis club is persuasive In such a circumstance 
it makes sense to say that no one person could have "saved" the club Cooper says that 
while it might be true that the character of the members are to blame, in that if they were 
different people, the same actions may have had different consequences, there was 
nothing blameworthy about their characters Cooper's conclusion seems a little hasty to 
me While it might be true that one member could not address the lack of esprit de corps 
alone it would not have required the actions of all Members could have tried harder, and 
perhaps worked collectively in some sense 
A closer look at the case of the tennis club is revealing Success of the tennis club, 
as it is described by Cooper, requires that the members "like" one another, that they 
"enjoy" their time at the club Such positive attitudes are much more slippery than the 
goals that I have associated with collectives throughout this dissertation Does Cooper's 
descnption fit if instead the tennis club was a tennis team, and the goal was to win 
matches7 In the latter case the team would have gathered together and determined a 
strategy to win Tennis player A would be given instructions for her part in this collective 
endeavour, as would Tennis player B Together, these individual actions would be the 
team strategy to win their matches And in this case the failure to achieve their goals 
17
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could be seen as a failure of each do their part of the collective act This description may 
not fit the case of large, unstructured collectives, but it does work with most collectives 
that I have discussed The problem with Cooper's example of the tennis club is that the 
members of the club are not working together to achieve esprit de corps (natural 
conviviality and communal feeling) The hope, as it is in most clubs and other social 
situations, is that the members will achieve this somehow 
Cooper argues that to hold members responsible for the failure of the tennis club 
is like holding someone responsible for the purchase of a stepladder because they are not 
six feet tall In both cases the failure is not the fault of the individual, but rather a 
description of reality 18 Cooper's analogy is revealing of his position on the actions of 
collectives He sees the failure of the tennis club as not only more than the sum of the 
individual actions of the members, but also something that is distinct from the members 
In fact, it seems that Cooper would not say that collective action is more than the sum of 
the actions of individuals, but rather that collective action is something different and 
separate from the actions of individual members Like being six feet tall, the collective 
action is described as a quality of reality Under Cooper the collective appears as if to be 
an agent itself The question that I now turn to, is this a good description of collectives 
and collective events'7 And the answer is no In Cooper's example of the tennis club, this 
may be accurate However, I am unclear whether the tennis club is even a good example 
of a collective that acts The tennis club, presumably, is being run by a single individual 
for the membership (as most clubs are) If, as is possible, the tennis club has a governance 
structure, and a leader is chosen in some manner, then it seems that the failure of the club 
to reach its goal may very well be the responsibility of each However, if "club" refers to 
18
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a facility, and not a social group, then it is not a collective in so much as it is a group of 
people (customers) who did not cooperate with the wishes of those in charge 
Further, the lack of "esprit de corps" is itself unlike all the collectives that I have 
examined Esprit de corps is not something that can be strategized for, and worked 
towards in the way that many of the goals and outcomes discussed here can It is like 
having the goal that you will befnend, at the deepest level, the person sitting next to you 
You cannot force friendship, or strategise to create it (in the deepest sense of reciprocal 
friendship) Cooper describes his argument as a situation where the collective has fallen 
below what is expected of it, but that individuals m the collective may not have fallen 
below what is expected of them 19 But this may be no more than the result of the goal 
Cooper has chosen How can an individual fall below what is expected of them if the goal 
is "esprit de corps"7 The goal is problematic, and by changing the example to a tennis 
team who has the goal of winning matches, collective responsibility that can reduce, in 
some way, to the individual is intuitively plausible 
What is persuasive in Cooper's argument is the idea that in some cases collective 
harms may occur when individuals in the collective have not fallen below what can be 
expected of them Thus, if evaluated individual agents will appear blameless, and yet as 
members of a collective that causes harm, they may, under a reductive account, become 
blameworthy 
Cooper's argument rests on his descnption of collective harms as being more than 
the sum of the actions of its individual members, a descnption that I also defend Cooper 
claims that if we accept such a descnption we must use a non-reductive account of 
collective responsibility On the surface his argument appears sound, but, upon close 
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examination it requires a very specific interpretation to be correct Recall the example of 
baseball Agent B swinging the bat in the park alone, compared to Agent B swinging the 
bat (hits a homerun) m a game of baseball Cooper says that wining a baseball game is 
more than the sum of the individual actions of the players, indicating that if looked at as 
parts, Agent B's swinging the bat would be her contribution Since the same act 
(swinging the bat) is different when done alone, as opposed to done m a game of baseball, 
the argument claims that winning the game of baseball is more than the sum of the 
individual actions of the players 
Here is a different interpretation Cooper has argued that the action of Agent B 
seems to be the same m collective or individual accounts, and yet under the collective 
descnption her action becomes something more For Cooper this means that the collective 
act is more than the sum of the actions of the individual members But what if we include 
agent intention to participate in the collective9 This element would only exist in the 
collective version of Agent B's act In fact, Cooper seems to conclude that there is a 
mystery surrounding the nature of collective acts, but I would argue the real problem is 
the impoverished descnption of collective action If Agent B were blindfolded and led to 
the diamond, where, with instruction, she swung her bat without knowing the collective 
context the act would occupy, we would not consider her a member of the team (and thus 
collectively responsible for winning or losing the match) Thus it cannot be causal 
contribution alone that makes agents responsible for collective acts 
The above alternative descnption includes elements that Cooper disregarded, but 
it does not answer his more pressing concern that if collective action does not equal the 
sum of individual actions, then it cannot be the case that individual responsibility can be 
reduced from collective responsibility To be clear, Cooper is relying on the idea that if 
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we cannot reduce in the way he is suggesting it would be "unfair" We could reduce to 
agents by simply dividing the harm evenly among members If Cooper's argument is 
successful then a successful theory of reductive collective responsibility will have to 
explore other ways of reduction, a topic I will return to in section 5 5 of this chapter 
Arguments for or against a reductive account will be impacted by what kind of 
collective is being considered Most often theorists see reduction as possible m structured, 
but not unstructured, collectives Among those that defend a non-reductive account, 
collectives are often less structured There is an implicit argument in these accounts that if 
responsibility will apply to unstructured collectives it must be non-reductive Virginia 
Held (1970) argues that random collections of individuals (or unstructured collectives) 
can be considered collectives that are responsible but only under a non-reductive account 
Held proposes a theory of collective responsibility that will show that random collections 
of individuals can be morally responsible Held describes such random collections of 
individuals as 
a set of persons distinguishable by some characteristic from the set of all persons, 
but lacking a decision method for taking action that is distinguishable from such 
decision methods, if there are any, as are possessed by all persons 
Held continues, saying that the passengers on a train or pedestrians on a section of 
sidewalk are distinguishable from all other persons by their location and destination 
Held's description of the collective emphasizes that these groups do not have a pre-
existing decision making method There is no structure and no leadership in these 
groups 21 Held is likely speaking of small, unstructured collectives when she identifies 
random collections of individuals because of the location qualification The passengers on 
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a train are similar to the strangers who help the person who has fallen on the ice It is 
unclear whether large, unstructured collectives could fit with Held's description, however 
I feel their sheer size would be problematic It is difficult to see how the people causing 
climate change would be distinguishable from other persons Perhaps you could argue 
that the collective causing climate change consists of all agents, and we all share the same 
location Earth But if we were to include all agents the description of "random" seem less 
appropriate, as does the qualification that the collective lack a decision making apparatus 
While there may be no global government, individual governments do have a decision 
making mechanism in place Thus, it seems unlikely Held's account can be applicable in 
the case of climate change 
Held argues that to hold individuals morally responsible requires that the agent be 
aware of the moral nature of the action Held claims that there must be alternatives open 
to the agent22 This would include the Aristotelian conditions discussed m Chapters 3 and 
4, the agent must cause the act, and the agent must know of the nature of the act that they 
have caused Held argues 
It is quite possible that other judgments may be supplied indicating that the 
members are indeed morally responsible or that the members may be morally 
responsible for the quite different actions of having joined or of retaining 
membership in the collectivity in question, but judgements about the moral 
responsibility of its membership are not logically derivable from judgements about 
the moral responsibility of the collectivity 3 
Held's position is very similar to Cooper's She does argue that agents can be held 
responsible for the choices and actions she sees as under the agent's control, namely 
joining the collective Held distinguishes between acts that are collective and those that 
are individual For Held, agents can only be held accountable for their individual acts, 
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which leaves collectives to blame for collective acts For Held collectives can meet the 
requirements for moral responsibility, the same as individuals can, but individuals cannot 
meet the requirements for collective responsibility 
The mam thrust of Held's argument surrounds the moral responsibility of random 
collections of individuals for the non-performance of some required event Held descnbes 
a situation on a subway tram where two people fight in one of the cars that has five other 
people (witnesses) The fight escalates and leads to one person killing the other Held 
argues that the witnesses can be held morally accountable, collectively, for failing to step 
m It is a collective failure, because, as Held argues, it is possible that no individual acting 
alone could have stopped the fight24 Further, Held argues that random collectives may be 
responsible for not acting to transform the collective into an organised group that could 
react, but that no individual is responsible for failing to take the action that ought to have 
been taken by the group 25 
Held's argument is interesting, and at first glance it makes sense to blame the five 
witnesses for failing to act together (let's say that at least two would have had to join 
together to stop the fight) But consider the following suppose Witness 1 is an elderly 
man He alone cannot stop the fight, and it would be personally dangerous for him to try 
So he looks at his fellow witnesses in an effort to elicit support When this fails he singles 
out Witness 5 (who looks to be the strongest of the group) and begins to argue with him 
in order to persuade him to act Despite the efforts of Witness 1 the other witnesses will 
not work with him to stop the fight and prevent the murder Is it correct to say Witness 1 
has failed in some way? 
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The question is similar to the one that Liam Murphy struggles with regarding the 
demands of beneficence that I discussed in Chapter 3 Recall, he argued that while 
consequentialist theones would normally argue that each agent is required to comply with 
the theory of beneficence and thus shoulder not only her own share, but as many of the 
shares of non-complying agents as would be optimal, that this is problematic, and instead 
he concludes that each agent should only be responsible for their share of an action in a 
world where everyone complied While the case for beneficence is importantly dissimilar 
to collective responsibility, it offers some insight in this case For Witness 1, it would 
claim that the elderly man is responsible, but only for his share This is a reductive 
analysis Held argues that none of the witnesses is individually at fault, the collective of 
"witnesses on the tram" is to blame for failing to act But this description seems odd It 
would be more intuitive to argue that the elderly man did his fair share, he tried to act, 
and therefore should not be considered a member of the responsible collective However, 
we can only see the actions of Witness 1 as exculpatory if we are working in an account 
of collective responsibility that is, in some sense, reducible 
Held's random collections of individuals are interesting here because they share 
many characteristics with my unstructured collectives, both large and small In all these 
cases it is true that while the collective acts (or fails to act) it may only take the actions of 
one, or a few, to "turn the tide" In Held's example the witnesses in the train need to act 
collectively to stop the fight In my example of the person who has fallen on the ice, 
someone needs to start the action by approachmg them to help However, since it could 
be anyone in these collectives who takes on this essential role it cannot be the case, 
according to Held, that we hold anyone individually responsible for this failure And if 
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someone acts, it will not be the case that those who did not are held morally responsible 
Collectively the witnesses are responsible, but individually they are not 
If any member could have taken a leadership role in the collective, yet no 
individuals are faulty if they do not, what does this mean when it comes to collective 
harm9 Take the example where the collective is doing something harmful to others In 
this case it may be true that someone took a leadership role and began the collective down 
this path Is it true that it could have been anyone, and thus that special responsibility 
cannot be attributed to this individual9 Recall Jan Narveson's argument from Chapter 3 
about Heinnch Himmler's role in Nazi Germany While if Himmler had not taken on the 
role, it is possible that someone else would have, I find it unsatisfying to conclude that the 
collective "Nazis" or "Germany" or however the collective is going to be defined bears 
responsibility, but that no individual does I find Held's example persuasive, and it is 
important to identify that halting collective harms or enacting collective solutions may 
require the actions of only a subgroup of the collective However, Held's argument that 
the collective may be responsible while none of the members are is no more convincing 
than the arguments from Gilbert and Cooper 
Collective action is complex, even the more so when we examine unstructured 
collectives that lack defined roles for members and clear rules for behaviour However, it 
does not mean that individuals will not be responsible, while the collective is This leads 
to an interesting possibility of dual responsibility, one at the collective level and one at 
the individual level I will return to this topic in section 5 5 of this chapter 
Gilbert's account of collective responsibility rests on a description of agents 
whose agency is compromised in collective situations, Cooper argues that if collective 
action is no more than the sum of individual actions it cannot reduce to the individual, 
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and Held argues that even random collections of individuals can be held responsible for 
failing to act, but only collectively These three are all accounts of non-reductive 
collective responsibility In all three the fear of agents bearing responsibility for that 
which they cannot control provides motivation for a non-reductive account For these 
wnters collective responsibility is something real, but to treat agents fairly, it must not be 
the case that if affects the moral status of individual agents 
However, while the control condition is important in attributions of responsibility, 
this need not lead us to accept a non-reductive account if we can provide agents with 
relevant control in collective situations The elderly man had control over the actions he 
took, and if we hold him responsible in light of those actions, and not in light of a desired 
collective outcome, then responsibility is withm the control of the agent The way 
collectives and collective actions are depicted in the above accounts may be, in part, what 
leads to accepting a non-reductive account However, it may be these are not the best 
descriptions of collectives, and a different description may lead us to a different result In 
Chapter 6 I will provide a definition for collectives which will begin to answer these 
concerns 
While the above accounts of a non-reductive theory of collective responsibility 
have problems, they do present one interesting issue collectives are more than just the 
actions of individuals, and individual action is different in a collective context This may 
point to the idea that a successful account of collective responsibility will exist between 
reductive and non-reductive accounts I will return to this after examining reductive 
collective responsibility 
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5.4 Argument for Reductive Collective Responsibility 
In this section I will examine three theories of reducible collective responsibility 
These theories each argue for a different interpretation of the collective and the 
relationship between collective and individual agent Christopher Kutz emphasizes the 
relationships between agents, R S Downie distinguishes between two different kinds of 
collective responsibility, cntiquing Cooper's account discussed above, and Jan Narveson 
claims that the only collectives that can be responsible are those where individuals have 
control 
Kutz argues that we have to understand collective responsibility in terms of 
individual responsibility He writes, 
Because individuals are the ultimate loci of normative motivation and deliberation, 
only forms of accountability aimed at and sensitive to what individuals do can 
succeed in controlling the emergence of collective harms The oughts of morality 
and politics must apply to me The trick lies, then, not in modifying the fundamental 
bearer of responsibility, but in expanding the scope of individual accountability by 
including an assessment of what an individual does with others 
In his account Kutz is acknowledging the two opposing camps, individualistic and 
collective, and claiming that instead of choosing one of them, that we need to find a way 
to choose both Collectives do act, and can cause harm But in the end, responsibility 
must be understood as something which belongs to the individual 
In Kutz's analysis of collective action he contrasts the holistic view of action, 
where the action of the collective explains the action of the individual (ex my stepping 
left is explained by our dancing a waltz) with the individualistic view, where collective 
action is explained by individual intentions and actions (ex our waltzing is explained by 
Kutz (2000) 7 
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my dancing my part and you dancing yours ) Kutz charactenses individualists as those 
who claim that collective action can always be reduced to individual action So, for 
example, if we were to take the claim, "Because Exxon posted a third-quarter loss, its 
share price fell" this can be replaced by sentences that refer only to individuals The 
above sentence could be replaced by a large set of sentences about individuals, and the 
best explanation for the lower share price can be deduced from sentences about those 
individuals A holist, m contrast, would claim the loss could only be explained by 
reference to a collective plan Although it requires the actions of certain company 
9R 
officials, their actions can only be explained by reference to the collective 
After defining the individualist and holist positions, Kutz continues his argument 
by placing himself somewhere in the middle He writes, 
The position I will defend with respect to collective actions is a form of explanatory 
reduction in the following sense statements about collective acts may be rephrased 
always as statements about individual agents, because all collective action is 
explicable in terms of the intentionality of individuals - their motives, beliefs and 
plans My claim is only that individual intentional action always implicitly 
mediates the causal explanation of collective acts and events, not that referring to 
individual acts always provides the most useful explanation 29 
Kutz acknowledges that this is a very weak form of individualism, one that will be, at 
times, compatible with moderate holistic accounts While Kutz supports the view that 
collective actions can be reduced to the individual level, he strongly denies that a full 
explanation of such collective actions could be provided without reference to collectives 
or social facts He claims that this is because, " reference to irreducibly holistic facts and 
entities must occur in an account of the mental states of individual agents "30 Here Kutz 
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means that collectives may act because of shared attitudes they possess, or norms they 
have accepted The best explanation for the acceptance of these norms that influence 
behaviour might be non-individualistic like some kind of group level adaptation Further, 
Kutz says that often the identity of a group is grounded in individual's dispositions to 
identify themselves as members 31 Since Kutz argues that this emphasizes the importance 
of his participatory intentions, this is another way in which the account rests on individual 
mental states 
Kutz argues that there is an irreducible nature to accountability, similar to Cooper, 
but clarifies that this means that responsibility cannot generally be reduced or explained 
by facts about the agents alone Kutz examines the possibility of degrees of responsibility, 
and argues that responsibility must be interpreted relationally as a function of the 
character of an agent's relations with their respondents 32 Here Kutz is arguing against the 
claim that degrees of responsibility are no more than causal contnbutions to the act Kutz 
looks at the case where we would be reluctant to hold an agent responsible, for example a 
child or an agent with limited cognitive capacity He says, 
my point is that the indeterminacy intrinsic to the notion of causal responsibility 
precludes any reduction to degrees of accountability to causality Contributory, 
necessary causes are metaphysically equal and only normatively unequal When 
accountability is assigned in degrees ostensibly relative to causal responsibility, 
independent normative interests are doing the real work These interests are 
themselves derived from relationships between agents and respondents, namely 
relationships of control, reliance, risk, and capacity to compensate 33 
In the above quote Kutz makes a strong argument for his particular interpretation of 
collective responsibility He is arguing against a purely causal account of collective 
responsibility claiming that when viewed as only causal many contnbutions will appear to 
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be equal He claims that we are often using a normative judgement derived from 
relationships between agents and respondents to determine the degree of responsibility, 
which points to the importance of non-causal factors By moving away from causal 
contributions as the main, or only, determination of responsibility, Kutz is returning to the 
emphasis on character, or the Strawsoman reactive attitudes discussed in Chapter 3 With 
this change in focus the collective harm itself looks different In Chapter 3 I discussed 
the example of a burglary which included a mastermind and a getaway dnver Kutz uses a 
similar case of two agents who rob a bank He says, 
My driving the getaway car may be an essential part of our successful bank robbery, 
but the additional wrongfulness of your instigation of the crime, and willingness to 
use force, exposes you to greater condemnation in the eyes of others Initiating 
wrongdoing is only worse than complying with wrongdoing if the first represents a 
more aggressive affront to the standards governing particular moral relationships 
than the second34 
Kutz has identified the importance of the role the agent has in the collective, both in terms 
of causal contribution and position in regards to performance of the collective act Here 
we begin to get a feeling for what degrees of responsibility, as mentioned by Lewis, may 
look like While causal contribution may be a necessary condition, role of the agent is 
important to how responsible an agent may be And further, Kutz's account shows that 
there should be different responsibility for different members 
In order for Kutz to maintain his position of weak individualism further analysis is 
required For Kutz, as discussed m Chapter 1, the "participatory intention" of the agent is 
what allows for collective action Participatory intention is the intentional participation, 
by the agent, to contribute to the collective act an intention to act as part of the group 
Contra Gilbert, Kutz argues that participatory mtentions are, " ordinary individual 
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instrumental intentions whose content is irreducibly collective " Further, this does not 
require agents intend or even conceive of the collective's performance as within their 
control, but rather only that they intend their own contributions 35 The focus on 
participatory intentions, something possessed by the individual, provides a tool to track 
individual responsibility 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are a number of problems with Kutz's reliance on 
participatory intentions The example from Chapter 1 was of Ellen and Jayna Ellen prays 
for the political protesters in Iran, and Jayna refuses to hire anyone over the age of 55 In 
Chapter 1 it seemed that, if analysed in terms of intention to participate in the collective 
action alone, Ellen would be a member of the collective (even though no member of the 
collective knew of her contribution), and Jayna would not be a member of the collective 
(promoting ageism) because she did not have any intentions beyond hiring for a particular 
position Perhaps we could argue, after looking at Lynn Hankmson Nelson's epistemic 
communities in Chapter 3 that Jayna did know (or could know) of the collective 
implication of her action Setting aside the example of the wilfully ignorant agent, 
participatory intentions alone may link members to collectives that we do not want to 
include them in Ellen is a member of the collective of Iranian protestors because she 
intends her praying to help them While this has implications for Ellen's character, 
without a causal link to the work the protesters are doing, we may not want to include 
Ellen in their collective This suggests that a causal condition may be required 
As discussed m Chapter 1, Kutz modifies his theory of participatory intentions 
when it comes to large, unstructured collectives, instead using "quasi - participatory 
intentions" and "symbolic or character-based accountability" This change in theory 
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allows Kutz to capture problem cases where, as with pollution, agents may not see or 
understand the collective nature of the action they are participating in Further, in large, 
unstructured collectives there is such a lack of organization that the lack of knowledge 
might not be considered the fault of the agent (Although Heidi E Grasswick would likely 
argue that they are failing to be responsible knowers See Chapter 3 ) In Chapter 1 I 
argued that Kutz failed to provide a reason for the change m theory with the change in the 
size of the collective And further, that when applied to small or highly structured 
collectives, Kutz's combination of quasi-participatory intentions and character-based 
accountability failed It resulted in the inclusion of agents we do not consider members of 
the collective And if this is happening in the smaller collectives, it is possible that it is 
also happening in the larger collectives if we rely on the same theory 
Kutz's theory provides a strong argument that harms can, and should be, reducible 
to individual moral responsibility without seeing the collective act as no more than a 
collection of many individual acts However, what Kutz does not provide is an adequate 
theory to determine individual responsibility in such contexts So while Kutz is very 
persuasive in the idea that normative judgements based on an agent's relationship to 
respondents (or roles) is relevant to moral considerations, his account is not completely 
successful Perhaps the problems for Kutz he in the fact that I am currently applying his 
theory to all collectives Perhaps not all collectives are relevant examples of collective 
responsibility R S Downie also argues for a reductionist account, but he distinguishes 
between two kinds of responsibility that will each follow different rules 
Downie (1969) argues that collective responsibility is reducible in cases of moral 
responsibility, although not in other (causal, legal) cases of responsibility He claims that 
our confusion on how to reduce responsibility springs from confusing different kinds of 
227 
responsibility Downie is responding to Cooper's argument, which I examined above 
Downie says, 
I shall argue that although there is a sense m which the actions and responsibility of 
a collective cannot be analysed in terms of the actions and responsibilities of 
individual persons who compose the collective, it is not moral responsibility which 
is involved36 
Downie identifies Cooper's two kinds of collective responsibility, that which is divisible, 
and that which is indivisible So, when authors claim that responsibility of a collective is 
just another way of speaking of the responsibility of the members, this is "divisible" 
collective responsibility Downie is not concerned with this kind of responsibility, and 
instead will focus on "indivisible" collective responsibility 37 
Downie describes Cooper's argument for indivisible collectives, citing Cooper's 
example of a tennis club While a tennis club may close, and the members of the tennis 
club may be said to be responsible for the closure, Cooper argues that the collective can 
incur blame if it falls below the standards we normally expect of similar collectives, but 
that no individual is to blame Downie challenges Cooper's claim, denying that we 
would hold the collective (the tennis club) morally responsible in such circumstances 
Downie questions the practice of claiming no individual performed a morally 
blameworthy act, and yet the tennis club did He clanfies that we may say that the tennis 
club is legally or causally responsible for the actions that led to closing the club But, 
Downie argues, 
it would be exciting (but it is false) that the club collectively is morally 
responsible for its bad atmosphere or creating debts even when no individual or 
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group (such as the committee) is individually morally responsible for creating 
them39 
Downie argues that Cooper is confusing different kinds of responsibility (moral, legal and 
causal) Recall, Downie does not think that causal responsibility is reducible from 
collective to individual Causal responsibility for Downie is based on the actions and 
responsibilities of individual agents who compose the collective Downie claims that 
causal and legal responsibility requires the existence of alternatives for the agent, and the 
agent must be able to control their choice However, moral responsibility does not require 
such alternatives 40 While Downie's description of moral responsibility is effective in his 
account, his position that agents do not need to have control in circumstances that may 
lead to moral responsibility is not the dominant one in the literature, and not the one I will 
be defending here However, the way that Downie reduces moral responsibility is 
interesting, and relevant to my discussion 
Downie closes his article with a brief description of a theory which would reduce 
collective responsibility to individual responsibility He argues that collectives are 
constituted by rules, so when an individual acts in a collective, they are acting qua 
collective (as representatives of the collective ) While Downie argues that reducibihty of 
non-moral responsibility is problematic, he says " the moral responsibilities of a 
collective do stem although in a complex way, from the moral decisions of individuals "41 
In this argument Downie is moving away from explanations of collective responsibility 
that claim that the collective is something more than the individuals who comprise it He 
claims that the reduction is complex, but possible 
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There are three ways in which Downie argues that we can trace collective 
responsibility to the moral decisions of individuals first, the rules of the collective These 
have been created or accepted by individuals in the collective, and the resulting actions 
from these rules will bear the moral character they do because of these individuals 
Second, individual members decide whether or not to become members of the collective, 
which can carry moral weight Third, an individual can bring moral qualities of her own 
to her actions as a member of the collective 42 
Downie identifies an issue that I will continue to analyse in this chapter, and that 
is the problem with claiming that the collective has failed (morally) but that the 
individuals have not Downie looks at Cooper's example of the tennis club, and points out 
that if the club closes, it would be odd, if not simply inaccurate, to not look at the actions 
of the finance committee, for example, as relevant to the closing While the nature of acts 
that we perform together are importantly different than the nature of the actions we 
perform alone, if is not enough to blame the collective but be undecided about the 
individuals To do so requires much more argument regarding what collectives are, and 
how they are to bear responsibility I will return to this topic in the next section 
In Downie's description of how we can ascribe responsibility to individuals in 
collectives - through their choice to be members, their actions, and their upholding of the 
rules - Downie has supplied a theory that defines collectives in a certain way Downie's 
argument will most easily cover smaller and structured collectives collectives like tennis 
clubs where members know the rules and agents can easily join or leave However, taking 
into account the arguments from Chapter 3, Downie's theory does not preclude the 
possibility of large, unstructured collectives As discussed in Chapter 3 there is an 
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argument that we are responsible for our attitudes (which speaks to upholding collective 
rules),we know the rules and objectives of the collective (if it is known to the community 
at large), and we can control our actions/membership (or , until such actions/membership 
are against our will/desires, we do ) 
Downie has begun distinguishing between moral and causal responsibility, 
divisible and non-divisible collectives By doing this Downie has forced us to look at the 
definition of a collective In Chapter 1 I defined all collectives (except for large, 
unstructured collectives) Most wnters in collective responsibility provide only examples 
of collectives or vague descriptions Even my descriptions were not designed to 
determined membership in said collectives, which, when determining responsibility, is a 
crucial question Downie's analysis did provide some useful possibilities for such a 
description of membership, and for reducing to individuals Jan Narveson, who is 
strongly opposed to responsibility in cases where he claims the control condition has not 
been met, proposes an account of collective responsibility that will directly reduce to the 
individual While such an account is simple and easy to apply, we have to keep in mind it 
must also capture the nature of collectives 
Narveson (2002) argues that if we are to have collective responsibility, it must be 
reducible to individual responsibility I examined Narveson's arguments regarding 
voluntariness for group membership in the previous chapter The argument for the 
importance of voluntariness, as well as Narveson's overall argument for individual 
responsibility both hinge on his focus on the control condition for attributions of 
responsibility Narveson argues 
The question for morals is always and fundamentally cast in individual terms what 
is this, that, or the other person to do? If we think that there are things which groups 
should do, those claims will say nothing to anyone unless there is some way of 
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understanding that individuals, such as members of that group or persons affected 
by its behaviour, have duties or rights or some other moral status in relation to it43 
While this argument makes a practical claim (that reducibihty is required to motivate 
agents to act regarding collective responsibility) which may or may not be theoretically 
compelling, I note it here because of its popularity in the literature (in one form or 
another) If we have determined responsibility, then what does that person there have to 
respond to9 This is the main critique of non-reductive accounts Without individual 
responsibility it seems individual members will not be concerned about their 
responsibility 
In Chapter 3 I quoted the following passage from Narveson to argue for the 
importance of control in collective contexts He claims that we must appeal to 
individualism in cases of collective responsibility I return to it here to examine 
Narveson's argument He says 
A group can only be said to "oppress" another group if many individuals in it 
characteristically, or at least significantly often, mistreat members of the other 
group - e g by hacking them to pieces, as with the Tutsi/Hutu massacre And 
individuals in that group who do nothing of the sort, and perhaps exert themselves 
to prevent other members from so acting, or try to shield the oppressed from their 
actions, simply are not guilty, and may not be properly thought to be so 44 
Narveson's argument is not only against non-reducible collective responsibility, but 
against many forms of collective responsibility He is restnctmg responsibility to groups 
who are composed of people who have made individual contributions that have harmed 
others However, what I want to emphasize here, is the compelling idea that if we are to 
hold a collective responsible for an atrocity such as the Rwandan genocide, we want to 
include every individual who wielded a weapon and killed a neighbour, but do not want 
Narveson (2002) 180 
Ibid 182 
232 
to include a member of the society who tried to stop the massacre, or simply did not kill 
anyone However, this argument amounts to seeing the collective act as no more than the 
acts of many individuals (unless through some other action they "participated") Narveson 
is defining the collective by the individual actions This approach is counter that espoused 
by Cooper as well as myself, that collective acts are more than the sum of the action of 
their individual members 
Narveson examines the actions of individuals in groups in order to argue that 
collective actions are not easily reducible to individual actions He uses the example of 
raising his hand This action has no group implications However, "stnkmg out" (meaning 
what it does in baseball) is something that can be done only if there are 17 others 
involved, and "stnkmg out" happens in a game of baseball 45 Narveson provides this 
example to show that groups can have both an important and materially essential bearing 
on our actions, even if we embrace individualism Narveson argues, 
every group action involves the doings of various things by individuals, who, 
however much they may be reacting to the behaviour of others, decide to do what 
they do, and could in principle decide otherwise - though, granted the range of 
alternatives that will occur to them is seriously affected by their relation to groups 
Group organisms are not related to their constituent individual members in the 
way that mushroom cells are to mushrooms, in short4 
Here Narveson is arguing that the individual must have control over her actions (recall 
Narveson's arguments from Chapter 3) However, what lies behind his theory is his 
perception of the individual Narveson sees the individual as an individual behaving or 
acting in a collective context The collective is the stage on which the action is performed 
In a way this is in line with Heidi E Grasswick's argument from Chapter 4 of seeing 
agents as "individuals-in-communities " However, it is importantly different from many 
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theories, including Kutz's, who would claim that the collective is more active and 
relevant than mere scenery 
Narveson examines what he identifies as "irreducible" collectives from the 
literature These commonly include collectives such as those that perpetuate genocide or 
potentially that cause climate change These collectives do not include structured groups, 
for example teams In the case of irreducible collectives, Narveson says that if we are to 
distribute responsibility we should either punish no one, or punish everyone equally 
Narveson argues that we cannot punish everyone equally because in order to be fair this 
would require that each member contributed equally Since such a description will only 
be true m rare cases, Narveson concludes that in general we will not be able to punish 
anyone for the harm 47 
The claim that collective responsibility leads to a situation where we can blame no 
one is Narveson's main argument against irreducible collective responsibility Recall, 
Narveson says it must be the case that it can reduce, but he has shown that reduction is 
not possible He writes, 
Precisely because it will not reduce, it precludes you from getting at anybody - all 
you can do is wave flags and write poems But in fact, it was this person's 
grandfather who was brutally murdered by that soldier and his buddies, this other 
person's sister who was raped and tossed down a well, these people over here who 
were herded into a gas chamber, by these particular soldiers Only individual agents 
can do such things - this grandfather and that sister were not murdered by an 
irreducible entity 
Narveson continues, arguing that the problem with irreducible collective responsibility is 
that such a theory deprives us of any logical means to distribute blame to individual 
agents 
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Instead of relying on irreducible collective responsibility, Narveson pulls apart 
actions done in a collective m order to determine responsibility Examining the case of 
Nazi Germany, Narveson claims that, 
Most of us are wimps most of us will respond to authority by doing things we 
would rather not do, and many will respond to it even when authorities order us to 
do great evils to other people It is not psychologically realistic to hold that this 
makes no difference 49 
Narveson's response is to hold leaders much more responsible than those who follow 
them He continues 
Nothing is more important than the attitudes of leaders And underlying those 
attitudes, very often, is a philosophical theory of collective virtue, collective spirit, 
collective significance, that purports to authorize the doing of great evils by 
individuals Palestinian suicide bombers, members of a Polish village who helped 
their Nazi conquerors by participating in the murder of hundreds of their fellow 
citizens who had the misfortune to be Jewish, and any number of other cases need 
to be analysed with a view to finding the crucial points at which we can respond 
effectively to control such things [emphasis mine]5 
Narveson's emphasis on the responsibility of leaders of collectives is key to his theory, 
but has serious implications for the theory of collective responsibility being examined in 
this dissertation If a collective is only a collective if it has a leader, then many of the 
collectives discussed here will not qualify Small, unstructured collectives you could 
argue have an implied leader, perhaps when the stranger falls on the ice, Good Samantan 
#1 calls out "I need some help over here'" and the other good Samaritans come to the 
fallen person's aid However, in the case of large, unstructured collectives this will not be 
the case Who is the leader when it comes to systemic social racism?51 How about climate 
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change9 While there are those that are in positions of leadership in these collectives 
(politicians), there is not a declared leader of this particular harm 
It would be false, under any of the theories examined thus far, to claim that racism 
is the responsibility of the government, unless the government is actually a leader in the 
act of racism itself Governments, politicians and social leaders have impactful roles 
within society, but certain harms will be driven without a leader, or by a leader who does 
not fit that description While the role of agents may be important in a successful theory, 
Narveson does not provide such a theory here Under Narveson's account of reduction we 
are looking at individual contributions, and unless he is suggesting we replace these with 
responsibility only for leaders (which would leave leaders responsible for that which they 
cannot contrpl, and members of collectives responsible for nothing) difficulties continue 
This suggests that his method of reduction may be the issue 
The final line in Narveson's quote above deserves attention Here Narveson 
identifies a crucial characteristic of agents in collectives how effective can they be in 
responding to the harm9 If we look at the ability of agents to respond, we are looking at 
how agents can control such collective occurrences This rescues responsibility, for 
Narveson, in collective accounts because it will meet the control condition - at least for 
the leaders But does this mean leaders are responsible for the collective harm while the 
members are not9 Or are members responsible for their own individual acts9 
Narveson examines the collective nature of such acts He uses the examples, "The 
Nazi soldiers who murdered a hundred or so Canadian soldiers after the Normandy 
landings could not have committed the cnme of violating the rules of war if they were not 
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at war " Because there are commonly followed rules in war, war qualifies as a 
collective action This is because certain actions have the character they do because of the 
actions of others There is a difference between simply hitting a ball with a bat, and doing 
so while playing the game of baseball While Narveson sees the collective nature of the 
acts, he also argues that it is still true that some agents will be guiltier than others What 
he does not provide is a clear way to reduce to individuals to different degrees 
Kutz proposed an account of reductive collective responsibility that included the 
relationships between agents Downie argued that irreducible collectives (those lacking a 
decision making structure) could be morally, but not causally reduced Narveson 
introduced the idea that responsibility should be portioned according to how effective an 
agent could be m the collective, focusing particularly on the role of leaders While none 
of the three accounts examined here escape criticism, they are more persuasive than 
arguments for non-reductive collective responsibility Agents act as they do often because 
they perceive themselves as acting as a member of a collective, be it hitting a ball in a 
game of baseball, or driving the getaway vehicle in a robbery However, before we can 
accept a reductive account of collective responsibility we have to answer one more 
question how might we reduce9 What is the method to do so9 I turn to that question next 
5.5 How to Reduce? Options 
If a reductive account of collective responsibility is to be successful it must 
reduce, and do so in a way that is coherent with the account of collective responsibility 
Different defenders of reductive collective responsibility have proposed methods to 
reduce to the individual Recall, H D Lewis said, "What has to be stressed is that the guilt 
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of each is strictly proportionate to his part in the joint undertaking " However, as I 
discussed in Chapter 3 this quote can serve only as a direction An account that meets 
Lewis' criteria would avoid many of the critiques levelled against reductive accounts It 
would not give equal blame to all members, and it would consider blame in accordance 
with the role of the agent In this section I am going to examine three different accounts 
from the literature on collective responsibility that provide a method to determine 
individual responsibility for collective harms 
Before beginning on potential methods to reduce I want to return, briefly, to 
Kutz's account Kutz uses his complicity pnnciple (discussed in Chapter 1) to explain the 
tie between collective responsibility and individual responsibility His complicity 
pnnciple states that, "I am accountable for what others do when I intentionally participate 
in the wrong they do or the harm they cause " This is the basis for individual 
responsibility according to Kutz The object of such accountability is descnbed in the 
second part of the quote "I am accountable for the harm or wrong we do together, 
independently of the actual difference I make " 54 The problems with Kutz's account of 
collective responsibility have already been discussed I am restating his complicity 
pnnciple as a pnmer for this section Kutz's only description of attnbuting different 
degrees of responsibility comes from his distinction between being the inclusive or the 
exclusive author of an action Kutz argues that he is the exclusive author of the actions he 
performs himself, or the events that are caused by him He is the inclusive author of 
actions and events that result from the group in which he participates 55 This distinction 
is useful in that while you are the inclusive author of all the acts of a collective, certain 
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actions of the collective may correctly be attributed to individuals, and in that case, they 
would be the exclusive author Beyond these distinctions, however, there is no clear 
method for attributing collective responsibility 
Howard McGary (1986) proposes a method for determining individual 
responsibility that is the result of collective responsibility He begins by posing the 
question, "can all the members of a group be held morally liable if only some of its 
members' actions have been faulty?" McGary answers with two options from the 
literature first that under certain conditions each member may be held liable McGary 
characterises this response as one that aims to achieve "administrative convenience", 
where the goal outweighs the problem of holding some responsible for the actions of 
others The second answer to this question, according to McGary, is to claim that 
membership can justify liability This would result in all members being equally 
responsible McGary concludes that both these responses are inadequate 56 
McGary sees the challenge of collective responsibility as identifying the 
conditions which will warrant holding agents responsible for actions they themselves did 
not directly engage in McGary is focusing on what he terms "practices" and not 
"collective actions" Practices are a commonly accepted course of action, actions that 
specifies certain forms of behaviour as permissible and others as impermissible 57 This 
will be like the attitudes in a collective, or potentially epistemological communities, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 The example that McGary uses is systemic racism He argues that 
moral norms impact behaviour " Moral norms that form our conventional morality may 
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be followed for a variety of reasons, but I am sure that one of them is that people have 
come to see from childhood that following these norms is in their best interest "58 
McGary is writing in defence of a reductive account of collective responsibility, 
against the position that in order for this to be the case there must be group solidanty, 
pnor notice to the liable party, and opportunity for control by the liable party Group 
solidanty is commonly descnbed as existing when all members of a group share interests 
and feel pnde and shame when others in the group act 59 McGary challenges these 
qualifications, beginning with a different definition of group solidanty which will allow 
for "loosely organised" groups For example, residents of California have group solidanty 
when they rally around efforts to prevent needed water from being routed to another state 
Based on this description, McGary's loosely organised groups would be the same as my 
semi-structured groups (such as states) McGary claims that there is no solidanty in 
random collections of individuals, whose membership is determined by luck and 
circumstances 
McGary uses strong group identification to show group solidanty, which allows 
him to argue that groups based on racial or national characteristics will have the required 
group solidanty 61 He argues that the notion of community is crucial for agents As such 
McGary proposes a theory that will hold members who fail to take steps to prevent 
harmful occurrences, morally liable for these consequences McGary claims that agents 
have a moral duty when they are members of a collective (including society) because of 
their, " chosen strategy to insure that all members of society remain free moral agents, 
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which is an integral part of their reason for joining the moral community in the first 
place " 62 This is similar to Kutz's claim of responsibility based on receiving some 
benefit, a kind of symbolic or character based responsibility Members of moral 
communities benefit from being members One crucial aspect in some groups will be that 
members remain free moral agents This creates a duty on all the members to ensure and 
protect such freedom 
McGary lays out the following conditions under which a moral agent X can be held 
morally liable for a faulty practice, P When these conditions are satisfied it provides a 
moral basis for liability 
(1) X knows or should have known about P 
(2) X identifies or has solidarity with those who engage in P or X does not 
sufficiently disassociate himself from P or X's failure to disassociate from P 
was not part of a reasonable strategy to prevent further or greater harm 63 
The first part of McGary's first condition is the searchlight view discussed in Chapter 4 
With the addition of "should have known" McGary is potentially making a similar claim 
as George Sher widening the scope of the epistemic condition to include some kind of 
reasonable person standard McGary expands on this claiming that it must be the case 
that the agent has made a reasonable effort to become knowledgeable McGary states that 
the agent does not need to have been a party to the act that is faulty The first part of 
condition (2), which requires solidarity, will be satisfied when agents involved share 
common interests McGary is trying to capture some more loosely organized groups, such 
as races, that typically are neglected in accounts of collective responsibility (large, 
unstructured groups) The second part of condition (2) requires disassociation where 
appropriate m order to avoid moral responsibility McGary defines this as requiring at 
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least publicly denouncing a practice and refusing to take any benefit, but could also 
require some direct action 64 The second part of the second condition allows for cases 
where someone is acting as part of the group because they are "under cover" or in some 
similar situation 65 
Under McGary's account all members of responsible collectives will be held 
responsible for not disassociating themselves from the collective action (unless, of course, 
they take steps to do so ) The use of disassociation here is interesting Disassociation is 
not a method to avoid responsibility or exit the collective, but rather McGary is saying 
that by not disassociating agents have performed a morally wrong action, they need to 
disassociate once they are members What might McGary's disassociation include9 He 
says it can involve publically denouncing a practice (of the collective), but only if this 
option is all that is available to the agent Further, the agent should refuse any ennchment 
that occurs as a result of the harmful collective act 66 I agree that if an agent is deemed a 
member of a responsible collective such acts of disassociation are morally relevant What 
we are still missing, however, is the criteria for membership itself Once we have these 
criteria (which I will propose and defend in Chapter 6) then I will have to determine what 
affect such acts of disassociation will have 
Holding agents responsible for failing to leave the collective circumvents concerns 
about control But it also limits what kind of responsibility we are speaking of here 
McGary does not clarify this point, but it seems a fair interpretation to assume that he 
imagines two levels of responsibility- you can be responsible for the faulty practice, or 
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for being a member of the collective , or in some cases both In this way agents are not 
responsible for the actions of others, but for being members of collectives, while those 
"directly responsible" bear two kinds of responsibility This move allows McGary to 
include large, unstructured collectives While I agree with him that solidarity is morally 
relevant, and that disassociation may be important, overall his account fails to provide 
enough details to answer the concerns about collective responsibility I am going to look 
briefly at another account that also proposes levels of responsibility 
Robin Gildert (2000) wrestled with the challenge of indivisible collective 
harms, focusing on the case of genocide Gildert argues, 
Surely it should be the case that the Nazi in the bakery does not receive the same 
punishment as the Nazi in the death camp [so] we must pay close attention to the 
distribution of the punishment But if it is the individuals that are punished then 
we should simply look towards individuals and forget about the collective the 
individual that took the lives of many should be punished more severely than the 
person that baked bread But if a collective's crime is not divisible then the 
members of a collective should be punished equally Thus, these two should receive 
the same punishment It would appear that my intuitions have led me into a 
contradiction 69 
Here Gildert is identifying a key issue in cases of collective actions While it seems the 
case that some actions are collective, in that we cannot understand them if we do not see 
them in a collective context, this has implications for distributions of responsibility 
Being responsible for being a member of the collective will likely mean that agents are 
being held responsible for having a certain kind of character, 1 e they have chosen to 
associate with people that are producing a harm, and this tells us something morally 
important about the kind of agent they are 
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Gildert wants to find a middle ground between the two His reply to his own problem is 
thus 
Thankfully, however, this contradiction is easily dealt with I stated at the outset of 
this essay that there are things that individuals can do and that there are things that 
collectives can do I would argue that we not conflate these two things In the case 
of the death camp worker I would argue that this person is responsible for two 
crimes The first deals solely with what that person could have accomplished on an 
individual level Thus, if that person murdered then that person is held responsible 
for that murder But there is a deeper and separate crime at work here, namely, 
genocide As such, that person should be held responsible for that crime as well As 
a result, the death camp worker does receive the greater punishment However, that 
greater punishment does not stem from the person's particular role in the genocide 
In regards to the genocide, both people receive the same Instead, the death camp 
worker is punished more severely to account for the individual crimes that person 
committed as well as genocide 
I find Gildert's solution quite appealing It captures the idea that, intuitively, we feel that 
there is a difference between the agent who baked bread for the Nazis, and the guard, and 
of course, those like Heinnch Himmler And yet, Gildert's solution also retains the idea 
that some actions are irreducibly collective Gildert's proposed levels of responsibility are 
simple to determine (depending on the number of levels) In particular, it is much easier 
to determine responsibility under Gildert's account than it was under Lewis's when he 
argued that society would be partly responsible when a woman stole a loaf of bread 
Under Gildert's account the woman would maintain prime responsibility for the 
individual crime of stealing the loaf of bread If there are any individuals who did 
something to this woman to put her m this situation— perhaps her employer defrauded her 
a pay check— then the employer will be individually responsible for that single crime 
When examined at the level of the society it may be the case that those in either 
leadership or other positions of power will bear some responsibility for allowing the 
woman to be in such a desperate state of need The society in which they live will be 
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collectively responsible for failing this woman, and each person in that group will be 
equally responsible for the failure 
While this solution solves many of the problems in attributing collective 
responsibility to individuals, a few remain I will mention three here The first is what 
such an account will mean for collective responsibility As we determine punishment 
based on individual action, ensunng that the Nazi guard receives more than the baker, the 
emphasis appears to be on isolated individual actions We are concerned that the guard is 
punished, and collective responsibility acknowledges that the guard did not act in 
isolation, but that they participated m a collective effort However, it still seems that the 
true crime is the individual crime, and the other less important If the guard was to stand 
in front of a tribunal to determine his moral responsibility, he would be facing two counts 
He would be responsible for the death of X number of agents, and responsibility for his 
equal portion of the collective crime for the genocide Now, in order for this to remain 
fair to the baker who will bear equal responsibility as the guard on this later count, the 
responsibility will likely be mild So the real crime is the murder (the individual crime) 
and the mild crime is the portion of the collective act This limits the scope and efficacy 
of collective responsibility which is particularly problematic for collective harms that lack 
serious individual crimes (e g climate change) 
This analysis will depend on the details of the collective act Depending on how 
collective responsibility is portioned out to members, it will not necessarily be the case 
that the individual murderers are always blameworthy The collective harm of genocide is 
very severe, and so participation in genocide may weigh heavier on an agent's moral 
status than a single murder However, since the bread baker will bear equal responsibility 
for the genocide as the guard, if such responsibility is to be fair, it is likely to be milder 
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than what we would attribute to the guards if they were the only members of the 
responsible collective The second issue with this division of responsibility has to do with 
the characterization of such acts as individual verses collective It is unclear here where 
Gildert makes the division between the two One interpretation is that collectives are 
responsible for creating (as McGary claimed) a collection of shared practices, ways of 
acting, and rules of behaviour And solidarity with such groups allows people to act in 
certain ways The ways that individuals act, however, would be classified as individual 
actions 
The third problem is that this account requires a kind of "double dipping" for 
attributions of responsibility If collective actions are what they are because of the myriad 
of individual actions of which they are composed, then it seems that the responsibility 
portioned out to the guard is based on the individual murders he performed (in part) 
However, the guard is also being held individually responsible for those murders So, in a 
sense, the guard is being held responsible twice based on the same action but for two 
different crimes, murder and genocide Perhaps this is not a problem, or there is a way of 
pulling apart the two acts to eliminate this result, however it is important to note that on 
some descnptions we are holding someone responsible in two different ways for the same 
action Gildert's theory describes agents as acting within a collective context In this type 
of account the collective acts as a type of backdrop that influences attributions of 
responsibility Tracy Isaacs also argues for this approach, although she does not provide a 
solid reductive method 
Isaacs (2006) examines genocide as a collective act against another collective, and 
she explores the moral responsibility that will arise in such situations Isaacs says, 
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I maintain that, since collective contexts make it possible for individuals to perform 
acts together that they would not be able to perform on their own, we need a 
framework for thinking about individual responsibility that takes this fact 
seriously71 
Isaacs goes on to argue that we should consider individual agents responsible for their 
part in collective efforts, and that their contributions should be characterised in light of 
the collective goals and actions in which they take place 
Isaacs examines the theory that individuals are morally responsible for their 
contribution, their part of the collective harm She claims that, in the case of genocide, 
this will leave the "genocide" as the responsibility of no one, or the "collectivity" as a 
whole, an answer she finds problematic This is further complicated when looking at 
harms where individual contributions are not morally blameworthy (unlike in genocide 
where individual contributions are often murders ) Isaacs describes the case where smog 
in the city in the summer causes respiratory problems (sometimes very serious) for a 
collective of citizens The smog is being created by another collective To combat the 
smog citizens are asked to refrain from running their air conditioners as much as possible, 
among other things In the case of smog, the individual contribution of using an air 
conditioner is not, in isolation, a morally blameworthy act This is why holding each 
responsible only for what she does will not capture the nature of collective harms 72 
Isaacs briefly explores using a non-reductive account of collective responsibility, 
claiming that the collective could bear responsibility in such cases She argues against this 
conclusion, stating that if individuals are not implicated in the harm, then they will not be 
motivated to act differently, and this will leave collectives, but not individuals, 
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responsible Isaacs says, " we fail to capture the extent and nature of the wrong if we 
do not consider the individual act in the context of the acts of others "74 To achieve the 
collective context, Isaacs suggests a re-description of action that is performed in 
collective contexts In the case of genocide, instead of describing individual actions as 
"murder" or, perhaps, "mass murders" we should describe them as "contributions to 
genocide" or "participation in genocide " Isaacs argues that the case for such descnptions 
is stronger in the case of genocide than smog, because often perpetrators of genocide 
share an intention (to commit genocide, in some way) whereas m the case of those that 
create smog, they do not75 
Isaacs' use of genocide as an example is limiting While genocide is defined as the 
deliberate extermination of a group (national, racial, political or cultural), we commonly 
use it with little emphasis on the degree of deliberation While members of the 
perpetrators of genocide (typically some kind of leader) may be acting systematically to 
achieve a goal, the many members of the collective are often lacking such deliberation 
(e g the Rwandan genocide contained many elements of both organization and hystencal 
mob behaviour ) Thus, it is too simplistic to say genocide is performed by a group, 
against another, with the goal of extermination While it is important to determine 
individual responsibility in such cases, the "interesting" cases of responsibility will be 
that of the Hutus who did not participate, the radio commentators, or even the 
international community, and not those who actually wielded the weapons We know that 
the collective is morally blameworthy, but who is in the collective9 If we restrict the 
collective to those who wielded weapons, then even if we cannot determine individual 
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responsibility in such cases, the individuals are hardly without blame Individual agents 
will be morally blameworthy for their individual acts of murder The cases I am 
examining in this dissertation, in particular those of large unstructured harms, are cases 
where without the collective being responsible the individuals within the collective will 
not be responsible (which more accurately descnbes the "interesting" cases noted above) 
This shows in Isaacs's example of smog, but she admits that her theory is weaker m that 
case 
Isaacs' theory of responsibility is heavily dependent on the intention of agents In 
truth, this is a very individualistic account Isaacs speaks of a third group, which exist 
between perpetrators of genocide and creators of smog The third group is a, " well-
defined, cohesive group that harms without intending to " Isaacs concludes that in the 
case of the third kind of collective we may need, " a different basis for responsibility, 
perhaps collective negligence " To alter the theory significantly for such groups 
requires much more defence Like I argued regarding the changes in Kutz's theory of 
collective responsibility in Chapter 1, such changes require explanation From one 
perspective, Isaacs theory begins to look like a very good fit for cases of genocide, but a 
bad fit for smog and not even intended to cover other kinds of collectives 77 
Isaacs makes the following point in defence of her account, 
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 Isaacs agrees with Kutz's claim that acting with intention to participate in a group act is 
a sufficient basis for responsibility She differs from Kutz by increasing the normative 
weight individual contnbutions to collective acts can have by descnbing these acts in the 
larger context as a contribution to collective harm This move will be more effective in 
cases where the harm is intended by participants (genocide) than m cases where it is not 
(smog) (Isaacs 183) However, while Isaacs does not argue this, the strength of the latter 
case may depend on the epistemic conditions in play if smog is the known consequence 
of certain acts, then performing those acts could be perceived as displaying an intention to 
participate 
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Agents of course think of themselves as morally innocent if they are just driving to 
work But once they begin to think of their actions as contributions to a serious 
health and environmental problem, the actions take on a moral dimension they did 
not have before 78 
While there remain problems in Isaacs account when supplying the kind of theory of 
collective responsibility I am looking for, one that can apply to all types of collectives, 
this characterisation of collective responsibility is important Recall from Chapter 4 my 
discussion of Heidi E Grasswick's "lndividuals-in-community" There is something 
important about describing actions collectively, and the impact this will have on our 
attributions of moral responsibility Isaacs concludes that in most cases individuals will 
not be responsible for collective harms, but that they are responsible for their 
contributions, and such contributions must be understood in a certain way 79 It may be 
the case that no one is responsible for the collective harm, but that individuals do bear 
responsibility for their contributions Therefore Isaacs will hold agents responsible for 
"killing as a contribution to genocide", or "using an air conditioner as a contribution to 
the creation of smog" The individual acts of agents include the collective context in 
which they occur, and this context should shape what, exactly, we hold agents responsible 
for For Isaacs collectives cannot be collectively responsible, and even if they could it 
could not reduce to the individual Instead, attributions of individual responsibility should 
capture and include the collective context in which they occur 
I have examined theorists who attempt to reduce collective responsibility to the 
individual Kutz's complicity principle explains the move from collective to individual 
responsibility, but the exact attribution of responsibility is not defined While it is 
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important to note whether I am the inclusive or exclusive author of the action in question, 
this distinction alone does not provide enough information McGary emphasizes 
responsibility for disassociating from the group in cases where we are discussing 
responsibility for practices or attitudes It will be most applicable in cases of systemic 
social problems, and it provides a clear path of responsibility for individuals What 
disassociation may require complicates this issue, but it is interesting and I will return to 
it in Chapter 6 
Gildert proposed interpreting responsibility that results from collective action as 
twofold responsibility for your individual action, and an equal portion of responsibility to 
be shared with all members for the collective action This is also a clear method for 
determining responsibility And in the end, as I will return to later in this chapter, a 
simple method will be best A few problems remain for this theory, in particular the 
import of collective responsibility, and whether agents can be held responsible twice for 
the same action 
Isaacs emphasizes the importance of the intentions of individuals, and causal 
connection (it is not enough to simply intend) when determining responsibility, and she 
proposes that simply re-descnbing individual actions as contnbutions to collective actions 
will capture responsibility for collective harms Isaacs aim is to show the moral 
significance of certain actions that are, when viewed alone, harmless, and yet when part 
of a collective act are harmful Although there are a few problems with Isaacs' account 
(most importantly that it cannot apply to all the collectives I am examining, 1 e smog, and 
is not intended to provide a reductive account), the idea of viewing individual actions as 
participation in a collective is a theme that I have discussed previously, and will return to 
in the remainder of this dissertation I began this section with a quote from Lewis that the, 
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"guilt of each is strictly proportionate to his part in the joint undertaking " None of the 
theones examined above provided this While in the literature I found that Lewis was not 
alone in his request, what I did not find was a method he would have been satisfied with 
The option of re-describing individual action as participating in the collective holds the 
most promise for portioning blame accurately and fairly, and further, intention will also 
play an important role in my theory For now I set aside the details which I will return to 
in Chapter 6 Next I will move on to examine the role character can play in attnbutions of 
individual responsibility for collective harms 
5.6 Character-based Responsibility and Reducibility 
In Chapter 3 I introduced a number of theones for individual moral responsibility 
that included some connection to the agent's character, a theme earned forward from my 
discussion of Kutz in Chapter 1 Recall that when Kutz wants to cover the case of large, 
unstructured collectives he introduces two connected qualifications for accountability 
quasi-participatory intentions and symbolic or character based accountability In Chapter 
1 I challenged the introduction of new conditions when moving to the case of large, 
unstructured collectives, and showed that the account Kutz was using at the level of large, 
unstructured collectives did not work in the case of any other kind of collective 
(especially those that were small and structured) I argued that both conditions were too 
"loose" for what they were being used for In this section I return to the idea that 
character may have a role to play in attnbutions of responsibility I will start by returning 
to Kutz's account of character, and examining it in more depth While Kutz's two 
conditions do not, alone, solve the problems that anse with attnbutions of collective 
responsibility, they may form part of an answer 
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Kutz identifies that while it may be hard for agents in a collective to see their 
collective involvement, it is often clear to their victims And in cases of unstructured 
harms, he says, 
[they] share an objectively determinate and highly interdependent way of life For 
the socioeconomic structures noted by the victims are neither self-originating nor 
self-sustaining They emerge, rather, from unreflective confluences of habit and 
sentiment, tacit agreements upon, for example, the value of private transportation 
Indeed, to the extent that the offending socioeconomic structures are social, they 
must arise from the motivations of individual agents, for all social activity is 
individual activity (emphasis mine) 
Kutz here is defining the collective nature of agents, and, as we see in the final sentence, 
ensuring that responsibility for such collectives rests fully with individual agents He 
further explains that individuals do not belong to either group X or group Y, but that 
agents inhabit many groups of different sizes that overlap in terms of shared meaning and 
political identification Recall from Chapter 4 Lynn Hankmson Nelson's characterization 
of epistemological communities This description would hold for Kutz's collectives as 
well 
Kutz invokes the perspective of victims in his theory Recall from Chapter 1, and 
earlier m this chapter, if we consider harm from the perspective of the victims the harm, 
and the group, is often easy to identify Taking such a position allows us to quickly 
abstract from the concerns of individual perpetrators who may seem to have lacked 
control, or have limited knowledge, etc By moving to the victims perspective we are 
really doing two things, we are acknowledging the role of the relationship between 
perpetrators and victims, and we are moving to a more objective (although not entirely 
objective) standpoint From this perspective the participation of agents in a collective 
harm becomes clearer, even in cases of large, unstructured harms I would argue that we 
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should not move to the victim's perspective when determining responsibility, but rather 
that this perspective needs to always be in the background of our accounts 
Kutz says that collectives that orient agents in a social space (for example, 
cultures or nations) can be used as a foundation on which to build structures of 
responsibility This allows that even in the absence of a, " discrete identifiable collective 
act whose unwanted consequence is the harm in question, agents can think of themselves 
as participants in a collective venture " 82 Focus on participation connects agents to even 
loosely structured collectives Kutz describes the example of car drivers (as contributors 
to pollution) 
we are asked to reflect on the interactions that already, concretely, structure our 
lives Thinking of the damage that I and my fellow American drivers do confirms 
me in a regional identity I already hold Against this background, we can each 
foster a sense of accountability for what we do together83 
While so far this strategy only shows that individual agents can see themselves as 
members of even loosely structured or large unstructured collectives, this is an important 
step Above I discussed Gilbert's distinction between collectives and aggregates, claiming 
that collectives had a structure, like a social group which, under my definition, would 
exclude large, unstructured collectives Gilbert contrasted such groups with aggregates, 
and provided the example of "the global population of people named 'Susan'" Gilbert 
concluded that collectives, and not aggregates were applicable to the discussion of 
collective responsibility My large unstructured collectives fit into neither category 
However, with Kutz's argument here about a shared identity among even extremely 
unstructured groups, for example the group of American car drivers, shows that large 
unstructured collectives are not the "mere aggregates" that Gilbert sought to dismiss 
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There is something different between the population of people named "Susan", and the 
example of American car drivers And the difference is that being named "Susan" is a 
description, and American Car drivers share a culture, an experience and a causal 
contribution to an identified harm 
This leads into Kutz's discussion of symbolic or character-based accountability 
Kutz says 
The cases of facilitation and environmental damage invite a similar form of 
subjunctive accountability In overdetermmed contexts, agents can have reason to 
refrain from participating in a harm, not because of the relation between this choice 
and an actual outcome, but because of what the choice symbolizes in their 
characters and commitments 84 
Here Kutz begins to hold agents accountable for who they are Participation by agents in 
harm causing collectives demonstrate their concern, or lack of concern, regarding the 
overall collective harm Kutz clanfies that agents do not need to believe that by changing 
their behaviour it will lead to others following (or stop the harm itself) The intent of their 
action expresses meaning about who they are 
I want to turn briefly here to recall John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's 
account of individual moral responsibility from Chapter 3 They argue that alternatives 
need not be available to the agent in order for the agent to meet the control condition for 
moral responsibility This theme returns in the defence of character-based conditions for 
collective responsibility The agent does not need to be able to stop the act, or even 
disassociate from the group As long as the agent is acting in line with her desires, she is 
responsible If the agent does not want to participate and finds she cannot leave, then her 
responsibility is mitigated 
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Kutz intends to offer motivation to change behaviour, not just to provide a sound 
theoretical foundation for collective responsibility For Kutz, holding agents responsible 
for who they choose to be, in terms of collective harms, has the benefit of encouraging 
agents to act differently, even when acting differently may have some cost to the agent, 
and will not solve the problem alone Kutz hopes that if enough agents are encouraged by 
this line of reasoning they will stop acting m the harm contributing way, and then the 
harm itself may stop While one person changing their driving habits will have no impact 
on the environment, and will be costly to the individual, once there is enough people 
making the change, society and businesses will support the change, which may encourage 
more agents to change, and then the harm can cease 
In Chapter 3 many of the writers discussed the character of the agent in their 
accounts of individual moral responsibility Aristotle believes that ignorance can mitigate 
responsibility, as long as the agent regrets the harm after the fact, thus indicating that with 
full knowledge they would never have performed it Peter Strawson writes about the 
importance of a "good will" and how we interpret the actions of others towards us and 
provide a moral evaluation based on the intention behind the act And this theme was 
continued in both Larry Mary and Jan Narveson When speaking of many large, 
unstructured collectives, what allows the collective to act will be the shared attitudes 
among members And, when we are afraid that agents are being held responsible for the 
actions of another, we can also suggest that they disavow the actions of the group, 
breaking at the level of intention, or character 
While I argued against Kutz's use of character based accountability in Chapter 1,1 
do believe that this is a very powerful tool that can be used in cases of responsibility, both 
collective and individual What needs to happen is that character must be understood in a 
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certain way, and it must be incorporated into the theory appropriately I will return to 
this task in Chapter 6, here I want to discuss how character-based responsibility can 
provide help when it comes to a successful account of reductive collective responsibility 
There are two important aspects of character as a source for reductive collective 
responsibility The first has to do with the nature of the collective As I have discussed in 
Chapter 1 I am looking for a theory of collective responsibility that will apply to all 
collectives, from small and highly structured, to the large unstructured collectives, which 
include that which is responsible for climate change Many of the theories discussed in 
this dissertation, and many of the theories discussed in this chapter, do not include large 
unstructured collectives in their accounts By requiring interaction, common goals and 
shared intentions among members, many of these theories cannot explain or include large 
unstructured collectives While I would not argue that it can be used in isolation, 
character-based accountability can cover cases of large, unstructured collectives and cases 
of small, structured collectives In fact, as I have argued, it is also common m accounts of 
individual moral responsibility 
Character-based accountability is centered on responsibility for who an agent is A 
major part of this in the case of collective responsibility is demonstrated by who one 
chooses to associate with (and to a lesser extent other social actions like who you vote 
for, or what you buy, etc ) This is the second important contribution from character-based 
responsibility By measuring responsibility based on association, we can, in a sense, hold 
agents responsible for their intentions, and their character While we want to say that the 
morally good person is morally good, and thinks good thoughts about others, etc , in the 
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" Chapter 4) This is an example of a more "appropriate" place to incorporate character as 
part of responsibility 
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case of collective responsibility we can look at whom that agent associates him or herself 
with Are they a member of a fraternity9 A neo-Nazi group9 A chanty9 These 
associations are outward manifestations of character 
This has two further benefits The first is that association and, on the flipside, 
disassociation, are often easy This circumvents concerns about control as discussed in 
Chapter 3 Now, once again, I am not suggesting that a character only account is going to 
work, but a character element will be important to a successful theory Character-based 
responsibility provides a satisfying way to reduce to the individual Depending on how 
detailed the evaluation of association is, it could provide basic responsibility for 
membership, or a more complex responsibility for different levels of association (leader, 
follower, etc ) Character alone is not enough as there is a difference between association 
with those that do the bad deed, and participating in it But it is a good start 
The final benefit of a character-based account comes from how it acknowledges 
the social dimension of agents, without making radical changes In Isaacs' theory she 
argues for a re-description of events from "the single murder of X", to "a contribution to 
genocide" However, if we are to look at the character of agents who associate 
themselves with a collective that is responsible for genocide, then no re-descnption is 
necessary Re-descnption may accurately capture the elements of an action and it is an 
active and interesting debate whether re-descnption or character is an easier and more 
intuitive way for agents to see themselves in the world, or possibly the best would be a 
combination of them both 
In this section I discussed that a character-based account of responsibility has an 
important place in a theory of collective responsibility, and that it can, as well, explain 
how to reduce responsibility under certain circumstances In particular character can play 
an important role in claims about responsibility for association/disassociation Larry May 
in Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance of changing your attitudes and disavowing the 
actions of the collective In this chapter McGary in his condition (2) includes the 
importance of disassociating from the group act, arguing that by not disassociating the 
agent performed a morally wrong act More needs to be said about both character and 
association (what this includes) and I will return to this topic in Chapter 6 when I examine 
what a successful theory of collective responsibility will look like In the remainder of 
this chapter I return to the debate between reductive and non-reductive accounts 
5.7 Argument for Reducibility Revisited 
In this chapter I have examined the many aspects of reductive and non-reductive 
theories of collective responsibility - outlining some of the possibilities and issues that 
theories on either side of the debate can and cannot address The emphasis in this chapter 
has been on reductive accounts, although in part this is simply because a successful 
reductive account requires more theory than a successful non-reductive account A 
successful theory must include a defence of both its reductive nature and method From 
the above discussion a number of requirements have emerged for collective 
responsibility The first is that, as per Chapter 3, individuals are responsible for the harm 
they do This is integral to cases of individual moral responsibility, and as we are still 
speaking of moral responsibility, this cannot be forgotten Second, collectives, whether 
large or small, structured or not, can achieve what individuals cannot Collectives are 
capable of actions that are more than the sum of the actions of their individual members 
These first two requirements are the horns of the dilemma that creates the debate between 
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reductive and non-reductive accounts Both are indisputable, and yet, on first glance, they 
are also in conflict with one another 
The third requirement is that collective action, especially as the collective grows 
in size, is not easily reducible, and the fourth point is that a successful theory needs to be 
not only practical, but also theoretically sound These four requirements make up the 
framework from which a successful theory must emerge 
Non-reductive accounts have a serious problem they do not hold individuals 
responsible, only the collective is responsible as no single agent falls below what was 
expected of them While this allows for collective actions to be more than the sum of the 
individual actions of its members, it fails in terms of the accounts of individual moral 
responsibility discussed in Chapter 3 I argue that non-reductive accounts make strong 
arguments about what must exist in a successful account, but that they are not themselves 
successful 
A reductive account is not without its own problems, but these are issues that can 
be worked through A hybrid account can provide great explanatory power Here I mean 
hybrid in that it is a reductive account that incorporates many ideas from non-reductive 
accounts, and not an account that sits in the middle of the two Kutz charactenses his own 
theory as a hybrid account because he argues that collectives do act, and can cause harm 
But in the end, responsibility must be understood as something which belongs to the 
individual 
As examined above, Kutz's method for determining such responsibility is lacking 
He differentiates between inclusive and exclusive authorship of the action, but the 
resulting application is unclear Isaacs challenges Kutz in regards to this description, 
asking whether there is a morally relevant difference between the two kinds of authorship, 
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and arguing that in the end, Kutz himself claims that there is not (because he has already 
argued that causal connection to the act will not be relevant) Isaacs charactenses Kutz as 
leaving ascriptions of responsibility to be determined on a case by case basis 87 
Isaacs argues that her theory is more sound than Kutz's because it avoids these 
problems, and simply descnbes the individuals act as part of a collective whole As I have 
argued above, this is not enough But I do believe that this is the nght direction for a 
successful theory of reductive collective responsibility 
So what will a hybnd account look like that will incorporate the requirements that 
I have outlined in this section? This question will be answered in full in the next chapter 
What I will say here is that a successful account will be reductive, because otherwise the 
account fails the test of responsibility as set out in Chapter 3 Reductive theones of 
collective responsibility are theones about responsibility Non-reductive accounts of 
responsibility are descnptions of the world at large And when we consider attempts by 
Isaacs and others to take into consideration the collective context in which we act, fears 
about loss of agent control and inability to account for collective actions that are more 
than the sum of the individual actions of which they consist, disappear 
5.8 Conclusion 
By examining reductive and non-reductive accounts of collective responsibility, 
the key features of collective responsibility have been revealed I have argued for a 
reductive account of collective responsibility because it can maintain more of these key 
features than a non-reductive account can I have looked at Kutz's theory, which he 
positions as "weakly individualistic" The ability of his theory to capture individual 
87Isaacs(2006)181 
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responsibility, while also acknowledging the social nature of action, is very appealing and 
intuitive However, it lacks details when it comes to actually determining responsibility, 
and it seems that Kutz in the end is more concerned with changing group behaviour and 
providing a practical solution to collective harms than providing a sound philosophical 
theory Further, Kutz cannot address the problem of large, unstructured harms 
A successful theory of collective responsibility that can cover all collectives, and 
explain responsibility in the case of climate change will have to do better than this, but 
Kutz's theory provides an important step in the nght direction In Chapter 6 I will defend 
my theory of collective responsibility that will address the concerns of the previous 
chapters 
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Chapter 6: A New Theory of Collective Responsibility 
6.1 Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to propose a new theory of collective responsibility that 
will be able to cover the case of large, unstructured harms In the previous five chapters I 
have explored various theories for collective responsibility I have argued that they are 
unable to address the case of large, unstructured harms satisfactorily, and that this is a 
deficit that must be addressed I have examined accounts of individual moral 
responsibility focusing on their conditions for responsibility to test whether their 
conditions could be useful in a collective context Many of the theories I have examined 
have been inadequate to the task I identified of accounting for the participation of agents 
in harm causing collectives It is this task that I turn to in this chapter 
I will begin this chapter by returning to the definitions of collectives from Chapter 
1, and add a definition for a large, unstructured collective (which was previously 
missing) I will propose a causal and epistemic condition that is based on accounts of 
individual moral responsibility but that addresses the concerns raised in this dissertation 
Additionally, in this chapter I aim to provide an account of collective responsibility that is 
largely reducible to the individual such that individual agents who are members of harm 
causing collectives will be individually responsible I intend to propose a theory that 
retains the nature of the collective, but that can tell us what individuals within that 
collective are responsible for I will be addressing the case of climate change only bnefly 
in this chapter, and leave a full examination of that key case for the dissertation's 
conclusion 
263 
6.2 Collectives Revisited 
In Chapter 1 I presented definitions for a variety of collectives I divided 
collectives into small structured (two people painting a house), large structured (a 
company producing a product), small unstructured (strangers helping someone who has 
fallen), semi-structured (a nation waning with another nation), and finally large, 
unstructured collectives (the population that is causing climate change ) For each 
collective, excluding the last one, I was able to examine the elements of the collective and 
analyse the relationship between the collective and accounts of responsibility, both 
collective and individual A few key elements distinguish large, unstructured collectives 
from the other types of collectives, most noticeably a lack of a clear decision-making 
structure and unknown membership conditions While I have offered examples of large 
unstructured collectives throughout the previous five chapters, I have not yet defined 
them This is the task I turn to in this section 
In the literature on collective responsibility little work has been done to discuss 
large, unstructured collectives Margaret Gilbert has "hand waved" at the concept in much 
the same way that I did in Chapter 1 when I said that large, unstructured collectives 
would cover all the cases not covered thus far However, every action is not, ultimately, a 
collective action, and so "large, unstructured collective" cannot be a catch-all term that 
describes all actions that do not fit into the categories we have defined Gilbert 
distinguished between collectives which can be described as a plural subject and mere 
aggregates of people who share characteristics but do not have a decision-making ability 
or possess the other qualities of a plural subject An example of an aggregate would be 
the population of people named "Susan " While I am not defending Gilbert's account, I 
do agree that there is an important difference between collectives and the population of 
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people named "Susan", and this is why it is necessary to define large, unstructured 
collectives as opposed to leaving the definition as something that covers all remaining 
cases Further, a definition will be useful in the analysis of the causal and epistemic 
conditions and reducibihty that is to follow 
In order to capture the nature of large, unstructured collectives that have been 
discussed in the dissertation I offer a definition below I am focusing on the membership 
conditions for collectives because the purpose of this chapter, and this dissertation, is to 
determine what collective responsibility means for individuals So I have structured the 
definition to be used by an individual to determine whether they are a member of a large, 
unstructured collective 
Large Unstructured Collectives: An agent is a member of a large, unstructured 
collective if and only if she participates in the collective action by doing any one of the 
following 
(1) Reciprocally provide solidarity and receive identification (including public 
membership), or 
(2) Causally contribute to a collective outcome, 
and 
(3) She is not participating m a recognised activity by combining action and language 
to publicly distance herself from, and denounce the actions of, the collective 
The intention of the above definition is to capture the nature of large, unstructured 
collectives, and further, to distinguish them from Gilbert's "aggregates" To clanfy, I am 
not suggesting that if an agent meets the above description they are responsible for the 
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actions of the collective This definition is only intended to take the first step and see 
whether an agent is a member of the collective In a sense, this determines their eligibility 
for responsibility In order to determine responsibility we will have to apply the causal 
and epistemic conditions which I will discuss later in this chapter 
To begin, membership in a collective is determined by participation in the 
collective act The collective action at issue here is the act from which the responsibility 
results This would include individual actions that support a racist culture, but exclude 
actions that are unconnected to the collective harm, like riding a bike Often in the case 
of large, unstructured harms the reason the collective is viewed as a collective will be 
shared participation in the harm-causing act This claim may seem reminiscent of 
Chnstopher Kutz's proposal of a "participatory intention", but key differences distinguish 
it The act of participation is defined by the two conditions in the above definition For 
Kutz, participation was connected to intention to participate (or intention of the end goal 
of the collective, depending on which collective you were considering) However, as has 
been pointed out, inefficacious participation poses a problem for Kutz's theory It allows 
for group membership to be bestowed for merely thinking you are a member Recall the 
example of Ellen from Chapter 1 In the example Ellen prays for the protestors in Iran 
every day Intuitively, without being part of any recognised collective this isolated action 
would not make Ellen a member of the relevant collective, and therefore she will not be 
eligible for responsibility (Note this assumes prayer has no causal impact)' 
A similar case may be one where Ellen drops a couple of dollars into a can when 
walking down the street, and the can indicates the money is going to the Iranian cause 
Here, while a couple of dollars will not have a huge impact on the events m Iran, it is a 
causal contribution This action would include Ellen m the collective 
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The first kind of participation that is appropriate for attributing membership m a 
collective is to reciprocally provide solidarity and receive identification This includes 
being publicly a member of the group To be publicly a member means that somewhere 
there is a list of members This includes cases of citizenship (your citizenship documents, 
passport etc, list you as a Canadian) This could also include membership lists, for 
example in a club, on a team or employee lists To be publicly a member relates to an 
action undertaken by the agent themselves, so they cannot become a member unwillingly 
or unknowingly I cannot include you on the tennis team by adding your name to the team 
list without you knowing (at least not legitimately) This is a common form of the first 
condition because the public membership of agents has a large impact on their identity, be 
it their job or their citizenship, among other possible memberships In such cases the 
agent's identity is partly created in response to such membership, as are the identities of 
others with the same membership status 
The condition of reciprocally providing solidarity and receiving identification also 
includes identification gamed in less regulated ways This condition is intended to capture 
the less formal groups of which we are members from which we receive a sense of 
identity, including family, friends, groups based on age, on gender, on ethnicity, and 
based on interests, etc Not all identifications are relevant It only includes those groups 
whose identity you contribute to For example, while Ellen may receive a sense of 
identity from the protestors and their cause, because they do not reciprocally receive such 
identification from Ellen (they do not know about Ellen) Ellen fails to meet condition (1) 
Participation includes a level of interaction between members This will distinguish 
between those who identify with a particular ethnic group, and (a) have regular 
interactions with people of the same ethnicity from which they receive a sense of identity, 
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from (b) those who make claims about their ethnicity from many generations ago, but 
have no interaction with others in order to maintain that identity A benign characteristic 
(e g the way you look) may cause you to associate with others with the same 
characteristic, but it is the association, not the characteristic, that is relevant to this 
discussion For example, Sri Lankans who participated in the protests in the summer of 
2009 in Toronto were a collective even though there was no specific membership list, but 
the group "Sri Lankans" is not a collective The characteristic of being Sri Lankan is not 
sufficient to create a collective 
The second condition rests on simple causal contribution to a collective harm 
This type of participation does not require intention and makes no claims about the type 
of agent it is referring to I reiterate that meeting the conditions for membership in a 
collective does not determine responsibility for the actions of the collective, just 
eligibility for responsibility However, it seems to be the case that if an agent is 
performing an act that is causally contributing to a collective outcome, then they are a 
member of that collective, even if they are not morally responsible for any actions I 
include this collective, even though I believe that occasionally members will not meet the 
necessary conditions to be held responsible (in particular the epistemic condition), 
because there is a sense in which such actions are collective, and it provides an important 
explanatory tool in the case of large actions 
What does it mean to have causally contributed to a collective action9 This is an 
important question because when we remove intention from causal contribution we can 
be left wondering what collective action we might currently, and unknowingly, be 
participating in at this moment While unknown (or unknowable) causal contnbution will 
not meet the epistemic condition, and so will not be lead to moral responsibility, there is 
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something important about being part of a collective act even if agents are not morally 
responsible The problem arises m how we define causal contribution In Chapter 1 I 
critiqued Kutz's theory and argued that if there was a team of house painters whose 
business was helped by a lemonade stand, according to Kutz, those running the lemonade 
stand would be part of the collective of house painters Under my account the owners of 
the lemonade stand will be in the larger collective This is not a problem In the case of 
the lemonade stand their decision to set up in that location has affected the success of the 
painting business Once again the young children will not be morally responsible for this 
outcome, but in an important sense they are participating in the outcome 
The above example may not seem contentious, but there is an ambiguity when it 
comes to causal contribution, a term I have not defined For a theory of collective 
responsibility it is important to note that the only causal connections that will lead to 
moral responsibility will be those that also can be (or are) known by the agent While it 
might be true that by typing these words I have started a chain of events that will lead to 
some unforeseen harm, because it is unforeseen I would never be morally responsible for 
my contribution (unless my failure to know was somehow my fault) For the purposes of 
this chapter I will focus on the primary outcomes of the actions of individual agents 
Primary outcomes are those that happen fairly close to the action of the agent themselves 
It does not need to be the immediate outcome, but it cannot be at the end of a large causal 
chain For example, if I were to hire only employees of my own race this will lead 
directly to a lack of diversity in my work place, and secondly promotes a racist culture 
Another outcome of racist hiring practices could be that the racist culture in Country X 
altered immigration in another country, Country Y, and caused two ethnic groups to live 
together (in Country Y) which led to a violent civil war This outcome is not directly 
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linked to the actions of my hiring practices While my focus is on the causal chains that 
are fairly direct, I will not argue that it would be incorrect to draw a connection between 
the acts in one country to the civil war in another Agents will very rarely meet the 
epistemic condition m such circumstances, but I leave the details of the causal condition 
open to debate in specific cases because we may want further dialogue on whether a 
specific collective should or should not include certain agents 
The final condition in the definition for membership in a large, unstructured 
collective is vitally important It may be the case that an agent meets one (or both) of the 
two possible conditions to determine membership, and yet we still want to distinguish 
them from other members of the collective While it may seem that this belongs in a 
discussion of whether an agent is morally responsible or not, I include it here because 
membership in a collective means something in particular, and in certain very specific 
cases we may not want to even include certain agents who meet the conditions in the 
collective itself To explain, being perceived as a member of a collective strengthens the 
collective in its pursuits I would argue that the strength of a collective can, in some cases, 
be the ingredient that allows the collective to perform the collective act This is 
reminiscent of collective action problems that often plague situations of collective 
responsibility For example, I am more likely to covertly water my lawn during a lawn 
watenng ban if I see other neighbours doing it, or see evidence (lush lawns) of it My 
belief that many of my neighbours are watenng their lawns makes it more acceptable for 
me to do so Thus, the perception that many of my neighbours are members of a group 
that is involved in covert lawn watenng has motivated my action The flip side to this is 
that publicly through action and language denouncing the group action will have an effect 
as well If, as I am sneakily watenng my lawn a neighbour comes up and explains that 
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there is a watenng ban, that her own lawn is suffering as a result, and that I am causing 
problems by ignoring it, etc , then the collective takes on a different appearance in my 
mmd, and even if I keep watenng my grass, I know that my neighbour is not a member of 
the collective Publicly distancmg oneself from the collective through language and 
actions may, in some cases, succeed in doing just that 
The first two conditions work independently, such that if an agent meets either 
condition they would be considered a member of the collective (as long as they do not 
meet (3)) Many agents may meet both conditions, such as a member of the KKK who 
attacks those deemed targets by his group He is both participating in a collective, and 
directly causing harm The conditions are intended to explain what participation includes 
Condition (1) captures the usually problematic case of participation in a collective where 
the agent does not make a causal contnbution to the collective goal This avoids the 
thorny discussion of over-determined harms from Kutz that I discussed in Chapter 1 
Actions are not over-determined because they are not the sum of individual agent actions, 
but rather of agent participation Additionally, this description can address the cases of 
harm that look less like actions and more like the result of attitudes in a culture In the 
case of systemic social prejudice we are not restncting responsibility to only those with a 
causal connection to the harm The culture that demeans people of a certain skin colour 
perpetrates psychological damage to those people targeted Such systemic social 
problems are not the result of a hundred, or a thousand people, saying or doing something 
demeaning to a person They are rather done through the creation of a certain kind of 
hostile environment If we rely on causal contribution alone we will be ignonng many 
key cases of collective harm, particularly at the level of large, unstructured collectives 
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Using my definition of membership in large, unstructured collectives such problems are 
avoided 
6.3 The Causal Condition 
In order to determine responsibility in the case of collective harms, I will propose 
two conditions, a causal condition and an epistemic condition These are not conditions 
that determine whether we have a case of collective responsibility, but instead are 
conditions to determine whether agents who have been deemed to be members of a 
collective are responsible This approach is importantly distinct from that taken in the 
theories of Kutz, Gilbert, and many others working in the field of collective 
responsibility Most wnters treat the collective as an agent (collectivize the conditions for 
individual moral responsibility - see Chapter 1) What I propose is a theory that 
understands individual responsibility when individuals are members of collectives 
Individual agents are members of collectives, and collectives have the means to 
accomplish tasks that individuals cannot, but, the focus needs to remain on the individual 
agent What is important is that the individual agent's responsibility is going to have to be 
understood in a certain way 
The two conditions that follow are versions of the conditions normally applied to 
agents in cases of individual moral responsibility I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 what 
these conditions look like in traditional accounts, and what modifications and 
interpretations already exist that might be of use in the case of collective responsibility I 
find convincing the arguments that traditional accounts of mdividual moral responsibility 
cannot address, without modification, the situation of individuals within a collective 
context Thus, if we use these theories without modification then most agents who are 
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determined to be members of collectives will not be responsible The common move in 
the literature is to invent new conditions or collectivize the individual conditions for 
moral responsibility, I have shown that such moves are problematic What I propose is a 
revision of traditional causal and epistemic conditions, including the modifications 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 The conditions that I present will apply to individuals who 
have been identified as members m collectives The causal condition addresses the 
concerns of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and the epistemic condition is a 
modification of George Sher's proposal These conditions apply to collective 
responsibility by including a focus on agent participation It is possible that these 
conditions could easily apply in cases of individual moral responsibility as well I will not 
be arguing in this dissertation for their use as such, but there is nothing immediately 
barring that possibility 
The Causal Condition An agent has met the causal condition for collective responsibility 
if and only if she causes (through participation) the act in question to happen This act 
1 Must not be coerced, and 
2 Must not be against the agent's desires (or character) 
The causal condition will only be relevant when the agent has already been determined to 
be a member of a collective The use of "through participation" parallels this same term in 
the definition of large, unstructured collectives Participation includes any of the items 
listed from that definition 
The first condition, "must not be coerced" is intended to acknowledge that we do 
not hold agents responsible for their actions when such actions are not considered free A 
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coerced action is one where one agent is using another agent as a tool to their own end, 
and, justifiably, responsibility should fall upon the agent doing the coercing, not the one 
being coerced I have included in the definition of the causal condition "causes the act in 
question to happen" in order to include cases where an agent causes another to act For 
example, a ball rolls through a china shop and knocks over a number of vases 
Traditionally we may look to the agent who dropped the ball because of a causal chain 
that ended in the broken vases What I am concerned with here is not the causal chain in a 
physics sense, but rather what caused the action to happen Here the question is, why did 
the agent drop the ball'? If it was because a second agent threatened them, then the threat 
is what began the chain It is the second agent that caused the bouncing ball and the 
broken vases to happen I included, "to happen" to direct attention beyond a strictly 
mechanical understanding of action 
The second condition is more complicated than the first It is intended to capture 
the control condition that I discussed in Chapter 3 where Fischer and Ravizza required 
that agents have control over what they caused, but only guidance control, not regulative 
control To review, this meant that agents did not need to have an alternative course of 
action available, but their action did need to be in line with their desires It had to be the 
case that they had wanted to participate, for example, even if not participating or a certain 
outcome not occurring was not possible An agent who tries to not participate or stop an 
2
 This could also include inaction (e g failing to prevent something from happening when 
you could have easily done so ) I have excluded a discussion of inaction above because it 
deserves a lengthy treatment, and, at some points, will seem to suggest there could be an 
obligation to perform collective solutions See Virginia Held (1970) "Can A Random 
Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible9" The Journal of Philosophy 68 14 
274 
outcome and cannot has demonstrated that they do not have even guidance control over 
their actions and therefore would not meet the causal condition 3 
The second condition is worded in the negative to capture what will, in fact, be an 
excusing condition when it comes to responsibility in collective contexts Instead of 
looking to see whether an action or outcome is in line with the desires of an agent or in 
line with their character, the focus is on whether or not it is against the desires or 
character of the agent To make this condition a positive condition, that it must be in line 
with an agent's desires, another addition is required about what knowledge the agent 
possessed However, since we are looking only at the causal condition (and I will turn to 
the epistemic condition next) I do not want to speak about knowledge here Instead the 
focus is on whether the agent is mvolved in something that is against their own desires or 
character In a sense this points to the possibility of something akin to coercion 
happening 
This second condition deserves a lot of attention, so I will begin with an example 
The example from Fischer and Ravizza was that of Sam and the mayor, and the question 
was if Sam shot the mayor, but had he decided not to, Jack would have triggered 
something in his bram to cause him to shoot the mayor, is Sam responsible for shooting 
the mayor? Was he free in the relevant sense9 The key m this example was that the mayor 
would have been shot by Sam either way In Chapter 3 I introduced the example of Bella, 
To clarify, the causal condition requires that the action not be against any of the agent's 
desires (first and second order) For example, you may think that violence is not the right 
reaction to a verbal insult, however, when msulted you become enraged and hit the person 
who insulted you While this is against your desire to avoid violence, it is still in line with 
your desires An example of an action that would not be in line with your desires would if 
you did not want to hit the person, and someone grabbed your arm and hit them (however, 
if you did want to hit them, then it would be in line with your desires, although you would 
not have caused it) 
275 
a citizen of Country X, a country that is deeply divided along racial lines In the example 
Bella is in the more "powerful" race She has witnessed racist acts but has neither overly 
participated in or mitigated any 
According to the definition of a large, unstructured collective, Bella will be 
considered a participant in the offending collective (she is seen as a member of the 
responsible "powerful" race, and does not through language and action distance herself) 
The critique most often levelled against theories of collective responsibility is that Bella 
cannot control whether there is a racist climate or not in Country X However, if instead 
we look at the second condition in the causal condition (assuming, of course, that Bella is 
not being coerced into participation), we can see her participation perhaps more clearly 
Bella is choosing to witness the acts but not act herself This action is not coerced, and it 
is in line with both her character and her desires Perhaps she is epistemically at a loss 
because she believes that by witnessing she is causing no harm However, such 
considerations must wait until we discuss the epistemic condition As Larry May says, 
racism can be the result of shared attitudes between those who are oppressing, and it 
seems clear that Bella shares some of these attitudes So she will meet both (1) and (2) 
under the causal condition 
I have already indicated, and argued in Chapter 3, that a focus on desires and 
character may address the concerns of those who fear that in circumstances of collective 
action the individual loses control over that which they are responsible for While desires, 
character and attitude are not easy to change, they are withm the domain of the individual 
It remains the case that by combining actions and language to distance and denounce the 
collective an individual agent can keep from being in the collective in the first place If an 
agent were unable to take this step, or threatened in some way if they took this step, then 
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we could consider their actions no longer free Would this analysis satisfy critics such as 
Jan Narveson and H D Lewis? I will leave this question for now I think that the condition 
goes a long way to addressing their concerns, however looking at only the causal 
condition leaves half of the story unconsidered So before returning to the critiques of 
Narveson and Lewis, I will first move on to look at the epistemic condition 
6.4 The Epistemic Condition 
In Chapter 4 I discussed the epistemic condition for individual moral 
responsibility The mam epistemic concern centered on kinds of ignorance and what can 
and cannot be known by an agent Under other accounts of collective responsibility that 
collectivize the conditions for individual moral responsibility, we would be talking about 
whether the collective can know After debating the possibility of the group being the 
pnmary epistemic agent, I argued against that possibility and instead have argued that we 
can still focus on the individual, as long as we understand that certain actions occur in a 
collective context In Chapter 4 I examined the epistemic condition that George Sher 
proposed My epistemic condition is a modified version of his condition here 
The Epistemic Condition An agent has met the epistemic condition for collective 
responsibility if and only if she either 
(1) Is consciously aware that her participation has that feature (I e that it is with a 
wrong causing group) as she participates, or else 
(2) Is unaware that the collective outcome is wrong despite having evidence for its 
wrongness her failure to recognise which 
a Falls below some applicable standard, and 
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b Is caused by the interaction of some combination of her constitutive 
attitudes, dispositions, and traits 4 
The changes that I have made from Sher's ongmal epistemic condition includes focusing 
on agent participation in collectives which are performing wrong actions I also have 
excluded Sher's criteria for agents being responsible for positive outcomes Sher argues, 
and I agree, that responsibility for positive outcomes is not the opposite kind of 
responsibility one has for negative outcomes Since the focus of this dissertation is on 
individual responsibility for collective harms, I will not be proposing an additional 
description of responsibility for positive collective outcomes at this time 
The first clause in the condition is intended to capture what Sher terms our 
common-sense notion of the epistemic condition, what he names the "searchlight view" 
It claims that we are responsible for wrong actions that we perform that we know are 
wrong To apply in cases of collective responsibility the phrasing has been changed to 
reflect participation in a collective that is performing a wrong (that the agent is aware of) 
Therefore, if a group of people are attacking someone, and you join in, then you have met 
the epistemic condition when it comes to being morally responsible for that action The 
first clause follows our intuitions and is not contentious 
The second clause with the addition of (a) and (b) is more complicated, and is 
intended to reach beyond the simple case described in (1) to capture the idea that there is 
a standard that we expect agents to avail themselves of In some cases agents will be 
genuinely unaware of the outcome or potential outcome of a group action Carbon 
emissions as a cause of climate change was not accepted as fact until recently Emissions 
4
 Sher (2009) 143 
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in the 1970s were as harmful as those today (or nearly so), and they were the result of a 
collective action, but at the time cause and effect of carbon emissions was not known It is 
in cases like these that we will want to excuse the agent from responsibility What the 
second clause is intended to capture is the idea that when an agent lacks knowledge, we 
need to clarify whether they should have known somethmg 
In the second clause some insights from feminist epistemology regarding what can 
be known by the individual come into play While I have argued against making the 
group the primary epistemic agent, I do think that some acknowledgement needs to be 
made regarding the social nature of knowledge A useful concept that can be employed 
here is from Margaret Gilbert when she uses "population common knowledge" to 
describe the knowledge conditions relevant to her theory of the plural subject This will 
include knowledge such as, in Kitchener-Water loo the inhabitants of the city know that 
the primary language spoken is English That the primary language is English is 
population common knowledge among the inhabitants of this particular city 
Gilbert does not go into detail as to what exactly constitutes population common 
knowledge, instead providing examples to explain the concept However, I think that this 
concept is of use for my argument What needs to be the case for something to be 
population common knowledge? Must everyone know the information9 Such a 
requirement seems too steep a condition here Instead it seems it must be a function of 
what is available and what is known, on average In order for something to constitute 
population common knowledge (and therefore to indicate that agents who do not possess 
it have fallen below some relevant standard as in 2a) I would argue that it needs to be 
both available, and known, on average 
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Both availability of knowledge, and being known, on average, are inexact criteria 
However, I find value in describing them instead of simply providing examples that 
appear to use such criteria Beginning with availability of knowledge or information this 
criterion simply requires that is be possible that an agent, in their particular situation, 
could know it It must be "knowable" For example, m Kitchener-Waterloo the 
information that the language spoken in Kitchener-Waterloo is English is available to 
every agent In 1972 the information that carbon emissions were contributing to or 
causing climate change was not available While individual scientists may have argued 
for the connection between greenhouse gases and climate change, there was no consensus 
in the scientific community, such that it had yet to pass the epistemic standards of the 
scientific community If the scientific community had reached consensus (appealing to 
the standards of that group) that greenhouse gas emissions were causing climate change 
then the information would be available 
The second criterion is whether such information is known, on average Here I do 
not mean that we must survey the population and if 50 + 1 percent know a piece of data, 
then it is known on average (although, if such a survey was administered, such results 
would indicate that the information was known, on average) To simplify, to be known, 
on average, indicates that an average person in that population would know it Almost as 
if you could take a cross cutting of the society itself I am not claiming that this is the only 
kind of knowledge that exists, which would be one place where Lynne Hankmson Nelson 
and I part ways When we are talking about participation in a collective where an agent is 
responsible the kind of information that we are looking at is the kind that is population 
common knowledge The first clause in the epistemic condition that ignorance is not the 
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result of the agent falling below some applicable standard refers to this kind of 
knowledge 
This may well describe what happens when we want to hold someone responsible 
for something they should have known, but what happens to those in a society who have 
additional information that others lack9 What happens if all the scientists in a community 
have knowledge that is not commonly known (which is likely often the case)9 In fact 
there will be many situations where experts will have information that will not be 
commonly known So, what happens in these cases9 Or does such knowledge and 
information fall outside the purview of responsibility9 The answer is no, population 
common knowledge is not a concept that is intended to restrict the information for which 
agents can be responsible, it only provides us with a way to determine whether ignorance 
of a particular thing is acceptable or not It provides us with a reasonable person standard 
to use (as used in Sher's condition) The reasonable person standard provides a 
benchmark against which all agents can be compared Agents must know at least what 
the reasonable person would know If a reasonable person would have known some piece 
of information, then an agent who fails to know has failed an important epistemic test 
They have not been epistemically responsible 
While (2b) is joined with (2a), I will first focus on (2b) in isolation, and then 
return to see how it fits with (2a) (2b) states "is caused by the interaction of some 
combination of her constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits " Where (2a) discussed 
what is known by the average citizen, (2b) speaks to why this person does not know about 
the nature of their participation or action This removes reasons including manipulation or 
force In order to be relevantly ignorant it must be the case that the agent has not failed to 
reason properly due to their own constitutive attitudes, dispositions and traits Ignorance 
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caused by the agent in this way is distinct from that caused by factors outside of the 
agent's control 
Sher provides the following example to further illuminate (2b) 
Hot Dog Alessandra, a soccer mom, has gone to pick up her children at their 
elementary school As usual, Alessandra is accompanied by the family's border 
collie, Bathsheba, who rides in the back of the van Although it is very hot, the 
pick-up has never taken long, so Alessandra leaves Sheba in the van while she goes 
to gather her children This time, however, Alessandra is greeted by a tangled tale 
of misbehaviour, ill-considered punishment, and administrative bungling which 
requires several hours of indignant sorting out During that time, Sheba languishes, 
forgotten, in the locked car When Alessandra and her children finally make it to the 
parking lot, they find Sheba unconscious from heat prostration 5 
Sher introduces this as an example where we would believe that Alessandra is 
responsible, yet, according to the searchlight view, she would not be The example, which 
will require Sher's conditions 2(a) and (b) to attribute responsibility to Alessandra, is a 
great example of the relevance of (2b) There is a sense in which Alessandra failed to 
know what she should have known (that Sheba was m the car) Sher says we cannot 
explain Alessandra's forgetfulness by appealing to a vice she developed, or even from 
habits or traits that are markedly worse than normal 6 Alessandra is not an irresponsible 
person, but she did fall below a reasonable person standard because of a failure of her 
own constitutive attitudes Alessandra knows that Sheba is in the car in that while this 
information is not, "before her mind, she would sincerely assent to it if prompted "7 The 
combination of constitutive attitudes that leads Alessandra to forget Sheba may not 
themselves be bad, for example, being solicitous of her children or having heightened 
anxiety when faced with conflict However, if they had been different she would not have 
forgotten the dog Sher say that in this case we can make sense of Alessandra's 
5
 Ibid 26 
6
 Ibid 37 
7
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responsibility by looking at her as a whole person, as the source of her failure to draw the 
connection between what she knows and the wrongness of her act8 
The above description of Alessandra is illuminating in that it explains what we see 
her failure to be when she forgets Sheba in the car 2 (a) and (b) together identify a kind 
of culpable ignorance that will not excuse responsibility Either the agent knew of the 
action (1) or they fell below the epistemic standard in their community due to a failure of 
their constitutive attitudes 2 (a) and (b) To fully understand 2 (a) and (b), we need to 
examine which agents it will not identify as responsible Sher provides the following 
example 
Jackknife Father Poteet, a good driver, is gathering speed to enter a busy freeway 
Because the merge lane is very short, he must either pull in front of a looming 
eighteen-wheeler or stop abruptly He makes the split-second decision that he has 
room to merge, but he is wrong The trucker hits the brakes hard, his truck 
jackknifes across four lanes of traffic, and many people are seriously injured9 
In the example of Father Poteet, if we apply 2(a) and (b) to assess his responsibility, then 
we will end up with a more complicated answer than what we had for Alessandra In 
Alessandra's case the constitutive attitudes that led to her forgetting Sheba were an 
important part of who Alessandra is, her identity In Father Poteet's case Sher says we 
would have to say that the inaccuracy with which he, "processed the visual cues with 
which he is flooded is itself a reflection of the complex psychology that makes him the 
person he is "10 The problem here is that we are left saying that the speed with which 
Father Poteet processes visual cues is important to his identity in the same way as 
Alessandra's sohcitousness of her children This comparison seems awkward and 
problematic Sher comments that our reluctance in the case of Father Poteet has to do 
8
 Ibid 92 
9
 Ibid 26 
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with our uncertainties about the boundanes of the self Sher finds this uncertainty poses 
little difficulty for his account, and he moves on It may be the case that Father Poteet 
does not meet the epistemic condition, and thus cannot be held responsible For 
Alessandra the constitutive attitudes "at fault" are an important part of her identity For 
Father Poteet his failure is the result of a physical charactenstic or mechanism A physical 
mechanism may well cause an agent to develop certain constitutive attitudes in response 
(e g Father Poteet's vision may cause him to distrust visual cues and take nsks His 
nskiness is a constitutive attitude for which he could be held responsible ) I follow Sher 
that in cases of collective responsibility agents should not be held responsible for their 
physical charactenstics, only their attitudes, but that distinction between these may be, at 
times, muddy In any case, if we employ the reasonable person standard discussed above, 
then unless Father Poteet's vision is unusual in that he is short-sighted but has 
irresponsibly decided to drive without glasses, we may excuse his decision to merge 
Even by using a reasonable person standard we cannot definitively answer whether Father 
Poteet should be responsible, but it will provide us with another way to assess this 
difficult example 
In the above two sections I have proposed and defended a causal and epistemic 
condition for responsibility for those agents identified as members of collectives Both 
conditions focus on the individual agent, but measure participation and acknowledge the 
role of the social nature of knowledge Agents who meet these conditions are morally 
responsible for the harm caused by the collective I next turn to the question of how to 
attribute such responsibility 
11
 Ibid 93 
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6.5 Theory of Reducibility 
I have argued throughout this dissertation that it is imperative that a successful 
theory of collective responsibility can be reduced to individual members The attributions 
of responsibility that will fall on the individual agents are important because individual 
agents are the appropriate targets of responsibility I want to avoid the case that Gilbert 
and Virginia Held (among others) proposed, where it is possible that the collective is 
responsible, but no individual agent in the collective has fallen below what was expected 
of them What needs to happen is that members of a collective will be attributed 
responsibility because of their membership and participation in the collective The 
collective action itself is not reducible to the individual because it is more than a 
collection of individual actions (and saying "the collective" is not some linguistic tool of 
convenience ) Rather, the collective action may be, and often is, more than the sum of the 
individual actions of the members By participating in the collective, individual agents 
will be attributed responsibility for harm Further, I want to emphasize that questions of 
reducibility will only emerge after a case has gone through the analysis already presented 
in this chapter It must be, in fact, a collective action, and the individual must be a 
member of that collective Further, the agent must have met the epistemic and causal 
conditions for responsibility From here on out I am only speaking of agents who would 
have met that criteria 
In Chapter 5 I introduced a number of theories that sought to reduce collective 
responsibility to the individual I wish to revisit one of them here that I believe has merit, 
if the problems could be addressed The theory I want to revisit is that posed by Robin 
Gildert To recap, Gildert proposed two kinds of responsibility for members of 
collectives, a general responsibility for the collective harm which falls on all members, 
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and specific responsibility for individuals who perpetrate specific harms The example he 
used was that of a Nazi death camp during WW2 Gildert claims that all death camp 
employees would be responsible for the collective harm of genocide, but the guard who 
shoots someone would additionally be responsible for that individual murder as well This 
would distinguish the actions of the guard from those of the person who bakes bread for 
the guards, yet includes both in the collective responsibility for the overall harm 
My critique of Gildert has two parts First, I argued that when the two kinds of 
responsibility fall on an individual agent, one for the collective harm and one for the 
individual harm, it seems to be the case that the responsibility for the individual harm 
(murdering that person there) will be more severe than the kind that can be shared 
between all people at a death camp, from baker to guard, to Heinrich Himmler My 
second critique was that the responsibility attributed to the guard represented a kind of 
double dipping - the action of killing the person may be the action that is the guard's 
participation in the collective, which would mean that the one act has led them to be 
responsible both collectively and individually These are problems that will need to be 
addressed, but I think that by addressing these issues this theory can satisfy the needs of a 
reductive account Instead of strictly rehabilitating this account, I will propose a new 
account below that aims to achieve the same idea as Gildert, but with a few necessary 
modifications 
Before moving on to the proposal I want to further motivate my choice of Gildert 
for the reductive account What Gildert's account aims to do is provide an explanation for 
differentiated responsibility in a collective context Recall from Chapter 3, this is what 
H D Lewis and Jan Narveson required Under Gildert's account the action is collective, 
the members are responsible, but responsibility does differ between the guard who pulls 
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the trigger, and the man who bakes the bread for the guards This is intuitively pleasing 
While it is often easy to see the responsibility of leaders for the harms they produce, we 
are often quite conflicted when it comes to the responsibility of the bread baker at the 
death camp Were they just doing their job9 Did they really participate in genocide9 What 
may seem to be a problem when we start asking these questions is that the answer, under 
my account, is yes If an agent meets the criteria for membership in a collective, and the 
conditions for responsibility, then yes, they are responsible But what is compelling about 
Gildert's account is that he does not excuse the actions of the bread baker, but rather he 
uses a kind of differentiated responsibility account While his particular application of it 
is problematic, the idea has merit 
Below is my proposal for reducing collective responsibility to individuals 
Reduction of Collective Responsibility to Individuals: Agents of collectives who have 
been deemed members of a collective, and have met the causal and epistemic conditions 
are responsible for the collective harm in one of the three ways 
(1) As Order Givers, 
(2) As Order Followers, or 
(3) As Supporters 
All three types of agents are responsible, however responsibility is portioned out 
according to which role the agent has in the collective The most responsibility will be 
portioned to the Order Givers, less to Order Followers, and the least to Supporters 
The first piece of information that is essential to understanding my proposal is that I am 
talking here of collective responsibility, and collective responsibility only Because it is 
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collective responsibility I am referring to the action as collective, and therefore 
responsibility is for the entire harm What the proposal is intended to do is determine 
individual responsibility in relation to participation in the collective harm What this 
means is that I am not concerned with looking at individual contnbutions to the harm, and 
then trying to reason from there when it comes to reducibihty You may argue that the 
only contribution the bread baker made to the death camp was baking bread, which 
nourished the guards, but that the baker cannot be responsible for actions taken by those 
guards I argue that this is the wrong way to assess the action itself The death camps (and 
this will work for other collectives as well, I am simply focussing on it here as it was 
Gildert's example) harmed people in a collective way, a way that was more than the sum 
of baking bread, or killing a few of the people However, what I am arguing for m the 
proposal is that agents can bear this collective responsibility to varying degrees The 
baker and the guard and Heinrich Himmler are not all equally responsible, but their 
responsibility is all for the same harm What distinguishes them is what role they had in 
the collective, be it Order Giver, Order Follower, or Supporter 
I have identified three roles agents have in a collective Not all collectives will 
have all three types of roles, so the existence of Order Givers, Order Followers or 
Supporters is not necessary for a harm to be produced by a collective Order Givers are 
the leaders in a collective They are the ones who often have the best perspective on the 
collective nature of the action A CEO of a company understands how the engineer and 
the marketing assistant all play a role in the success of the company This perspective and 
the power associated with being the one who gives the orders, creates the greatest level of 
responsibility of all the members of the collective Order Givers will most easily meet the 
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conditions for responsibility, and they have the most control over the outcome of the 
collective 
Order Followers are those who work immediately under the Order Givers, making 
the orders happen, so to speak The Order Followers do not have the same perspective or 
control that the Order Givers have, and as such, their responsibility is understandably less 
However, they are in the position that they are in to make the orders of the Order Givers 
happen This is their purpose in the collective As such, they are going to have more 
responsibility than the Supporters In a company the Order Followers are going to be the 
heads of various departments, and most of the employees of the company These are all 
agents who are directly aiming to help the Order Givers In the case of the Nazi death 
camp, the Order Followers would be the guards and any others who acted directly in the 
operation of the death camp 
The third class of agents are the Supporters Here the title may be misleading, in 
that it appears to indicate that these are agents who wish the success of the overall 
collective endeavour Instead I would characterise these as the agents who are more 
indirectly participating in the collective action By indirect here I do not mean to suggest 
that their actions are somehow unknown to them or accidental, because such agents 
would not meet the criteria for responsibility (however, they could potentially be not 
responsible members ) Rather their actions somehow support the actions of the others, the 
Order Givers and Followers, without being directly linked to the collective harm itself 
This would include the bread baker at the Nazi death camp The baker is making bread 
for the guards, they are in a supportive role of the guards, but they are not directly acting 
to harm those in the camp The bread bakers are going to meet the criteria for 
membership and responsibility in the collective, but intuitively we want to distance them 
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from the guards in the camp The company parallel to this case would be external 
contractors that work with the company, or consumers of the company's product 
My proposal for reducibihty identifies agents by their role in the collective By 
doing so we can avoid discussions of the causal impact of agent A in comparison to the 
causal impact of agent B, and instead treat collective actions as something different from 
the kinds of actions we do as individuals The three roles separate agents along the most 
basic lines of their positions m the collective, attnbuting more responsibility to those who 
had greater perspective and power than others Here, by perspective I am referring to a 
position where an agent can see the collective as a collective A CEO sees his workers as 
the company, the political class sees individual agents as a nation, etc 
Before moving on I want to return to the Supporters There is an objection here 
that needs to be addressed, and that is regarding the responsibility of the bread baker It 
seems possible that the bread baker sees his action as a contribution to the collective 
outcome of achieving the goals of the Nazi party It could be the case that the baker sees 
his job as a way for him to do his part However, it is also possible that the baker does not 
see what he does in his role as part of the Nazi machine The baker may ask, "Why is it 
that I am part of the collective with the guards and Himmler9 I am merely baking bread, 
and if I didn't do so, it would not affect the outcome of the death camp I am not harming 
anyone, I am just making bread " This is a compelling defence, and one that must be 
addressed 
There are a number of important issues m the baker's statement To begin, the 
baker questions why he is a member of the same collective as the guards and Himmler 
Here the baker is likely looking at the difference in action (or proximity to the harm in 
question) and his control (or lack thereof) in comparison to other members This can be 
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combined with the baker's last statement that he is baking bread, which is not a harmful 
act While these concerns of the baker are clear, and compelling in some cases, it does not 
follow that the baker is not part of the responsible collective Recall, I already assessed 
the baker's responsibility in regards to the definition and conditions in this chapter 
Perhaps this shows that the conditions and definitions are themselves faulty, because we 
want to excuse the baker This type of example will crop up again and again in cases of 
large, unstructured collectives, including climate change as will be discussed in the 
conclusion of the dissertation 
What we have to separate here are questions of the responsibility of the baker (by 
using the definitions and conditions) from the perspective of the baker, including his 
personal feelings about being a member As argued earlier, merely wishing the wellbeing 
of a group does not make you a member of the group (for example praying secretly for 
the success of the Germans) There has to be a reciprocal relationship So if wishing 
without acting does not make you a member, it is also the case that acting while wishing 
you were not a member, would not excuse you from the collective (at least wishing alone 
will not) What is happening with the baker is that he is self-deceived He is a member of 
the collective, whether he wishes it were true or not The conditions and definitions have 
shown that When an agent does not know the nature of their action, they will still meet 
the epistemic condition if this lack of knowledge is of their own making because of their 
constitutive attitudes, traits, etc It seems as if the baker, in making his statement, is 
demonstrating a lack of understanding of the impact of his action, but this lack of 
understanding is likely his own fault Further, at the point where we are attributing 
responsibility the baker has met the epistemic condition already 
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If we are to allow that the baker did not know the harm being caused by the death 
camp, or how his actions contribute to the harm, then to meet the epistemic condition the 
baker will have to meet conditions 2 (a) and (b) Thus far I have treated the case of the 
baker as being one where the "ignorance" of the baker is due to his own ill-conceived 
self-deception From our current position in history it is hard to see his denial as a senous 
description of his situation However, to keep this example such that it can inform on the 
actions of Supporters in many different situations of collective harms, I want to examine 
exactly how the baker could be said to meet 2 (a) and (b) The applicable standard, or 
reasonable person standard, m this case, is going to be one where a reasonable person 
would not participate in the genocide that was occurring m the death camps To do so 
would leave an agent responsible, to some degree, for that harm Further, a reasonable 
agent would understand that the death camps were more like a company than an 
individual, and required a large support team to operate From this, a reasonable person 
would conclude that the support team is part of the harm causing collective And, of 
course, the actions of the death camps were known I have come to the above 
conclusions in the case of the death camps because the death camps themselves were part 
of a national strategy of the political class, it was not a situation of manipulation and it 
was not particularly hidden In the case of a baker who is supplying the guards with bread 
such an individual is m a position to be aware of these facts 
The above indicates that the baker fell below some relevant standard In order to 
meet the epistemic condition it must be the case that this failure is due to constitutive 
attitudes of the baker which are, in a way, central to who he is Here I am looking more 
for a case like Alessandra's attitudes towards her children, rather than Father Poteet's 
physical problems with processing visual cues These attitudes could consist of an 
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isolationist perspective ("just doing my job"), anxiety regarding providing for his family, 
feelings of political helplessness, pride m his work, and even a combination of a desire to 
remain out of the political sphere and a desire not to cause harm The combination of 
these attitudes, none of which are themselves morally "bad", could easily result in the 
baker claiming that by baking the break he is not participating in the collective, and 
further, that he is not a part of the same collective as the guards His desire to not cause 
harm motivates his claim that he is "just baking bread " This is different from the case of 
Alessandra, because when faced with the claim that the baker is a member of the 
collective, he would likely deny this possibility (as indicated in the previous comment 
from the baker) He has not forgotten, momentarily, his contribution, but rather has 
concocted a version of his actions that leaves him safely outside the collective Regardless 
of his move to extncate himself from responsibility, he does meet both 2 (a) and (b) of the 
epistemic condition 
The other part of the baker's statement is that all he is doing is baking bread, and 
if he did not do it, someone else would This defence moves towards concerns of over-
determined harms In Chapter 1 I identified over-determined harms as one of the issues 
that a successful theory of collective responsibility would have to address Over-
determined harms are merely harms where you could remove any single agent (or bunch 
of agents) and the collective outcome would be the same In the case of climate change, 
this is demonstrated by the fact that if I were to stop all my carbon emissions it would 
have no impact on the destruction that is occurring to the environment In fact, m the case 
of climate change it is possible that entire countries could stop all carbon emissions with 
no impact In the case of the baker the suggestion is that the loaf of bread he makes today 
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does not impact the activities in the death camp such that choosing not to make the loaf of 
bread (or even quitting his job altogether) would not stop what was happening 
While many harms will be over-determined, this is irrelevant to attributions in 
both the collective, and of responsibility Under my account the nature of a collective act 
is irreducibly collective This is what makes the collective act different than simply many 
individual actions (and why it is the case that I require a definition for membership in 
large, unstructured collectives instead of assigning all remaining cases to that name) 
While individual contributions can lead to individual membership m collectives (it is 
condition (2) under the definition), it is not required for membership, and when it comes 
to reducing collective responsibility to individuals that initial causal contribution to the 
harm is no longer relevant While it is true that the baker could have acted differently, and 
the outcome for the collective would have been the same, what is important here is that 
the baker did not act differently 
Individual responsibility is often agent centered, and so the baker who is self-
deceived may appear, on first glance, to pose a problem for my theory While it is 
important that individual agents meet the causal and epistemic condition, conditions such 
as meeting a "reasonable standard" are determined by referencing to more than the 
individual agent alone In the literature (specifically Kutz) the perspective of the victims 
may be employed to show agent complicity in collective harms From the perspective of 
victims of collective harms the nature of the collective is far less mysterious than it seems 
to be for the baker For those kept at the death camps, worked, and killed (and their loved 
ones) the baker who feeds the guards is a member of the collective And if he meets the 
epistemic and causal conditions, then he is responsible as well, although to a lesser degree 
than the Order Givers (Himmler) or Order Followers (the Guards ) 
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My proposal for reducibihty is similar to Gildert's in that it includes levels of 
responsibility The question that I have to ask is whether my proposal answers the 
concerns I raised about Gildert's proposal in both this chapter and the previous one Have 
I solved the problems? The first critique was that by having blanket responsibility fall on 
all members of a collective, the responsibility would be mild m order to refrain from 
holding agents responsible unfairly We see an important difference between the bread 
baker and the guard at the Nazi death camp, and we would feel uncomfortable holding the 
bread baker responsible to the same degree as the Guard I have addressed this issue by 
including the different levels of responsibility depending on the role of the agent in the 
collective The roles are still very general, and thus will be able to capture agent roles in a 
variety of collectives However, what they provide is a method to attribute differentiated 
responsibility that retains a collective description of the action itself 
I critiqued Gildert claiming that his theory double-dipped in order to hold the 
guard more responsible (or responsible for greater harm) than the baker Instead of adding 
additional responsibility to those who have caused more harm, as far as the collective 
action is concerned, differentiated responsibility can use the same action (the collective 
action) and attribute different degrees of responsibility The Guard is more responsible 
than the baker I claimed that Gildert's account privileged the actions of individuals over 
those of the collective because agents could bear greater harm for individual actions 
Once again, differentiated responsibility addresses this problem 
A strength of Gildert's account may seem to be that the Guard is both collectively 
responsible for the genocide, and individually responsible for any murders he performed 
While attributing responsibility in this manner runs the risk of "double-dipping", does 
attributing responsibility under my differentiated responsibility account run the risk of 
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glossing over who murdered who9 Under my account is Guard A responsible for the 
murders he performed9 The best example to use here would be one of war In war 
typically we do not look at the individual murders of soldiers on the field War is 
considered a holistic act, and soldiers are performing their roles in that act In much the 
same way in a collective act (or at a death camp) the Guard is not murdering these five 
people, but rather is performing his role at the camp which includes murdering certain 
people The collective context in both the war and death camp example provides 
important information about the actions of the soldiers and the Guard 
By using an account of differentiated responsibility my theory maintains the 
collective context of these acts, and it also views the collective responsibility that the 
Guards will bear as being more severe than it could be under Gildert's account that holds 
the Guard and the Baker collectively responsible to the same degree This is important 
because Guard A killing these five people could have as easily been Guard B killing these 
five people Their role in the collective was the same, and thus their responsibility for the 
collective harm is the same Further, by moving away from attributing the greatest 
responsibility to those who directly caused the greatest harm (pulled the trigger, so to 
speak) greater responsibility falls on those who created the collective context required for 
the harm (Order Givers) 
In this section I have provided a proposal to reduce collective responsibility to the 
individual I have treated unstructured collective harms (and all collective acts) as 
ultimately collective in nature, but also reducible to the individual such that the individual 
has something to answer for My proposal for reducibihty answers the challenges I have 
posed throughout this dissertation, and has provided some possible solutions to the 
critiques of collective responsibility Specifically, my proposal answers the critiques of 
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Lewis and Narveson that I introduced in Chapter 3 Recall, Lewis claims that collective 
responsibility implicates you in the actions of another He argues that collective 
responsibility would need to provide a way for the guilt of each agent to be proportionate 
to his part in the collective act Narveson argues that group membership needs to be 
voluntary Both Lewis and Narveson argue that in collective contexts agents may not be 
m control of the actions for which they are being held responsible, and that such an 
outcome is unacceptable In my proposal moral responsibility is voluntary (as is 
membership, although members may lack knowledge of their participation) Individual 
agents are held responsible for their participation Further, moral responsibility is 
different depending on the role agents occupy in the collective While I have included 
only three levels of responsibility, this does create a differentiated theory of 
responsibility My proposal addresses concerns about agent control while also being able 
to identify collective harms as collective in nature In Chapter 1 I challenged Kutz's 
change in theory when he moved to address large, unstructured collectives I turn to the 
task of answering this challenge next 
6.6 Collective Responsibility and Collectives 
Throughout this chapter I have used examples from a number of collectives, 
focusing on Gildert's example of the Nazi death camp, which is a large, structured 
collective My aim in this chapter and this dissertation was to provide an account of 
collective responsibility that would work for large, unstructured collectives So why have 
I focussed on the death camp example instead of a racist culture or climate change? The 
simple answer is that I wanted to work with Gildert's example as I worked with his 
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theory However, there is a more complex reason, and it has to do with whether we need 
to have separate theories for separate kinds of collectives at all 
If you look at large, unstructured collectives you will find that agents fit into the 
roles that I have proposed In a racist culture you have Order Givers who will often be 
those in charge of setting public policy and reacting to social inequalities Order 
Followers will be those working withm this system, but with some kind of power over 
other agents, for example a company president who can control corporate culture And 
Supporters will be all the individuals, like Bella who live in a racist society and does not 
participate or mitigate racist acts I will look in detail at the case of climate change as 
collective responsibility in the conclusion of this dissertation 
An important shift has happened in my account of collective responsibility that 
has led me to be less concerned with the type of collective of which I am dealing It deals 
with the description of "structured" In Chapter 1 I identified different kinds of 
collectives, and an important distinguishing characteristic was the kind or level of 
structure that they possessed In most cases "structure" is simply a way to indicate the 
existence of a decision-making mechanism So corporations were more structured than 
strangers who help someone who has fallen on the ice Smaller collectives have clearer 
means of decision-making because all members are together, and can respond to one 
another The problem with large, unstructured collectives is that they lacked a decision-
making mechanism, and are too large for members to create some kind of impromptu 
mechanism However, the emphasis on structure is not necessary to the account, and 
rather is a relic of a certain kind of argument about collective responsibility Focus on 
decision-making mechanisms is akin to the attempt to collectivise the conditions of 
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individual moral responsibility in order to address collectives Both treat collectives as if 
they are a special version of the individual 
In my account I treat the collectives as something unique Under my definition of 
membership in a collective, responsibility conditions, and attribution formula I do not 
focus on a decision-making mechanism Under attnbutions of responsibility I do propose 
that leaders (Order Givers) bear more responsibility than other members, but a collective 
does not require an Order Giver m order to exist By moving away from the focus on 
structure we now have just collective responsibility There is no need for different 
accounts for different collectives And in this way I have answered the challenge I posed 
to Kutz when he altered his theory to address large, unstructured collectives 
To reflect this shift I propose a new version of the definition of membership which 
applies to all collectives 
Membership in a Collective: An agent is a member of a collective if and only if she 
participates in the collective action by doing any one of the following 
(1) Reciprocally provide solidarity and receive identification (including public 
membership), or 
(2) Causally contribute to a collective outcome, 
and 
(3) She is not participating in a recognised activity by combining action and language 
to publicly distance herself from, and denounce the actions of the collective 
The only change that I made to the definition was removing the references to a large, 
unstructured collective While membership in a collective may seem obvious in some 
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cases that does not mean that this definition is not accurate Two people going for a walk 
together provide solidarity and receive identification from one another (as one of two 
people going for a walk together) In a company employees are publicly members in that 
they are on the payroll and can be identified as employees This will hold for small 
unstructured collectives where people work together (are known to the others, and 
causally contnbute to an outcome), and large semi-structured (in a nation there are lists of 
citizens ) There is no reason to propose a different theory when it comes to large, 
unstructured collectives, because what I have proposed in this chapter works for all 
What is different between large unstructured collectives and other collectives is 
that in the former it may be the case (it may often be the case) that members are unsure of 
their membership status The bread baker in the Nazi camp is unsure of his own 
complicity In such cases the definition for membership will be useful For most other 
collectives membership of the agents will be obvious, and while they conform to the 
definition, will not be in need of it 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued for a new definition of membership in collectives, a 
causal and epistemic condition for responsibility, and a formula for determining the 
responsibility of individual agents My theory addresses the concerns raised throughout 
this dissertation, and by shifting from the tendency to see the collective as a version of the 
individual, my account can apply to all collectives In the conclusion of this dissertation I 
turn myself to the case study of climate change that I discussed m Chapter 2 If Climate 
Change is an unstructured collective harm, then does it fit my theory9 And can my theory 
determine what responsibility will look like in this case9 
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Conclusion: Climate Change and Collective Responsibility 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 I examined the case of climate change as a harm perpetrated by a 
large, unstructured collective This collective could potentially include most people on the 
planet As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, many theonsts deal with environmental harms 
by denying that they are collective, or by making unexplained, and undefended changes 
in theory to address the case I argued in Chapter 2 that climate change was not a natural 
act, but a human act, and therefore despite the complexity of the case, it needed to be 
addressed 
In this concluding chapter I will look at the case of climate change, and go 
through my proposed method from Chapter 6 to determine individual responsibility for 
collective harm I will be using details from cases of climate change discussed in Chapter 
2 I have already shown in Chapter 6 that there is nothing that immediately makes it 
impossible to account for individual responsibility in the case of climate change What is 
left to be done is to go through the case in detail to determine what such responsibility 
will look like 
7.2 Cases 
In Chapter 2 I discussed a number of cases that identified the victims of climate 
change I want to re-mtroduce them here in order to answer the questions Who is 
responsible9 and to what degree? The first case I want to discuss is the Republic of the 
Maldives I will not discuss the situation of Jalauddin Saha from India only because his 
situation is very similar to that facing the entire Republic of the Maldives In both cases 
rising sea levels have caused necessary relocation for inhabitants In the case of Saha he 
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had to relocate his family several times as sea levels have risen In the case of the 
Republic of Maldives their location (80% of the islands m this nation are less than one 
meter above sea level) means that in the next 100 years rising sea levels will leave the 
nation underwater 
The harm in the case of rising sea levels in both situations is loss of home, 
required relocation, and in some cases relocation outside the home nation which requires 
loss of national identity, and in some cases refugee status In some cases rising sea levels 
have led to death, although the process is slow, so most often the damage is loss of 
property and required relocation However, although the rising sea levels are not 
themselves causing death, I would not underestimate the harm caused when a person 
loses their home, their farm, or in the case of the Maldives, their nation After the 2004 
Tsunami some residents of the Republic of the Maldives had to relocate to other countries 
to live in "temporary" camps due to massive damage to their homes and towns Years 
later some of the Maldivians continue to live in these camps, where conditions are poor, 
livelihoods are restricted, and sometimes they are unable to live with family 
The second case I will discuss is the war in Darfur In Chapter 2 I explored the 
strain climate change can put on citizens which can lead to conflict As I quoted in 
Chapter 2, Achim Sterner, the executive director of the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP) argues that dramatic changes in the environment in the Darfur region of the 
Sudan contnbuted to the massive conflict that has resulted in the displacement of millions 
of people, and death of hundreds of thousands more He supports this claim by arguing 
that the roots of the conflict can be found in a devastating drought that went through the 
area in the 1980s Since the drought rainfall has decreased by 40% Farmers reacted to 
this change in climate by fencing off land that previously nomads had had access to This 
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in turn caused nomads to clash with the farmers over the shrinking resources The change 
in climate in Africa is considered the result of climate change 
What is important to note here is that in the case of Darfur when I speak of those 
responsible I am restricting it to a discussion of responsibility for climate change in the 
region What I am not arguing is that the bloodshed that has resulted is in any way 
inevitable due to climate change, because the resulting conflict is going to be the 
responsibility of a much more diverse group, including the actual perpetrators of the 
violence So while climate change pushed two groups into a position where they could be 
in conflict, the autonomy of these agents remain, and they will bear most of the 
responsibility for their direct actions 
In the case of rising sea levels, and drought conditions, the culprit is climate 
change This concurs with the results of the report from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Further, the cause of climate change, as I discussed in Chapter 
2, is primarily carbon dioxide and methane emissions In the case of carbon dioxide the 
largest source is from burning fossil fuels When looked at more generally, I concluded in 
Chapter 2 that the major sources were from industry, transportation, landfills, and certain 
This example is muddy, as will be the case with most real-world examples Here I am 
speaking about the conflict in Darfur as a way to emphasize the different kind of harms 
climate change can include, but at the same time I am separating a discussion of the 
conflict from a discussion on climate change So, while the conflict was caused, in part, 
by climate change, it will have other causes as well (socio-political, historical, etc ) 
Climate change, in that it has affected resources in the region, is harmful even without the 
resulting conflict In an attempt to clarify this muddy situation I am speaking here only of 
those responsible for causing climate change, and not for the different collective who 
would be responsible for the conflict in Darfur I am doing this to remain focussed on 
climate change, but if I was to examine responsibility for the conflict in Darfur it would 
necessarily require a larger collective 
2
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food production With this background in place I turn to the task of assessing 
responsibility 
7.3 Assessing Responsibility 
With the cases outlined above, I can begin to assess collective responsibility I 
descnbed the harms first, not the collective I believe this will often be the order in which 
we will have to proceed in cases of large, unstructured collectives What is easiest to see 
initially is the harm The people of the Republic of the Maldives will lose their country in 
the next century The harm, and the victims of the harm, are easy to identify However, 
from this we must move quickly to the collective itself to determine responsibility As I 
assess the case of climate change I will proceed in the same order I did in Chapter 6, 
starting with membership, then looking at the causal and epistemic conditions, and finally 
determining the levels of responsibility for responsible members 
To begin, recall the membership definition 
Membership in a Collective An agent is a member of a collective if and only if she 
participates in the collective action by doing any one of the following 
(1) Reciprocally provide solidarity and receive identification (including public 
membership), or 
(2) Causally contribute to the collective outcome, 
and 
(3) She is not participating in a recognised activity by combining action and language 
to publicly distance herself from, and denounce, the actions of the collective 
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If the collective is that which, "has caused climate change", who are the members? Not 
all members are going to be members because they meet the same criterion So, I am 
going to go through each The first condition is to reciprocally provide solidarity and 
receive identification through participation The clearest way to do so is through being 
pubhcally a member However, there is not going to be a membership list when it comes 
to climate change Climate change is not the action of a single country, or block of 
countries, and so we cannot look to citizenship as a list of members of this particular 
collective Nor is there an organization to which all those participating belong Instead we 
must analyse the collective in terms of who reciprocally provides solidarity and receives 
identification from membership In previous chapters I identified the role of attitude in 
social systemic harms such as racism Reciprocally providing solidarity and receiving 
identification has to do with creating a certain kind of culture or environment Is this also 
going to be the case for climate change9 There is an argument that you can make that it 
will play a part 
The use of fossil fuels, or the promotion of certain types of foods for certain low 
prices (and therefore of certain types of farming practices) is something that is part of 
many societies The identity of many cultures is going to include the promotion of 
activities that involve excessive carbon use In North America there is a culture which 
pnontizes suburban living in order to meet the prerequisites for a happy family, yet make 
it affordable only to those who work in the city This often requires, and justifies, long 
commutes to work This, in turn, leads to carbon emissions There is a very real sense in 
which agents will reciprocally receive solidarity and identification from this practice 
because it is tied to cultural norms This is like the example I used in Chapter 6 of the 
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lawn watering ban Cultural norms reinforce individual identity when agents conform, 
and in conforming they encourage others to do so 
The second cntenon is the one which will be the most obviously relevant in the 
case of climate change The first cntenon is useful, but the second more clearly identifies 
members Recall, some agents will be excused, including those who have "through act 
and language" acted to distance themselves from, and denounce the harm Those excused 
might include different environmental activists such as Al Gore and David Suzuki They 
have through recognised acts and language distanced themselves from, and denounced, 
the collective in such a way that limits their causal contnbution, and makes it publicly 
clear that they do not support the actions of the collective Additionally some agents who 
meet the membership condition may not meet the causal or epistemic condition, and 
therefore will not be responsible Putting these concerns aside for now, the second 
condition includes all agents who participate in a collective action by causally 
contnbutmg to the outcome As discussed in Chapter 2, all carbon emissions are harmful 
Natural carbon sinks can only remove approximately 54% of the carbon currently being 
released into the atmosphere This means that while we could speak of each person 
having a carbon share, such considerations are only relevant if carbon sinks could handle 
current emission levels At this stage all carbon emissions are causally contnbutmg to the 
harm This will also be true for the other greenhouse gas emissions as well 
This means that the collective we are analysing, by usmg the second criterion, is 
going to include all agents in all countries, except for those who have through act or 
language disassociated themselves from the collective, or those who make zero carbon 
emissions (or other greenhouse emissions) and do not participate in validating cultural 
3
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norms (perhaps a hermit) It is hard to imagine people who would meet the latter 
description for it would require agents to not rely on industry, transportation (non-
animal), to not consume most meats, to be extremely restrictive on garbage, etc 
However, it is possible that such agents exist, and if they do, then these agents will not 
meet the criteria for membership in the collective in question 
The next step in determining responsibility is to examine whether agents meet the 
causal and epistemic conditions In this case I will look at a few different types of agents 
who would have met the conditions for membership The agents I will look at will be the 
President of Country X, the CEO of a Car Company, a Small Business Owner, a Family 
in North Amenca, and a Citizen of a Poor Country In this analysis I will look at both the 
causal condition and epistemic condition together, and see whether these agents meet the 
conditions Here are the conditions 
The Causal Condition An agent has met the causal condition for collective responsibility 
if and only if she causes (through participation) the act in question to happen This act 
1 Must not be coerced, and 
2 Must not be against the agent's desires (or character ) 
The Epistemic Condition An agent has met the epistemic condition for collective 
responsibility if and only if she either 
(1) Is consciously aware that her participation has that feature (l e that it is with a 
wrong causing group) as she participates, or else 
(2) Is unaware that the collective outcome is wrong despite having evidence for its 
wrongness her failure to recognise which 
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a Falls below some applicable standard, and 
b Is caused by the interaction of some combination of her constitutive 
attitudes, dispositions, and traits 
I will start with the President of Country X who participates through her carbon emissions 
and other greenhouse gas emissions It is unnecessary at this stage to identify what type of 
country the agent is the president of, because industrialised or not, or poor or not, to be in 
the collective the president must have met the membership conditions Beginning with the 
causal condition, the president has not been coerced in her use of carbon emissions Let's 
use the example of air conditioning which uses electricity from a coal power plant Using 
air conditioning is not against the desires or the character of the President Therefore she 
meets the causal condition The epistemic condition is more complicated, did the 
president know of the impact of her carbon emissions9 This question requires positioning 
the President in a particular time and geographic location It is possible that the presidents 
of some countries may indeed lack the education which would allow them to meet this 
epistemic condition, and as such a failure would not be the result of the president falling 
below some reasonable standard and it would be an excusing condition As President the 
agent has access to greater educational resources than the citizenry, and also interacts 
with other world powers So, if we are speaking of what the President of a nation would 
know in 2010, it seems unlikely that they would not know about the IPCC report But 
there is a time element here In 1988 the IPCC was established, and in 1990 it produced 
its first report4 2005 is often cited as the first year when scientists reached consensus 
Whether any of these dates can be considered the moment when climate change entered 
4
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common knowledge is unclear, but it does seem to be known now A 2007 BBC World 
Service poll that surveyed more than 22,000 people in 21 countries supports this 
According to the poll 79% of respondents agree that, "human activity, including industry 
and transportation, is a significant cause of climate change "5 Therefore, generally 
speaking, it is clear that the presidents of countries will meet condition (1) of the 
epistemic condition 
If a president does not meet (1) then the availability of information on climate 
change (and the fact that such information is relevant to national leadership) indicates that 
the president has fallen below some applicable standard (2a) Some attitudes that might 
have led to this failure could be a constant focus on current crises (eg in a nation with 
extreme poverty problems), a belief (in the case of a president of a small, poor country) 
that international concerns are the domain of large, wealthy nations, prioritization of 
increasing wealth now over any consequences for later, suspicion of scientific findings 
from wealthy countries, etc These attitudes could lead a President to disbelieve the 
findings from the IPCC report, (and therefore could be said to not know about the causes 
of climate change) but in this case they would still meet the epistemic condition 
The above data from the BBC poll suggests that most of the agents I will discuss 
are going to meet the epistemic condition (1) for knowing that their actions are causing 
climate change Remember, self deception is not a valid reason for not knowing (or rather 
those who self deceive will fall below a reasonable standard because of who they are -
and therefore still meet the epistemic condition) What this poll, and the other information 
above indicates, is that there was a time when this information was not knowable, a time 
when the connection between carbon emissions and climate change was unknown While 
5
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the exact time when it became known is unclear, it would be non-contentious to claim 
that m 1976 it was not known It would not be "population common knowledge" as 
discussed in Chapter 6 
Before moving on to discuss the other agents I want to expand on this conclusion 
I discussed above the case of climate change in Africa which is considered a main cause 
of the current conflict in Darfur Stiener from UNEP argued that the roots of the conflict 
could be found in a devastating drought in the 1980s, as well as a 40% decrease in rainfall 
since the drought6 This demonstrates that carbon emissions have been climbing and 
causing harm for quite some time, something which has been argued by climate scientists 
However, the initial drought and resulting shortage of rain occurred well before the IPCC 
was formed, let alone their reports accepted internationally What does this mean for my 
argument9 
It means that agents are not going to meet the epistemic condition when it comes 
to the initial climate change which is cited as the roots of the conflict m Darfur 
Continuing drought conditions today will be the responsibility of the international 
community in the sense that they are the result of climate change But the international 
community will not be morally responsible for the conditions of the 1980s drought Here 
I mean to say that there is relevance m identifying those who are members of the 
collective, and who are causally responsible However, there is no use, and no theoretical 
support, in holding agents morally responsible for something in the past that they could 
not have known about In the case of the drought in Darfur agents will not meet the 
epistemic condition 
6
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Returning to my agents, who I will now position m 2010 in order to answer 
epistemic questions, I can continue my analysis When it comes to the CEO of a Car 
Company and a Small Business Owner, both will be responsible due to their participation 
as agents (their effects on others is irrelevant at this stage of analysis ) This participation 
is likely their participation in the culture in general, their use of fossil fuels, consumption 
of meat, and use of industry This will also be the case for the Family in North America 
and the Citizen of a Poor Country All will meet the causal condition because of their 
carbon emissions, and none of their carbon emissions could be said to be coerced Since I 
have now located all the agents m question in 2010, then barring unusual circumstances, 
all will meet the epistemic condition as well The information is now known by the 
population globally, and therefore all the agents are responsible for knowing it The only 
questionable case may be the Citizen of a Poor Country who may lack the necessary 
information The fix is simple - if this is so, then this agent would not meet the requisite 
conditions for moral responsibility 
In the above section I have looked at the case of climate change in light of the 
condition for membership, and the causal and epistemic conditions As long as we are 
examining the harm today, as opposed to 30 years ago, most agents are going to meet 
both the causal and epistemic conditions What this does mean is that my example of the 
conflict in Darfur is likely not going to fit under my account of collective responsibility, 
at least not tracing back to the roots of the conflict in the 1980s The differences between 
agents in the above section are minor, which may, at first, seem implausible However, 
where the differences will emerge will be in the next section, as I look at how 
responsibility is going to be distributed among agents who have been identified as 
morally responsible members of a collective 
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7.4 Attributing Responsibility 
In this next section I will explore the attributions of moral responsibility In this 
section responsibility is now sensitive to the differences between agents within the 
collectives Allowing for different levels of responsibility will address concerns of 
unfairness Here is the formula for responsibility reduction and distribution 
Reduction of Collective Responsibility to Individuals: Agents of collectives who have 
been deemed members of a collective, and have met the causal and epistemic conditions 
are responsible for the collective harm m one of the three ways 
(1) As Order Givers, 
(2) As Order Followers, or 
(3) As Supporters 
All three types of agents are responsible, however responsibility is portioned out 
according to which role the agent has m the collective The most responsibility will be 
portioned to the Order Givers, less to Order Followers, and the least to Supporters 
As discussed in Chapter 6, when individual moral responsibility is assessed we begin the 
analysis anew It does not matter what these agents did in order to be considered 
responsible members of the collective, only that they are responsible members To 
determine individual responsibility the focus changes from membership to what role 
agents had in the collective In order to determine individual moral responsibility I will 
return to my list of responsible agents From that list the President of Country X will fall 
into the category of Order Giver, the CEO of a Car Company and the Small Business 
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Owner will fall into the category of Order Followers, and the Family in North America 
and the Citizen of a Poor Country will be in the third category of Supporters These 
classifications are based on some assumptions about the individuals which I will look at 
below Through the analysis of the agents and their roles the categories will be further 
fleshed out 
Starting with the Order Givers, here I have placed the President of Country X 
Now the status of Country X becomes relevant There is an argument to be made that 
when looking at a harm such as climate change, which requires a global perspective, the 
political class, including the national leader, of less developed countries may not fit the 
definition of Order Giver However, the level of power that such individuals have in their 
own countries (if not globally) means that they will remain comphcit to a higher degree 
than others in the collective, but that perhaps an argument could be made that they would 
fit into the role of Order Followers 
With concerns about the power of individual political regimes (globally) put to the 
side, it is clear that when dealing with a collective harm, the role of the President (or, 
more accurately, all the members of the political class) in a country indicates they are in a 
position of power Here we are no longer worrying about the carbon emissions of the 
President, but rather the carbon emissions that result because the political class has 
structured their country (through democratic means) in the way that they have As I 
discussed in Chapter 2, at the G8 meeting in 2009 India said it would only limit its 
greenhouse gas emissions when they reached the same emissions, per capita, as that in 
developed countries 7 Presidents and the political class do have the power to enact 
democratic change in their own countries to limit, or increase, greenhouse gas emissions 
7
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They are in a position to negotiate with other nations The political class is in a position 
both of power and perspective, and can see the country as a collective in a way that 
citizens cannot This position and perspective also puts the political class in the role of 
receiving the most responsibility for the harm of climate change 
While the position of presidents (and the political class) as the most responsible in 
climate change may not be contentious (or even surprising), those who comprise the next 
two categones may require additional defence In the role of Order Followers I placed the 
CEO of a Car Company, and the Small Busmess Owner Recall from the previous chapter 
I identified Heinnch Himmler as an Order Giver, and the Guards as Order Followers In 
the Nazi death camp example the term Order Follower fit well with the role of the guards, 
who were doing exactly that, following orders they have been given In the case of 
climate change the analysis will not be as simple The terms Order Giver and Order 
Follower are more metaphorical in this case What made the President and political class 
in Country X Order Givers was their position and perspective on the role of the citizens, 
and potentially on the role of other people who are not citizens What makes the CEO and 
Small Business Owner Order Followers will be their positions within the collective and 
power as well The CEO and the Small Business Owner are both types of social leaders 
The CEO likely employs hundreds or thousands or more employees, and the Small 
Business Owner employs a few In both cases they have a position similar to that of the 
political class described above, except that those over which they have power is much 
smaller, and further, what distinguishes these agents from the political class is that they 
are both working withm the system (laws and regulations) that were created by the 
political class through democratic means So while they both have power over others in 
the collective, and perspective, they exist in a system where they are themselves obeying 
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already existing rules While the political class has the power to introduce policy, laws, 
and generally affect the lives of citizens, the CEO and Small Business Owner have the 
power to do these same things m a more restricted way on a smaller population 
I indicated that the CEO and Small Business Owner were both types of social 
leaders Will the analysis above hold true for other kinds of social leaders, perhaps a 
church pastor, a teacher, or even parents in a family? While an argument could be made 
that these would fall into such a category, what is the determining factor is the perspective 
and power that individuals have in their role as social leader While a church pastor may 
have great influence over his congregation, what he cannot do is enforce certain actions 
Teachers can only enforce or restrict behaviour in the classroom itself (and are governed 
on such enforcement and restriction by others), and parents in a family are in a similar 
position So what sets the CEO and Small Business Owner apart from other kinds of 
social leaders is that they can set policies in their respective workplaces They both have 
the perspective to see what will happen, and power to make changes 
It may seem odd to place the CEO and the Small Business Owner in the same 
category Especially considering that the CEO is a CEO of a Car Company If carbon 
emissions from transportation are one of the leading causes of climate change, should not 
the CEO bear greater responsibility than the Small Business Owner? This is a surface 
analysis that seeks to penalize those we wish were acting differently It is like creating a 
difference between the individual who drives an SUV and the one who drives a hybrid 
compact car We want to say there is a moral difference between these two actions I am 
not going to argue that the difference in choices made by these individuals is not relevant 
to their moral status, but it is irrelevant to their position within the collective, a position 
that has already been determined by their participation and that they met the causal and 
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epistemic conditions In both cases of the business owners and the car owners, they will 
fall under the same degree of complicity The question is, does this make sense9 
Collective harms are collective The entire purpose of this method of 
responsibility attribution is to keep the collective nature of the harm intact when 
determining responsibility of individual agents The harm of climate change is not simply 
shorthand for too many people dnving SUVs What has happened in the case of climate 
change, and in the case of most large unstructured harms, is a certain kind of culture has 
developed which supports the practices that are causing the problems And it is this 
culture which is relevant to discussions of responsibility As I have discussed already 
responsibility of agents has to do with their power to affect others (and how many others 
they can affect) and their perspective on the actions of others A culture which creates an 
economy which makes SUVs a valid vehicle choice is the problem, not Bob driving an 
SUV A culture which supports commuting hours to work is the problem, and Suzy 
dnving a hybnd compact does not solve that problem unless the culture changes so that is 
the only vehicle choice available (although driving a hybnd may impact Suzy's 
responsibility) In much the same way the CEO is responsible because he has the power 
and perspective relevant in collective action situations He could create policies for his 
employees to reward those who carpool, or he could put in showers for bikers These are 
only cursory solutions to climate change, but they are within his power to do Further, the 
CEO can see the impact of a policy on the actions of all his employees Let's say the 
Small Business Owner owns a tiny accounting practice specializing in tax claims While 
tax claims do not have a carbon footprint (beyond perhaps the paper or electricity used in 
the office), the employees do The Owner could take the same measures as the CEO to 
change the actions of her employees In this case the Order Followers are not responsible 
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for the market in which they work This responsibility belongs to all (or perhaps the 
political class because of their role in regulation and law) Order Followers are working 
withm the system as it exists What they are able to do is influence the actions of certain 
people, those over which they have authority, which would be their employees 
When the analysis turns to attributions of responsibility the type of analysis 
changes dramatically, instead of focusing on the actions that have entered an agent into 
the collective, and identified them as responsible, the analysis regarding attributions of 
responsibility starts afresh The agents being examined here have passed the requisite 
hurdles and are responsible members of the collective Concerns over epistemology and 
causality of actions (connected to the initial harm) no longer apply once the determination 
of responsibility has been made By pulling apart the concept of responsibility from the 
attribution of responsibility we avoid many of the problems noted throughout this 
dissertation One of the mam critiques about agent control (or lack thereof), was that 
agents could only be responsible for what they could control This manifested as a claim 
that an agent, in the case of climate change for example, could only be responsible for 
their carbon emissions, either in their entirety or just those that were above their carbon 
share It was their emissions that causally connected them to the group harm, and it was 
their emissions for which they were responsible Such analysis, although initially 
plausible, failed to capture the nature of collective harms The problem is that if we do not 
understand harms in a certain collective way, they disappear However, if we attribute 
responsibility in such a way that disconnects the agent from their action that they can 
control, it seems that we are holding them unfairly responsible By pulling apart the two 
ideas, we can answer both of these problems The causal contribution of an agent (as 
determined by participation) is important for membership in the collective Therefore, not 
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being responsible is within the ability of the agent herself There are many clauses that 
contain caveats that if the agent distances themselves through action and language, if their 
action is not in line with their desires, if they (though no fault of their own) do not know 
the nature of their action, then they will not be responsible However, agents who do meet 
the criteria are responsible What they are responsible for, their level of culpability, 
depends on a different analysis, one that looks at a collective harm as a collective harm 
And here the important characteristics of the agent are their power, their position, and 
their perspective in a collective 
In the first two roles, that of Order Givers and Order Followers, power, position 
and perspective has been fairly easy to determine The final category of Supporters is by 
far the most interesting As I discussed in Chapter 6 where the Supporters were the bread 
bakers, it seems acceptable at first to believe the bread bakers are caught up in a 
collective action, but that they are not really responsible, not like the Order Givers and 
Followers In the analysis of climate change I identified a Family in North America and 
the Citizen in a Poor Country as examples of Supporters The Family in North America 
represents individuals who live in the culture, with no special power, position or 
perspective The Citizen in a Poor Country represents an individual who has very limited 
carbon contributions because their capital is so limited This person could represent Saha 
from India, or residents of the Republic of the Maldives Again, in this case the important 
determinants of position, power and perspective are nonexistent So if position, power 
and perspective are the keys to responsibility, are the Supporters not really responsible at 
all? 
While position, power and perspective were important in the case of Order Givers 
and Order Followers, the fact that they are not mirrored m the case of Supporters does not 
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mean that responsibility is nonexistent for these agents In fact, Supporters do have 
position, power and perspective, if in a much different way Supporters have position in 
that they have been deemed members of the responsible collective, so through their 
participation and responsibility they are in a position to either remain m the collective or 
not Supporters have power over their own actions, and their own desires (recall desire is 
crucial in the causal condition for collective responsibility) Additionally, as I have 
argued elsewhere, perception of membership affects strength of the collective itself, so 
Supporters who are going to make up the majority of the collective, have that power as 
well Perspective is a little more difficult in the case of Supporters as they are 
characterised by their focus on the self, not the collective, and they have no particular 
reason to suspect that their action has impact on the collective itself However, what they 
do possess is perspective in that they have met the epistemic condition They should 
know that the harm is collective, and that their individual actions are contributing to it So 
while they might lack the perspective of seeing how all the pieces of a society work 
together to create the problem, what they should have is perspective on their own actions 
which are contributing 
In Chapter 1 I looked at Christopher Kutz's argument against the validity of 
agents compartmentalising their actions Kutz presented the example of an engineer who 
worked for a company that produced landmines and sold them to third world countries 
The engineer may excuse her own actions claiming that she is, "just doing her job " Kutz 
critiqued this, and identified it as a type of self deception I would argue that many 
Supporters will see themselves in a similar light as the engineer They will see their 
impact as necessary for them to live the kind of lives they want to lead, and that the 
culture in which they exist was not created by them, and cannot be altered by them 
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Moving to carbon neutrality is extremely burdensome on the agent, and in some cases 
- may actually be impossible Further, complicity for the harm of climate change can be 
determined not only through participation via causal contribution, but also through 
gaining a sense of identity, as long as this is reciprocal This seems to suggest that agents 
would also have to remove themselves from their culture in order to leave the responsible 
collective A Supporter may likely believe that their membership is not within their 
control, and that as such they should not be responsible 
However, once again the answer to this must be no The difficulty agents face to 
excuse themselves, or the tendency to self-deceive regarding their membership, is not 
relevant to whether they bear responsibility for the harm or not So I will put aside such 
excuses, and turn to examine the Family in North America and the Citizen in a Poor 
Country The Family, having met the requisite conditions to be considered collectively 
responsible, is acting within the norms of the culture m which they live They buy two 
cars to support two commuting providers, they buy food from far away in order to offer 
interesting food to their family, they participate in the many aspects of a society that have 
harmful effects, be it going to a golf course occasionally, or driving around a cottage lake 
with a motorboat The participation of the Family in each of these normal activities 
contributes to the pressure to normalize on others Everyone is eating guacamole this 
summer, so everyone is shipping in produce from far away The belief that such activities 
are normal leads individuals to self-deceive regarding their harm However, as mentioned 
above, such self-deception is not an excuse The Family works at the companies of the 
CEO and the Small Business Owner, they buy the products from these companies, they 
vote for the political class The Family is in fact the currency that is required in order for 
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the collective action to occur What limits the degree of responsibility of the Family is 
that they do not have a position of leadership in the collective 
The Citizen in a Poor Country will be in much the same position as the Family 
While those living in undeveloped countnes will have much lighter carbon footpnnts than 
those living in the developed countnes, any carbon footpnnt is a problem As I discussed 
m Chapter 2 all carbon emissions are harmful at this point It might be the case that in the 
future, if carbon emissions decrease significantly, we could treat carbon as a kind of 
allowance, and everyone would get their share, however, at this point such discussions are 
premature To those who are suffenng from the harms of climate change, the fact that 
someone is contnbuting only as much carbon as would be allowed if the carbon sinks 
were not being overused will sound tnte Those in the developed world with the highest 
per capital carbon emissions could claim that if the global population were half what it is, 
their emissions would not be harmful Once again, this argument is nonsensical What we 
must focus on is that carbon emissions, in any amount, are harmful currently, and 
therefore any emissions will enter agents into the collective 
With the complicity of agents outlined, I want to return again to those who will be 
excused from responsibility At the first stage of analysis those who distance themselves 
from the collective through action and language will not be members of the collective 
But what does this mean9 I mentioned that those like David Suzuki and Al Gore, both 
celebnty environmental activists, have succeeded in distancing themselves in just this 
way Now, what you might note is that I am not claiming that Suzuki and Gore live 
carbon neutral lives So you may ask why are Suzuki and Gore not members of the 
responsible collective, but that the Citizen of a Poor Country is9 This concern anses from 
the traditional concept of individual responsibility where we require the agents to be the 
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cause of the harm for which they are being held responsible, and greater harm equals 
greater responsibility Under my theory cause remains important in determining 
membership but not m attributing responsibility to members of the responsible collective 
Under my account the idea of participation in a harmful collective cause is broadened to 
include more psychological elements including attitudes, and creating a culture of 
support These actions would not normally be sufficient under traditional accounts of 
moral responsibility So when the Citizen of a Poor Country is compared to an 
environmental celebrity the point of comparison - carbon emissions - is misleading 
What the environmental celebnties are doing is speaking out against the collective actions 
and the culture that supports it, they are providing education on the nature of the 
collective harm, providing insight on how people can change, and limiting their carbon 
footprint Through action and language they have distanced themselves from the 
collective This will impact the strength of the collective itself The Citizen of a Poor 
Country with her limited carbon emissions is part of the culture that endorses carbon 
emissions She is considered a collaborator by the others in the collective This is the key 
difference between her and the environmental celebnties 
What you will notice in my account is that there is a kind of psychological 
profiling of the collective embedded in the account I do not see this as a move away from 
philosophy, but rather is reflective of the differences between collective actions and 
individual actions And further, I am not commenting on what will be required to cause 
change, because I am not treating this as a problem to be solved in game theory As I 
argued in Chapter 2 collective action problems are focussed on the practicalities of 
change in the collective I am concerned with the morality of actions of individuals who 
are members of collectives The practical questions of how agents may reverse climate 
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change or how a collective solution may occur is for another paper and another 
discussion To hand wave at this momentarily, it seems that global cooperation will be 
required by world leaders (or Order Givers) But this is just a guess, and, as I said, does 
not affect the responsibility of the agents The reason that distancing through acts of 
language and action is relevant is because in situations of collective action distancing 
oneself in such a public manner weakens the collective, and shows alternative ways of 
being to other members While collective action and game theory cannot tell us what is 
morally right or wrong, what it does show us is what consequences the action of 
distancing will cause, and this adds to the moral value of the actions themselves 
In the previous sections I have provided the analysis my theory requires of climate 
change - a large unstructured harm I have shown who is a member of the collective, who 
meets the conditions for responsibility, and how levels of responsibility are to be 
attributed The idea that the world leaders are the most responsible for the current 
situation is hardly surpnsmg, their power and influence create a greater burden to act than 
that which falls on agents in their societies Additionally, responsibility for those who 
similarly have power over other individuals, such as business owners, is also intuitive 
The most problematic attribution of responsibility is that for the Supporters, for these are 
the members that will most often be self deceived as to their involvement because their 
contributions seem small and inconsequential They cannot control the global decision 
But this feeling of smallness is inevitable in large unstructured harms, as is the feeling of 
not being in control However, when a harm is made up of small harms, or individual 
carbon emissions, then it must be the case that the Supporters are in fact responsible 
Their responsibility will be limited by their lack of power within the collective itself, but 
they will still be responsible This eliminates the ability of agents to claim that there is 
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nothing that they can do about what is happening The qualification that agents can be 
excused from the collective through acts of language and action suggests that exit is not 
out of reach for individuals A few questions remain for my theory, and I turn to those 
next 
7.5 Objections 
Two objections or points of concern with my analysis require more work Some of 
these remain from concerns in Chapter 2, which have actually been answered by my 
account and my analysis provided in this chapter However, before closing this 
discussion, returning to these key issues will act as an effective summary of what has 
changed in this theory The first objection, which was initially raised in Chapter 2, was 
that in the case of climate change the harm is incredibly complex, and, to a certain degree 
unknowable While what we do know is that greenhouse gas emissions are "very likely" 
causing climate change, the time they spend in the atmosphere means we cannot connect 
a specific carbon emission, or year of carbon emissions, to a specific climate event The 
existence of climate feedback loops, and temperature thresholds further complicate 
identification of the harm We cannot wait until climate change is completely quantified 
by science, if it even ever will be This, at first glance, poses a problem for collective 
responsibility for climate change 
I agree that climate change is an incredibly complex harm, however I disagree that 
its complexity affects our ability to attribute responsibility to the members of the 
collective And the reason for this lies in the epistemic condition that agents must meet in 
order to be determined members Backing up a bit, in order for the collective to be 
identified we must have some sense of the harm itself Moving forward with this 
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information agents must pass the epistemic condition in order to be responsible The 
epistemic condition requires that agents know the nature of their participation (or nature 
of the collective action) or that their lack of knowledge is due to falling below some 
applicable standard which is due to their own constitutive attitudes Individual agents, 
except for a few climate scientists perhaps, do not know about the length of time carbon 
exists in the atmosphere, what will happen with feedback loops or when we breach 
temperature thresholds The fact that most agents lack this information is not because of 
some failure of the agent What agents do know (or should know), and now I am speaking 
generally across the globe, is that carbon emissions are causing climate change, and it is 
for this that they will then be responsible Responsibility is contingent upon the 
knowledge of the agents who will bear responsibility, so agents are only responsible for 
what can be known and the complexity of the harm is unimportant At this point the 
complexity of climate change is accepted, and the potential for greater harm, or different 
harms, than have been predicted is already part of what is knowable about climate 
change Climate change is like someone who drives a car when intoxicated The driver 
does not know exactly what damage they may cause, it could be property damage, it 
could be harm to an individual But what they do know is that by getting in the car these 
possibilities exist Much like we would hold the driver responsible for any harm they 
cause through their action, we can hold agents in a collective responsible for currently 
unpredicted harms that result from climate change 
The second concern that I want to raise has to do with the levels of responsibility 
It is appealing, and intuitive, to argue that the President and political class of a Country, 
particularly a country with one of the top ten carbon per capita emissions, bears more 
responsibility for climate change than the Citizen of a Poor Country whose carbon 
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emissions and personal power are very low However, my theory states that the Citizen of 
a Poor Country, and the Family in North Amenca will both be attnbuted the same level of 
responsibility Since their carbon emissions will be vastly different, is it truly coherent to 
suggest that these agents bear the same level of responsibility for climate change*? 
I could have proposed a much more complicated theory, perhaps with fifty 
different levels of responsibility instead of three I could have attached power and 
position as elements of responsibility to causal contnbution to the harm However, such a 
theory would struggle with contnbutions that create attitudes, environments, and persuade 
others in the collective to act in a certain way In fact, such a theory would likely consider 
those who produce carbon as more responsible than those in leadership positions This 
would bnng back questions of control over the action that is causing the level of 
responsibility of the agent It may be the case that in a particular country or city a 
commuter lifestyle is required Perhaps an agent lives in a remote and cold region which 
would mean they use more fuel than those who live in warm and easily accessible 
climates Perhaps an agent has allergies that require her to only consume, for health 
reasons, foods that produce more emissions than others In all of these cases agents emit 
the emissions that they do because of conditions that are outside of their control In order 
to keep from holding agents responsible for such factors of their lives, and instead for 
their contnbution (or participation) and their role in the collective, I am actually 
acknowledging the social nature of agent's lives, of collective action, and keeping 
responsibility to elements of agents' lives over which they have the greatest control 
So the answer to the cntique is that yes, the Family in North Amenca and the 
Citizen of a Poor Country both participate in the collective in the same role, so regardless 
of differences in their per capita carbon emissions, they will be attnbuted the same level 
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of responsibility for climate change My account does not forget important differences 
between agents, but rather brings to the forefront considerations that come from the 
collective nature of the actions of the agents m the collective And it is this participation 
in the collective that is most important in collective harms 
This conclusion will seem counterintuitive to some, and the reason for this 
uncertainty is because of the different in causal contribution each agent makes In 
traditional theories of individual moral responsibility the casual impact of an agent is 
vitally important in determining the responsibility that agent will bear Further, such 
causal impact must be within the agent's control, or they will be excused But the case of 
climate change is not a case of individual moral responsibility, but collective 
responsibility The causal contributions of agents may make them members of the 
collective, but it is not the single determinant of responsibility Collective actions are not 
the same as individual actions, and so it is our intuitions that need to shift in these cases 
Part of what makes an action collective and not simply an aggregate of agents acting 
independently, are the shared attitudes, cultures, and reinforcing beliefs among members 
The actions of the Citizen in the Poor Country, much like those of the Family in North 
America, reinforce and encourage the collective action that is causing climate change 
This shift away from the overwhelming emphasis on the casual contribution of 
agents is mirrored in the excusing condition for agents Agents can avoid membership in 
harm causing collectives by distancing themselves through publicly recognised actions 
and language An agent who does this need not eliminate all their causal contributions -
David Suzuki and Al Gore both present examples of agents who have succeeded in 
avoiding collective responsibility while it is highly unlikely they are succeeding in living 
completely carbon neutral lives The reason their causal contributions do not implicate 
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Suzuki and Gore is that in the case of collective responsibility it is not just about causal 
contribution Agents contribute to collective harms in a number of ways, one of which is 
by supporting the collective action or validating the collective behaviour This is how my 
account can hold agents responsible depending on their role in the collective, attributing 
more responsibility to those in leadership positions It may be the case that on a purely 
causal account the political class of a nation produce the least amount of carbon emissions 
of any citizens Or, as can be the case, the richer economic classes have low carbon 
emissions because they are able to afford the more expensive products that use green 
technology If we were to look at a purely causal account, those in the poorer economic 
classes would be more responsible for climate change even though they have the least 
power in their societies, and are working withm a system that was not created by them 
Attributing the most responsibility for climate change to those with the least power is 
counterintuitive 
Returning to the Citizen in a Poor Country and a Family in North America our 
intuitions should begin to shift It is not the carbon emissions that really concern us here, 
because if I was to show that the Citizen in a Poor Country actually has higher per capita 
emissions that the Family in North America, it is unlikely that we would feel that the 
Family was being unfairly held accountable The relevant difference between these two 
groups is what power we perceive they have in regards to this harm, and their ability to 
change This power of the individual withm the collective is central to attributions of 
responsibility for collective harms, which should, when looking at causes of collective 
harms, fall squarely withm our intuitions Additionally, all agents are able to exit the 
collective, not by becoming carbon neutral, (which again, will be extremely difficult and 
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potentially impossible for some agents) but rather by publicly denouncing the activities of 
the collective, and changing their actions 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this conclusion I have examined the case of climate change, and subjected it to 
my theory of collective responsibility My analysis has been able to address climate 
change as a complex action without requiring any arbitrary restrictions or simplifications 
My analysis has captured the actions of most of the global population, but additionally 
has provided sound theoretical argumentation as to why the leaders of countnes will bear 
a greater load of responsibility for climate change than citizens, but that citizens will not 
be without responsibility 
My theory has addressed the gaps in theories of collective responsibility, 
including those of Margaret Gilbert and Christopher Kutz that I discussed in Chapter 1 I 
have proposed a way to address a collective that both Gilbert and Kutz struggled with, 
and I did so without collectivising the conditions for individual moral responsibility 
Instead I changed the discussion such that agents have to meet the conditions for 
membership in a collective, and then the conditions that are applied to determine 
responsibility resemble those from traditional accounts of individual moral responsibility 
instead of some collective version of those same conditions The major difference 
between individual responsibility and individual responsibility for collective harms 
occurs with how responsibility is distributed In collective responsibility the role the agent 
has determines their responsibility for the harm 
I have shown in this conclusion that my theory can apply to the case of climate 
change The theory I have proposed addresses the concerns brought up about control, as 
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agents are responsible for what they are choosing to do, even if the resulting action is 
bigger than any they could have done alone Further, agents are able to excuse themselves 
from the collective by participating in a recognised activity by combining action and 
language to publicly distance themselves from, and denounce, the collective Additionally 
my account creates differentiated responsibility which still addresses the harm as 
collective in nature 
Finally, under my account the individual members of collectives do have 
something that they are responsible for Collective responsibility is not just a way of 
describing a certain kind of social phenomenon Being a member of a responsible 
collective has meaning While the aim of this dissertation was not to motivate people to 
alter their behaviour because they were marked as responsible, this theory would succeed 
in doing so (if attributions of responsibility are motivating), a task that Kutz set out for 
himself but failed to accomplish This account identifies the responsibility that each 
member of the responsible collective will bear regarding climate change In this 
dissertation I have only discussed responsibility for collective harms, and not discussed 
blameworthiness of individuals, or punishment What my account can show, because it is 
a differentiated theory of responsibility, is how the burdens of climate change should be 
distributed A harm such as climate change is unlikely to appear in a court, however, 
relocation of the Maldivians, resources for people suffering from droughts, floods, and 
other extreme weather events, and other costs associated with climate change should be 
borne by those with the most responsibility for this harm 
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